¶1dissenting: I cannot in good conscience concur in the decision of the majority of the court that the petitioner Reid’s constitutional right to the assistance of counsel was satisfied under the totality of circumstances shown in the record in this case. In Avery v. Alabama, 308 U. S. 444, 84 L. Ed. 377, 60 S. Ct. 321, the Supreme Court of the United States stated that the mere formal appointment of counsel, without allowing an opportunity for counsel to confer, to consult with the accused and to prepare his defense, may constitute a violation of the constitutional guaranty of assistance by counsel.
¶2In the past several years the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has considered a number of habeas corpus cases alleging ineffective representation of counsel. Out of these cases has arisen the proposition that late appointments and lack of preparation of counsel, “are inherently prejudicial, and a mere showing of them constitutes a prima facie case of denial of effective assistance of counsel, so that the burden of proving lack of prejudice is shifted to the state.” Twiford v. Peyton, 372 F. 2d 670, 673 ( 4th Cir. 1967); Johnson v. Cox, 315 F. Supp. 875 (D. C. Va. 1970). In Turner v. State of Maryland, 318 F. 2d 852 ( 4th Cir. 1963), the court stated that when the initial consultation between a court-appointed attorney and his client occurs only a short time before the trial, normally, in the absence of clear proof that no prejudice resulted, the court should be obliged to treat the lawyer’s representation as inadequate and the trial as falling short of the standards of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. In Johnson v. Cox, supra, the standards required of attorneys appointed to defend indigent defendants are stated to be as follows:
“Counsel for an indigent defendant should be appointed promptly. Counsel should be afforded a reasonable opportunity to prepare to defend an accused. Counsel must confer with his client without undue delay and as often as *304necessary, to advise him of his rights and to elicit matters of defense or to ascertain that potential defenses are unavailable. Counsel must conduct appropriate investigations, both factual and legal, to determine if matters of defense can be developed, and to allow himself enough time for reflection and preparation for trial. An omission or failure to abide by these requirements constitutes a denial of effective representation of counsel unless the state, on which is cast the burden of proof once a violation of these precepts is shown, can establish lack of prejudice thereby. Coles v. Peyton, 389 F. 2d 224, 226 (4th Cir.). . . .” (p. 877.)
¶3The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice pertaining to The Defense Function set forth with particularity the basic duties of a lawyer for the accused necessary to satisfy his obligations to the accused and to the administration of justice. Under The Defense Function, Standard 1.1, it is stated that the basic duty which the lawyer for the accused owes to the administration of justice is to serve as the accused’s counselor and advocate, with corn-age, devotion and to the utmost of his learning and ability, and according to law. Standard 4.1 declares that it is the duty of the lawyer to conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to guilt and degree of guilt or penalty. The investigation should always include efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the accused’s admissions or statements to the lawyer of facts constituting guilt or his stated desire to plead guilty. Standard 3.8 states that the lawyer has a duty to keep his client informed of the developments in the case and the progress of preparing the defense. Standard 3.9 declares that once the lawyer has taken the representation of an accused, his duties and obligations are the same whether he is privately retained, appointed by the court, or serving in a legal aid or defender system.
¶4With these cases and standards in mind let us turn to the undisputed evidence which is set forth in the record in this case and which establishes the following factual circumstances:
¶5(1) The alleged assault which was the basis of the charge in this case took place on October 8, 1968. The petitioner Reid was placed in solitary confinement in the Adjustment and Treatment Center in the penitentiary on October 9, 1968. His plea of guilty was entered on December 9, 1969, at which time he had been in solitary confinement for approximately 14 months.
¶6(2) On March 28, 1969, two charges of assault with intent to kill *305were filed against Reid. He requested but was denied counsel at his preliminary hearing which was held on April 10, 1969.
¶7(3) An information was filed in the district court of Leavenworth county on April 24, 1969. On June 5, 1989, Mr. James N. Snyder, Jr., a Leavenworth attorney was appointed to represent Reid. There is nothing in the record to show that Reid appeared personally in court at the time of this appointment and apparently he did not do so.
¶8(4) After Snyder was appointed to represent Reid, Reid wrote many letters to Snyder. Snyder never went to the penitentiary to confer with Reid nor did he answer his letters. Snyder never saw or conferred with Reid until the day Reid’s plea of guilty was entered, December 9,1969. '
¶9(5) After Snyder’s appointment on June 5, 1969, Reid, not having an opportunity to confer with his appointed counsel, discussed the case with representatives of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation and requested them to advise the county attorney that he wanted to come into court and plead guilty. The county attorney set the case for trial after he received a letter from Reid to that effect. Reid testified that he wrote the letter because he was told that was the only way he could get out of solitary confinement.
¶10(6) Reid was not able to consult with his appointed counsel until after the county attorney had set the case for plea. At that time the decision to enter a plea had already been made by Reid without the advice of counsel and counsel did not make his services available to Reid until the very day the plea had been scheduled for hearing before the court.
¶11The character of Snyder’s legal representation of Reid can best be shown from Snyder’s testimony at the 60-1507 hearing in December 1971. On direct examination Snyder testified that he was vaguely familiar with Reid and apparently he had received an appointment to represent him; that he had no records which he had maintained in the case; that he had no independent recollection as to what transpired when Reid entered his plea of guilty; that he never visited Reid at the Kansas State Penitentiary after his appointment. His recollection was that Reid was anxious to plead guilty and had written a letter to the county attorney’s office to that effect. Snyder did not know how long he discussed the matter with Reid on the day the plea was entered, maybe for one hour, maybe 30 minutes, maybe 15 minutes. Prior to the entry of the *306plea he discussed plea bargaining with the county attorney. The result was to get one assault count dropped and the county attorney agreed not to enforce the habitual criminal act on the remaining count. The county attorney showed Snyder an admission made by Reid. There was no way to win the case. Snyder further testified that when Reid expressed his desire to plead guilty he may have stated that he wanted to plead guilty because he wanted to get out of solitary confinement.
¶12In denying Reid’s motion for relief under 60-1507 the trial court made no findings of fact to justify its conclusion that the movant had failed to establish that his rights were prejudiced by not having an attorney to represent him and that his plea of guilty was not freely and voluntarily entered. Furthermore the trial court placed the burden of proving prejudice on the petitioner rather than upon the state where under the federal decisions discussed above it properly belonged in view of the fact that the initial consultation between Reid and his court-appointed attorney occurred only a short time before the plea of guilty was entered. When the undisputed facts which establish the type of legal representation afforded Reid in this case by his counsel are considered in the light of the obligations of defense counsel under the federal decisions and the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice discussed above, I cannot reach any other conclusion but that the defendant was denied his constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. I would reverse the case with directions to the trial court to set aside the conviction and Reid’s plea of guilty and to proceed to trial on the original information filed in the case.