Hamilton v. Dackman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 15 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[Dr. Simon] opined that the Appleton Street property was a source of [the plaintiffs] exposure to lead-based paint. He assumed from the age of the Appleton Street property that it contained lead-based paint (invoking Md.Code Regs. 26.16.01.03(A) (2013)).[ 20 ] When asked to describe the basis for his opinion that the Appleton Street property contained lead-based paint, Dr. Simon admitted that he assumed the presence of lead both there and at the Harlem Avenue property from the properties’ age....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith · Hamilton v. Kirson Alston v. 2700 Virginia

2. “We did not mean to suggest in Dow, [ 144 Md.App. 67 , 796 A.2d 139 ,] or elsewhere, that plaintiffs must rule out all other potential sources in all cases. That process of elimination revived the plaintiffs case in Dow , and[,] on the other hand, the expert’s inability to eliminate that uncertainty in Taylor[, 207 Md.App. at 142 , 51 A.3d at 755-56 ,] contributed to our holding that summary judgment was appropriate there. iüoss[, 430 Md. at 670-71 , 63 A.3d at 13-15 ,] went the extra step, too, in suggesting that[,] even though a plaintiff need not produce an expert to establish causation, there are still limits to the inferences in a plaintiffs favor that yet could allow summary judgment. That suggestion does not mean, though, that[,] as a matter of law, a plaintiff cannot create a genuine [dispute] of [material] fact that a property probably was responsible for something [that was] less than all of a plaintiffs demonstrated lead exposure. To be sure, that would be a hard case — among other things, such a plaintiff would need to produce probability-level evidence as to exposure at each property separately. But the fact that such, a case might be hard to prove doesn’t make it impossible, and the fact that a lead-exposed child might have lived or spent time in more than one lead-based-painted property should not foreclose that child as a matter of law from pursuing any one of those potential sources — as long as he [or she] is able to rule in the subject property in the first ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith

3. “[A] plaintiff bears the burden to establish the presence of lead in the child’s environment, and cannot just assume it merely from the age or location of the house. We also recognize the real-life evidentiary challenges that proving lead paint injuries poses (based on practical realities like the relocation of residents and subsequent gut-rehabilitation or remediation of properties that improves present living conditions but spoils potential evidence pertinent to a plaintiffs lawsuit), but we have declined the invitation to assume causation away. [A] plaintiff must connect the dots between a particular lead-laden environment and a particular child. By allowing a plaintiff to meet this burden with circumstantial evidence, we recognize that the causal path may not always reveal itself fully through documents, real-time tests or inspections of the property, or other forms of direct evidence. But just as a plaintiff cannot assume causation, he cannot surmount this hurdle through speculation — the overarching principle, which is neither new nor indigenous to lead paint cases, is that “[cjircumstantial evidence may support a negligence determination if it ‘amount[sj to a reasonable likelihood or probability rather than a possibility.’ ””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 219 Md. App. 452 - Roy v. Dackman