¶1concurring specially.
¶2I fully concur in all divisions except Division 2. I do agree that it is not necessary to remand the case for an evidentiary hearing on the claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. First, there was a waiver by defendant’s withdrawal of the motion for new trial; he could have amended it instead, to add the ground. Bailey v. State, 264 Ga. 300 (443 SE2d 836) (1994). Inasmuch as he represented himself in effecting the withdrawal, he cannot bláme new post-trial counsel for this relinquishment. Although in Baileyit was counsel who acted, the pro se defendant is subject to the same requirement. Cf. Brumby v. State, 264 Ga. 215 (443 SE2d 613) (1994).
¶3Even if the pro se appellant did not waive the issue by failing to raise it at the earliest opportunity, i.e., by amending the timely motion for new trial rather than deliberately withdrawing it or filing an *863extraordinary motion as allowed by OCGA § 5-5-41, the instances of alleged ineffectiveness which he specifies may be reviewed on the existing record, as was done in Brundage v. State, 208 Ga. App. 58 (2) (430 SE2d 173) (1993). Compare Norman v. State, 208 Ga. App. 830, 831 (3) (432 SE2d 216) (1993). See Hutton v. State, 192 Ga. App. 239 (384 SE2d 446) (1989) (Beasley, J., dissenting to the remand).
¶4Appellant’s claim is governed by the test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668, 695-696 (104 SC 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984). He must show “(1) that his attorney’s representation was deficient; and (2) that the deficient representation prejudiced his defense, i.e., that a reasonable probability exists that but for the ineffective representation the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Norman, supra at 832.
¶5Three instances of ineffectiveness are asserted.
¶6(1) The first is that trial counsel allowed certain state exhibits, which were prejudicial and disallowed by the court, to be sent out with the jury. Seven exhibits are identified by number.
¶7State’s Exhibit 1 is a map of Atlanta and was admitted by the court.
¶8State’s Exhibits 2A and 2B are blowups of summaries which were admitted by the court.
¶9State’s Exhibit 6 is a blowup of a check and was admitted by the court.
¶10State’s Exhibit 50 is a blowup of a bank check log and was admitted by the court.
¶11State’s Exhibit 51 is a map and was admitted by the court.
¶12State’s Exhibit 103 is a map of NationsBank branches and was admitted by the court.
¶13Thus, none of these exhibits were erroneously sent to the jury. Moreover, they were properly admitted after, as to each, the requisite foundations were laid and the relevancy was established. They related directly to the checks defendant was accused of forging and the bank locations involved. There is no deficiency in counsel’s representation in this regard, much less a deficiency which would raise a reasonable probability of acquittal.
¶14(2) The second instance of alleged ineffectiveness is the failure of counsel to call as a witness Mary Mason (or Munson), to show that the search warrant did not contain the correct unit number of the unit that was searched. Mason was manager of the Briar Valley Apartments where defendant rented an apartment in another name.
¶15Counsel moved, in advance of trial, for suppression of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant. A hearing was held and the court denied the motion. The affidavit and application for a search warrant, and the search warrant, were in evidence. They identify the place as “1639 Briarcliff Apt. #6 (Briar Valley apartments).” This *864was the location that was searched after a pass key was obtained from Mary Mason, according to testimony and the return of service. The name of the lessee was given in the affidavit for the search warrant: “Jeff Stokes alias Stephen Lewis McBride.” A different address as the home address was given on the arrest warrant. Counsel brought this to the attention of the court in his argument at the conclusion of the suppression hearing. Thus there was no necessity for the testimony of the apartment manager to the effect that the unit was not in the name of Stephen Lewis McBride. That was not a disputed fact. Her testimony would not have changed the outcome of the motion hearing, and thus there is no Strickland-tested deprivation. See Cofield v. State, 204 Ga. App. 776, 777 (1) (420 SE2d 597) (1992). Division 10 of the majority opinion, in which I concur, concludes that the denial of the motion to suppress was not error.
¶16It is notable that at the end of the hearing, the court stated to defendant: “Mr. McBride, I will tell you — I have said this very few other times — if I was in trouble on a criminal case this man is one of the folks that I would come to see ... I don’t say that about many people ... He is a good defense attorney.”
¶17(3) The third contention regarding ineffectiveness is that counsel permitted certain proceedings to be conducted in his absence. Defendant brought this to the attention of the court at the conclusion of the trial. He referred to a conference in chambers during jury selection and also to the charge conference.
¶18The court explained that nothing substantive occurred during the first one except the denial of a motion by the state, that it had to be conducted out of the jury’s presence, and that security concerns counseled against defendant’s presence when balanced against the fact that nothing substantive would take place. The court also explained that the charge conference relates to issues of law and is conducted so the attorneys will know before their closing arguments what law the court will charge.
¶19Defendant accepted the court’s response, stating: “Thank you. I appreciate your clarifying that, Your Honor.”
¶20Thus, even if the point was not waived, the failure of counsel to insist on the presence of defendant at these two aspects of the trial neither constitute deficient representation nor raise a reasonable probability that the results of either proceeding or of the trial itself would have been different. As the majority has ruled in Division 11, a ruling with which I agree, it was not error for the court to conduct the charge conference in the absence of defendant.
¶21In sum, an examination of the specific instances of alleged ineffective representation leads inexorably to the conclusion that defendant was not deprived of reasonably effective counsel.