213 N.E.3d
Volume 213 — North Eastern Reporter, Third Series
12 opinions
- 213 N.E.3d 117State v. Bradshaw (2023)
MOTION TO SEVER EVID.R. 404(B) INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL RAPE SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE MANIFEST WEIGHT REAGAN TOKES LAW INDEFINITE SENTENCE. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant-appellant's motion to sever. The trial court did not commit plain error by permitting other-acts evidence. Defendant-appellant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant-appellant's rape convictions are supported by sufficient evidence. Defendant-appellant's rape convictions are not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The indefinite-sentencing provisions of the Reagan Tokes Law do not violate the separation-of-powers doctrine or infringe upon defendant-appellant's right to due process.
- 213 N.E.3d 170State v. Strickland (2023)
Trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion to vacate void conviction
- 213 N.E.3d 226Mosholder v. Briae Hill Stone Co. (2023)
Summary judgment lease to quarry stone
- 213 N.E.3d 260Matthews v. Springfield-Clark CTC Bd. of Edn. (2023)
The trial court erred in finding that appellant-board of education violated due process and fundamental fairness when it terminated appellee from a nonteaching custodial position. The trial court also erred in failing to accord any deference to appellant's findings and in blatantly substituting its judgment for that of appellant. Given these conclusions, appellant's other assignments of error concerning the court's damages award are moot. Judgment reversed and remanded, with instructions for the trial court to affirm appellant's decision to terminate appellee's employment.
- 213 N.E.3d 730Bostick v. Salvation Army (2023)
Summary judgment race discrimination unlawful retaliation wrongful termination in violation of public policy. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer where the employee failed to establish a prima facie case of race discrimination or unlawful retaliation. Further, the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the employer on the employee's wrongful termination claim where the employee failed to demonstrate that (1) a clear public policy existed (2) the employee's dismissal jeopardized the public policy (3) the dismissal was motivated by conduct related to the public policy and (4) the employer lacked an overriding legitimate business justification for the dismissal. Rather, the record demonstrates that in her 11-month period of employment with the employer, the employee was continually unable to get along with her coworkers and that was the reason for her termination.
- 213 N.E.3d 780Miller v. AutoZone Stores, L.L.C. (2023)
Appellant, a business invitee, fell and sustained injuries as she was walking from a vehicle toward the front door of appellee's business. Appellant identified a parking stop located immediately in front of the vehicle she had exited as the cause of the fall. The trial court granted summary judgment to appellee under the open and obvious doctrine. On this record, the parking stop, as a matter of law, was open and obvious, and there was no factual basis to support a conclusion that an attendant circumstance contributed to the fall. Judgment affirmed.
- 213 N.E.3d 800State v. Deckard (2023)
The trial court erred in overruling appellant's motion to suppress drug evidence found in his possession. University police officers lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity to justify stopping appellant as he was walking across a university-owned parking lot carrying a guitar. Judgment reversed and remanded.
- 213 N.E.3d 808State v. Thornton (2023)
The trial court erred in finding that there was no reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop and in granting defendant-appellee's motion to suppress. Considering the totality of the circumstances, the officers initially had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry stop. Additionally, appellee failed to submit to a show of authority by the police and was not seized until after he had fled on foot and had been observed holding and then discarding a firearm by that time, the officers had additional reasonable articulable suspicion to justify a Terry stop. Finally, appellee abandoned the firearm in his possession when he threw it to the ground while being pursued by police, thereby relinquishing any reasonable expectation of privacy in it. Judgment reversed.
- 213 N.E.3d 829Natl. Church Residences First Community Village v. Kessler (2023)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT CONTRACT AGENCY R.C. 1337.092 NURSING HOME REFORM ACT. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee.
- 213 N.E.3d 1175State v. Watson (2023)
- 213 N.E.3d 1212Dayton v. Parson (2023)
The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to employer on employee's workers' compensation claim. The undisputed facts established that the injury arose out of a personal dispute between the employee and a co-worker that was entirely unrelated to the performance of any duty related to her employment. Judgment affirmed.
- 213 N.E.3d 1240State v. Kocevar (2023)
The trial court correctly found that the sexual assault charges against appellant should not have been severed for trial because the evidence was simple and direct. The State did not unjustifiably delay in prosecuting appellant any delay was the result of the victims' delay in reporting sexual assaults to the police. Appellant was not deprived of any constitutional rights by being tried and sentenced as an adult. Under R.C. 2152.02(C)(3), R.C. 2152.12((J), and R.C. 2151.23(I), the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction over appellant because he was 22 years old when the indictment was filed. These statutes remove juvenile jurisdiction over persons who are not taken into custody or apprehended until after they attain 21 years of age. Thus, no equal protection violation exists because appellant was not similarly situated to persons who are still subject to the juvenile court's jurisdiction. Appellant was also not subjected to cruel and unusual punishment. Both before and after appellant's alleged crimes, there was no change in any relevant statutes defining children over whom a juvenile court could exercise jurisdiction. As a result, when appellant allegedly committed the crimes, he had notice that he could be tried in adult court rather than remaining in juvenile court. Appellant's sentence also did not shock the conscience. Moreover, because no pertinent statutory changes occurred after the alleged crimes were committed, no laws imposed additional punishment on appellant for purposes of ex post facto prohibitions against increased punishment. Finally, because no error occurred, no cumulative error existed. Judgment affirmed.