Volume 214 — Illinois Reports

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—-heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. C. G. NEELY, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Kankakee county; the Hon. A. W. DESELM, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Stark county; the Ho.n. B. F. Thompson, Judge, presiding.</p>

R. P. Goodwin, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court for-the First District affirming a judgment for $3500, rendered by the superior court of Cook county, in an action on the case, brought by Hannah Bennett, the appellee, against the Chicago City Railway Company, the appellant, to recover damages for a personal injury sustained by her through the alleged negligence of the appellant.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. L. D. PuTERBAugh, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Coles county; the Hon. James W. Craig, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Mandamus—one seeking to enforce rights as an officer. must shotv he is an officer de jure. One seeking by mandaimts to compel his restoration to the office of police patrolman must show in the petition that the office legally exists and that he is lawfully entitled to hold the same 'and exercise the duties and powers thereof.</p> <p>2. Same—de facto officer cannot claim benefit of act of April 2, 1903. ' A showing in a petition for mandamus that the .petitioner was a de facto member of the police department does not entitle him to claim the protection of section 12 of the Fire and Police Commissioners act of 1903, (Laws of 1903, p. 99,) providing that no member of the fire or police department who shall have been such for more than one year prior to the passage of the act shall be discharged except for cause, upon written charges.</p> <p>3. Office—office of police patrolman must be created by ordinance. The office of police patrolman or policeman, to have a legal existence, must be created by ordinance, and it cannot be created by appointment of an incumbent by the mayor and confirmation of the appointment by the council, nor by the mere appropriation of money to pay the salary or compensation of the incumbent.</p> <p>4. Same—when ordinance does not create office of policeman. An ordinance providing that the police department of the city shall consist of certain officers, who shall be ex officio members, and as many policemen as the city council may from time to time provide for, etc., does not create the office of policeman.</p>

<p>1. Evidence—when admission of evidence in an action against a city is not error. Permitting a night watchman, paid by private parties, to testify with other witnesses as to circumstances tending to show constructive notice to the city of an obstruction on the sidewalk is not error, upon the ground that the jury might infer that notice to the watchman was actual notice to the city although he was not in its employ, where such inference is expressly negatived by the instructions.</p> <p>2. Instructions—when party cannot complain that instruction is erroneous. On appeal by a city from a judgment awarding damages, the appellant cannot urge as error an omission from the plaintiff’s instructions upon the doctrine of constructive notice, of the requirement that a reasonable length of time to remove an obstruction from a sidewalk must have elapsed betweei the time the city would be charged with constructive notice of its presence and the time plaintiff was injured, where the instructions for the city on the same subject also omit that requirement.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Lake county; the Hon. C. H. Donnelly, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Wills—statute limiting time for Ming bill to contest will applies to actions previously accrued. Section 7 of the Statute of Wills, as amended in 1903, (Laws of 1903, p. 355,) requiring a bill to contest a will to be filed within one year from the date the will was probated, applies to causes of action which have previously accrued and are not thereby barred at the time the act took effect. (1Sharp v. Sharp, 213 111. 332, followed.)</p>

O. P. Thompson, Judge, presiding. This action was brought in the circuit court of Cook county by the appellée, against the appellants, upon an instrument in writing whereby the appellants agreed to save- and keep harmless J. H. Miller, sheriff of Richland county, North Dakota, intestate of appellee, from all costs, charges, expenses, etc., of every nature whatever, which he might sustain by reason of the seizure by him, as sheriff, of $900 worth of merchandise- situate in…

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Jersey county; the Hon. Charles S. White, Judge, presiding.</p>

Frank K. Dunn, Judge, presiding. On October 1, 1902, W. F. Hartough, an agent of appellees, negligently caused the death of a horse, which he had hired from Hajry B. Sinsabaugh, who was the proprietor of a livery stable, through immoderate and careless driving, while engaged in performing his duties as such agent.

Appear from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. This is a bill,- filed by the appellee on December 9, 1903, in the Superior Court of Cook county to set aside a tax deed upon lots 7 and 8 in block 7 in Browne & Culver’s addition to North Evanston, executed to thfe appellant, Jacob Glos, on June 27, 1903. Answers were filed to the bill by the two defendants below, Jacob Glos and Emma J. Glos, to which replications were filed.

Writ oE Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Moultrie county; the Hon. W. C. Johns, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appear from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. JESSE Hordom, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Special assessments—amendments of 1903 to section 4 of Improvement act are invalid. The amendments.of 1903 to section 4 of the Local Improvement act, which do away with the necessity of a property owners’ petition for an improvement in cities of certain population, are unconstitutional and void. (L'Hote v. Village of Milford, 212 Ill. 418, followed.)</p> <p>2. Same—absence of a property owners’ petition invalidates all steps in the proceeding. Absence of a property owners’ petition for an improvement, where one is required by law, is a defect going to the existence of the proceeding, and all steps taken to levy the assessment are void,</p>

<p>1. Ordinances—lawful ordinance has force of a statute within corporate limits. An ordinance passed by the city council within the legislative power conferred by charter has the same force and effect within the corporate limits as a law passed by the legislature.</p> <p>2. Same—party dealing with city is chargeable with notice of its ordinances. An attorney dealing with a city is chargeable with notice of and is bound by an ordinance creating a legal department, providing for a corporation counsel and prescribing his duties, and providing that the city shall not, in any case, be liable for the services of any attorney except the corporation counsel.</p> <p>3. Municipal corporations—contract by a city for legal services in violation of ordinance is void. A contract for legal services made by a city- in violation of a valid ordinance creating a legal department, providing for the appointment of a corporation counsel and providing that the city shall not be liable for the services of any other attorney, is without authority and void.</p> <p>. 4. Same—city is not estopped to deny validity of contract made without authority. A city is not estopped to deny the validity of a contract which it was without power to make.</p> <p>5. Same—force of ordinance is not affected by resolutions. The force and operation of an existing ordinance as a law is not affected by resolutions of the city council providing for the making of a contract in violation of the terms of the ordinance.</p>

<p>1. Special assessments—holders of vouchers are chargeable with notice of statutory provisions. Special assessment vouchers are issued and received in pursuance of statutory provisions, and holders thereof áre chargeable with notice of such provisions as fully as though they were set forth at large in the vouchers.</p> <p>2. Same—a holder of voucher has notice that property owner may pay assessment in advance. A holder of a special assessment voucher is charged with notice that under the statute a property owner may pay deferred installments in advance and relieve himself of payment of interest.</p> <p>3. Same—holder of voucher must demand payment when funds are collected. It is the duty of a holder of a special assessment voucher to ascertain when sufficient money has been collected to pay the principal and interest and to demand payment, and it is not the duty of the municipality to notify the holder of that fact.</p> <p>4. Same—what interest the holder of voucher is entitled to receive. The interest which the holder of a special assessment voucher is entitled to receive is that, and that only, which the property owners were required by law to pay in order to discharge the lien against their property.</p> <p>5. Same—interst on voucher ceases when money applicable to its payment is in the treasury. Interest upon a voucher issued against a deferred installment of a special assessment ceases, when money legally applicable to the payment of the voucher has reached the treasury of the municipal corporation.</p> <p>6. Same—when supplemental assessment cannot be levied. A supplemental assessment cannot be levied to pay a deficit in interest upon a special assessment voucher caused by the payment by property owners of deferred installments in advance, the fund being allowed by the holder of the voucher to lie idle in the treasury after being paid in.</p>

Theodore BrenTano, Judge, pre- ■ siding. It appears from the record in this case that Silas B. Cobb died April 5,1900, leaving a last will and testament, which is made a part of the bill,, which will was duly probated in the county court of Cook county on May 16, 1900.

R. W. CliEEord, Judge, presiding. On September 3, 1899, Herman Felsenthal died intestate and appellant was appointed administrator of his estate. He found in the Union National Bank of Chicago two accounts, one being the personal account of Herman Felsenthal, in which there was a balance of $176.62, and the other being in the name of Herman Felsenthal, trustee, in which there was a balance of $11,166.71.

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Monroe county; the Hon. R. D. W. Holder, Judge, presiding.</p>

M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. This was a bill in chancery filed by the appellants against the appellees in the superior court of Cook county to establish a trust in favor of the children of John G. and' Fredericka L. Stahl, deceased, in certain premises located in the city of Chicago, known as No. 15 Blue Island avenue, the legal title to which was in John Stahl.

<p>InEormation for disbarment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. Charles T. Moore, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Special assessments—zvhen variance between resolution and ordinance is willful and substantial. Variance between the resolutions for an improvement, providing that the entire roadway of a certain street, and all street intersections, shall be paved with granite-top macadam, and an ordinance expressly providing that certain of the street intersections shall not be paved, is willful and substantial, within the meaning of section 9 of the Local Improvement act.</p>

<p>Writ oe Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. E. TueEy? Judge, presiding.</p>

J. R. Creighton, Judge, presiding. Appellant brought an action of assumpsit against appellee in the circuit court of Richland county and there recovered a judgment for the sum of $600 and costs of… Held: others modified and still others refused. So far as appears from the abstract the plaintiff submitted no proposition whatever.

Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of Grundy county; the Hon. S. C. Stough, Judge, presiding. This is an indictment, found by the grand jury at the March term, 1904, of the circuit court of Grundy county against the plaintiffs in error, Frank Flanagan and Thomas Scully, for burglary and larceny. The jury rendered a verdict, finding the defendants guilty in manner and form as charged in the indictment.

Writ oE Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Will county; the Hon. R. W. HilschER, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Ffon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and Errors—when railroad company’s right to object to taxes cannot be questioned. If a railroad company, in its objections to a tax, avers that it is the owner of the railroad against which the tax is levied, and no question is made as to its right to file the objections, which are heard on their merits and an appeal perfected by the collector, the question of its right to object cannot be raised on appeal.</p> <p>2. Taxes—when levy of town tax is not sufficient. A certificate of the town clerk for the levy of a tax for “town purposes” of forty cents on the $100 is sufficient, but the levy itself is unlawful where the record of the levy at the town meeting does not show that the tax was levied for any specific purpose, but only for “town purposes” generally.</p> <p>3. Same—what does not affect validity of road and bridge tax. If the record discloses that a certificate of levy for road and bridge taxes in regular form was presented to the board of supervisors and acted upon by it, the tax should not be defeated because it is not definitely shown that the certificate was handed to the supervisor of the town five days before the meeting and by him presented to the board.</p> <p>«</p> <p>4. Same—when road and\bridge tax is invalid. While it is not necessary to the validity of a certificate by highway commissioners of a levy for road and bridge taxes that it specify the particular purposes for which the tax is levied, yet the tax is invalid if the record of the levy does not show that it was made for the specific purposes, or any of them, for which the commissioners were authorized to make a levy.</p> <p>5. Same—what is not a delinquent list for road district. The original lists, made by the commissioners of highways under section 84 of the Road and Bridge act, not sworn to and having no payments noted thereon, are not such lists as are required by section no of said act to be turned over by the overseer of the district to the supervisor of his town as the delinquent list of his district, there being no evidence they were ever presented and payment of the tax demanded by any one authorized to collect it.</p>

Appear from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. The appellants filed their bill in the superior court of Cook county against appellee for the specific performance of a contract.

N. E. Worthington, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal from an order or decree, based upon a petition filed by leave of court in an ejectment suit, by the terms of which it is ordered, adjudged and decreed that the present appellant, Robert VanTassell, plaintiff in said ejectment suit, “shall and may have the option of paying the said petitioner, William Wakefield, for said improvements mentioned in the foregoing findings, .the sum of $5755-00 upon giving said petitioner or…

<p>1.. Municipal corporations—regulation of water rates must be reasonable. The power of a municipal corporation, under the act of 1891, (Laws of 1891, p. 85,) to prescribe, by ordinance, maximum water rates to be charged by an individual or company supplying water to the inhabitants, carries with it the duty of ascertaining that the rates so prescribed are just and reasonable, with due regard to the property rights of the individual or company.</p> <p>2. Same—zvhen ordinance fixing water rates is unreasonable. A city ordinance requiring a water company operating in annexed territory to furnish water free to private dwellings, flats and apartment buildings for sanitary fixtures, including bath-tubs, water-closets, urinals and wash-bowls, thereby depriving the company of revenue to which it was entitled by the reasonable provisions of the ordinance under which it was organized before the territory was annexed, is unreasonable.</p> <p>3. Same—when ordinance fixing zvater rates amounts to a taking of private property without compensation. A city ordinance requiring a private water company organized and operating in anr nexed territory previous to annexation, to furnish free all water used in the conduct and carrying on of all charitable, religious and educational institutions is void, as a taking of private property for public and private use without compensation.</p> <p>4. Injunction—vahen injunction need not provide for re-investigation of question. An injunction restraining the enforcement of an ordinance fixing water rates and charges need not contain a provision reserving to the city the right to subsequently, move the court to re-consider the question of the reasonableness of the rates under changed conditions, where the ordinance contains invalid provisions amounting to a taking of property without compensation, which no change of conditions could validate.</p> <p>5. Same—zahén perpetual injunction becomes functus officio. A perpetual injunction restraining the enforcement of an ordinance fixing water rates and charges will become functus officio when the ordinance is changed to conform to the law, at which time the question as to the reasonableness of water rates may be further investigated.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Richland county; the Hon. J. R. Creighton, Judge, presiding.</p>

Philip Stein, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the case, brought in the superior court of Cook county by Charles Schoenfeld, the appellee, against John Condon and Lewis S. Long, to recover damages for a personal injury received by the appellee on July 20, 1899, while working at the Harlem race track in the county of Cook. The declaration in the cause consisted of three counts.

<p>1. Criminal law—right to kill in self-defense is not limited to real danger. One who is assailed in such a manner as to induce in him a reasonable and well grounded belief that he is actually in danger of losing his life or suffering great bodily harm is justified in defending himself when acting under such apprehension, even to the'extent of taking the life of his assailant, whether the danger was real or only apparent.</p> <p>2. Same—effect where party claiming killing was in self-defense was the aggressor. One who is the aggressor and begins an affray in which he takes the life of another, cannot escape the consequences of the killing upon the ground that he acted in self-defense, unless" he endeavored in good faith to decline further struggle before he inflicted the mortal wound.</p>

Writ oe Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Cir- ■ cuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. CliEEord, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Pleading—when count sufficiently charges the injury to be the proximate result of the negligence charged. A count alleging that the defendant negligently constructed a scaffold and allowed the same to remain in such unsafe condition, and that while plaintiff, with due caution, was working thereon said scaffold broke and collapsed, by means whereof plaintiff was injured, is sufficient, after verdict, as charging that the scaffold fell on account of its negligent construction.</p> <p>2. Instructions—when instruction is erroneous in omitting element of assumed risk. An instruction, in an action by a servant for personal injuries, which authorizes a recovery if the jury believe the plaintiff, while in the exercise of due care, was injured'in consequence of the negligence of the defendant, as charged in the declaration, is erroneous, where there is evidence tending to show the plaintiff assumed the risk and there is no allegation in the declaration that he did not assume it.</p>

E. E. Dunne, Judge, presiding. On April 27, 1887, Constantine Kann died testate, leaving a last will and testament, which was admitted, to probate. By the first paragraph of his will he provided for the payment of his just debts and funeral expenses.

<p>Deeds—zuhat proof overcomes presumption that deed was tmfairly obtained. Proof that a deed was executed by the grantor out of a strong desire to reward the grantee and his wife for the affectionate care bestowed upon him in- his old age, and that he himself procured a lawyer-to draw the deed in the absence of the grantee, explaining his reasons to the lawyer for making the deed, overcomes the presumption of unfairness arising from the fact that the grantee was his son and his confidential and legal adviser.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Green county; the Hon. O. P. Thompson, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Deeds—whether a deed zvas delivered is a question of fact. Whether the grantor, in leaving a deed in the hands of a third person to be delivered to the grantee after his death, intended to part with all power of control over it and with all right to re-call it, is a question of fact, upon which the finding of the chancellor will not be disturbed by a court of review unless good reason for doing so is disclosed by the evidence.</p> <p>2. Same—when intended disposition of property is ambtdatory. A deed intended by the grantor to be delivered to the grantee at the grantor’s death in case the latter did not conclude to re-call it is a disposition of property which is ambulatory until the death of the grantor, and which can only be effected by an instrument in writing executed in conformity with the Statute of Wills.</p>

Appear from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Frank Baker, Judge, presiding.

Writ oE Error to the Circuit Court of Eord county; the Hon. Colostin D. Myers, Judge, presiding.

Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding. This is an action of assumpsit, begun in the Superior Court of Cook county on November 2, 1892, by the appellee against the appellants, Winfield P. Dunn, Samuel D. McNeal, Will H. Pettengill, and Watson Trantor, composing the firm of W. P. Dunn & Co. The trial resulted in verdict and judgment in favor of appellee for $2000.00. Motions for new trial were filed both by appellants and by appellee.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Jasper county; the Hoo. I. D. ShamharT, Judge, presiding.</p>

M. F. TulEy, Judge, presiding. This is a bill for partition, filed in the circuit court of Cook county on March 2, 1904, by Arthur J. F. Deuter, Albert A. M. Deuter, Eva V. R. Deuter and Anna H. C. Deuter, minor heirs of John F. C. Deuter, deceased, by the Northern Trust Company, their guardian, against Christian J. Deuter, August W. Deuter and Mitchell Deuter, adult heirs of said deceased, and Minnie E. Deuter, wife of Christian J..

<p>1. Mines—zvhat is gross negligence in operating mines. It is gross negligence for a mining company to allow heavily loaded cars to be sent, without lights or signals or any one in attendance, down an inclined track in a dark and narrow passageway, where employees of the mine are required to be in discharge of their duties.</p> <p>2. Appeals and errors—errors not urged as grounds for nezv trial are zvaived. Alleged errors not urged as ground for sustaining the written motion for new trial in a suit at law cannot be considered by the Supreme Court.</p>

<p>1. Special assessments—when objections must be presumed to have been passed tipon. In the absence of a showing to the contrary it will be presumed, on appeal in a special assessment case, that all objections found in the record covered by the assignment of errors and argued in the briefs were passed upon by the trial court.</p> <p>2. Same—correct practice where there are many objections filed. In a special assessment case, where a large number of objections are filed, the court, upon application of the petitioner, should require the objector to point out specifically upon what objections he relies, and, the action of the court being properly preserved, the Supreme Court, on appeal or error, will deem all other objections waived and refuse to consider them.</p> <p>3. Same—when engineer’s estimate is sufficiently itemised. The engineer’s estimate of the cost of a proposed improvement is sufficiently itemized, so far as property owners are concerned, if it shows the estimated cost of the substantial, component elements of the improvement.</p> <p>4. Same—when ordinance will not be held to be unreasonable. Courts will not interfere to prevent the construction of a proposed improvement upon the ground that it is unnecessary, unless the ordinance'is so unreasonable as to render it void.</p> <p>5. Same—evidence on hearing as to benefits not considered in support of legal objections. Evidence given on the hearing of the question of benefits cannot be considered in support of a legal objection that the ordinance is unreasonable, where no evidence in support of the legal objection was introduced at a hearing thereof.</p> <p>6. Same—a city has power to define limits of drainage system. As incident to its power to construct a system of sewers, a city has the right to prescribe the limits of the district which will be permitted to drain into such system.</p> <p>7. Same—when failure to assess certain property is no objection to sewer assessment. Lands not abutting upon a proposed sewer system, not within the district and not given the right to drain into the sewers cannot be assessed for the proposed improvement.</p> <p>8. Same—whether property is assessed more than it is benefited is a question of fact. Whether property is assessed more than it is benefited by the improvement or more than its proportionate share of the cost thereof are questions of fact, and the finding of the trial court on the hearing will not be disturbed on review, unless so manifestly against the weight of the evidence as to indicate a mistaken or prejudiced view of the testimony.</p>

Writ or Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Abnrr Smith, Judge, presiding.

Appear from the City Court of Mattoon; the Hon. Jas. W. Craig, Judge, presiding.

John A. Gray, Judge, presiding. This is an action of ejectment, brought by the appellant against appellee in the circuit court of McDonough county to the September term, 1904, thereof, to recover the possession of a certain lot in the village of Industry in that county. The plea of general issue was filed. Jury was waived by agreement, and the cause was tried before the court without a jury.

<p>1. Propositions or law—proposition of law and fact is properly refused. A proposition of law requiring the adoption by the court of the facts upon which it is based and upon which the evidence is conflicting before it could be held as the law is properly refused, as presenting a mixed question of law and fact.</p> <p>2. Carriers—unlawful discrimination in rate does not entitle carrier to hold goods for regular charge. If a carrier contracts to unlawfully discriminate in rate by classifying the freight too low and accepts the goods for shipment, it is not entitled, after the goods reach their destination, to demand the additional charges, based upon proper classification, upon the ground that its act in making the discrimination was unlawful.</p> <p>3. Same—when rule permitting carrier to raise classification after shipment does not apply. The rule permitting a railroad company to raise the classification of goods after issuing a bill of lading to the shipper upon his false representation as to their character, and to hold the goods at their destination until the additional freight charges so occasioned are paid, does not apply where a servant of the company saw the car being loaded, knew the character of the goods, classified them and issued the bill of lading.</p> <p>4. Same—when carrier is estopped to- claim that plaintiff cannot maintain'trover. In an action of trover against a carrier for goods sold to pay freight charges, the carrier is estopped to claim that the plaintiff cannot maintain the action because he was neither the consignor or consignee nor the assignee of the bill of lading, where the refusal to deliver the goods to him was based upon the sole ground that the additional freight charges were not paid, the agent being notified by the consignee that the goods belonged to plaintiff.</p>

<p>1. Leases-—when lease will be presumed to have been with consent of all tenants in common. A lease of premises by one of four tenants in common and attested by another will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have been made with the knowledge and consent of all the tenants in common.</p> <p>2. Same-—use of premises for illegal purpose does not subject lessee to forcible eviction. The use of leased premises for an illegal purpose, while it might authorize the lessor to avoid the lease, does not subject the lessee to forcible eviction or deprivation of the benefits of the lease without his day in court.</p> <p>3. Same—when forcible eviction cannot be justified under doctrine of lis pendens. The fact that a lease was made after the filing of a bill to partition the property does not authorize the forcible eviction of the lessee by one deriving title through the partition sale, where the partition decree did not adjudicate the rights of the lessee nor require him to surrender possession.</p> <p>4. Same-—when surrender of key does not deprive lessee of possession. 'Surrender of the key by the lessee to one of the lessors for the purpose of caring for the building during the absence of the lessee, is not such a surrender of possession as deprives the lessee of his right to maintain trespass against a subsequent purchaser of the premises who forcibly entered them during the lessee’s absence.</p> <p>5. Trespass—entering building by removing obstructions from opening in windows is trespass. Entering a building in the possessiorr of another by removing obstructions placed over an opening in a window to prevent entrance is a trespass, regardless of the degree of force required to remove them.</p> <p>6. Triae—when improper conduct of juror will not reverse. A remark by a juror in a trespass case expressing an opinion as to the law of the case during a controversy arising between him and the attorney for the defendant in his argument is not ground for reversal, where the attorney was not without fault, and the trial judge sustained an objection to the juror’s remark, and, as far as he could, removed the effect thereof.</p> <p>7. Evidence—evidence that building zvas dilapidated is not admissible in action of trespass. In an action of trespass by a lessee against a purchaser of the building for forcibly entering the same during the lessee’s absence, proof that the building was in a dilapidated condition is properly denied admission.</p>

<p>1. Deeds—acceptance of a deed of voluntary settlement is presumed. Acceptance of a deed of voluntary settlement, if its terms are beneficial to the grantee, will ■ be presumed, even though the grantee had no knowledge of the existence of the deed until after the grantor’s death.</p> <p>2. Same—prestmptions are in favor of the delivery of a deed of voluntary settlement. The- law makes stronger presumptions in favor of the delivery of a deed of voluntary settlement than in ordinary bargain and sale, especially where the grantee is an infant or under mental disability.</p> <p>3. Same—what a sufficient delivery of deed. A deed of voluntary settlement, made to the minor child of the grantor but reserving a life estate to the grantor "and her husband, who joined in the deed, and which, after acknowledgment, is handed by the notary to the grantor’s husband in her presence and placed on record by him after the grantor’s death, is sufficiently delivered to the grantee in the absence of proof of any rebutting facts or circumstances.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Edward O. Brown, Judge, presiding.</p> <p>Appellee filed his bill in the circuit court of Cook county to set aside a certain tax certificate and deed issued thereon.</p> <p>■ The bill alleges that appellee is the owner of certain premises therein described, which on October I, 1900, were sold to appellant at a tax sale for the general taxes of 1899 and a certificate of sale issued thereon; that said tax sale was void because certain requirements of the statute had not been complied with; that the period of redemption had expired and that the year within which the appellant was required to take out a deed had not expired; that appellee was willing to pay whatever amount of money the appellant had paid in taxes, interest and costs, which sum was brought into court. The prayer of the bill was that the tax sale certificate, and any deed that had been issued or might thereafter be issued as a result of the tax sale, be declared null and void and set aside and vacated as a cloud upon appellee’s title. A general demurrer was filed to the bill, which was overruled, and the defendant thereupon filed his answer denying the allegations of the bill, and upon a hearing before the court a decree was entered in substantial conformity with the prayer of the bill.</p>

<p>1. Special taxation—city may contract for sidewalk to be constructed by it. In special taxation, where the municipality undertakes the construction of sidewalks which the owners of abutting lots have failed to build, the municipality may let the work by contract; but the contract must specify separately the items for grading, materials and labor, so that the bill of cost contemplated by the statute may be prepared from the contract.</p> <p>2. Same—a contract at so much per square foot is no basis for a bill of cost. A contract made with a municipality for the construction of sidewalks at a certain price per square foot does not authorize the municipality to divide the contract price into items for grading, material and labor, so as to prepare a bill of cost based upon such- items.</p>

<p>1. Special assessments'—when a party is not disqualified to spread assessment. A person employed by a city to design a system of water-works, furnish materials and labor, act as engineer in the construction of the system, make surveys, plat, estimates and specifications, receiving as compensation a per cent of the total cost or amount of all contract work, is not disqualified, by reason of interest, to act as commissioner in spreading the assessment. (Murr v. City of Naperville, 210 Ill. 371, overruled.)</p> <p>2. Same—evidence as to who made estimate of cost is not admissible. On petition to confirm a special assessment, where the estimate of cost is signed by the president of the improvement board, as required by law, it is not competent for objectors to attempt to show that the estimate was made or the data therefor furnished by another person than the president of the board.</p> <p>3. Same—absence of proof of legal existence of board of local improvements is no objection. On petition to confirm a special assessment, where the recommendation submitting the ordinance and estimate is signed by three persons as the board of local improvements, the question of the legal existence of the board cannot be raised, the remedy to test such existence being by quo warranto.</p> <p>4. Same—when proof that notice of hearing was not in legal form is properly excluded. Proof that the notice of public hearing was not in compliance with the statute is properly denied admission when offered after the case had been closed.</p> <p>5. Same—what not ground for revising assessment. A special assessment should not be modified or re-cast merely because there is a difference of opinion as to whether the commissioner exercised sound judgment in spreading it, unless his action was so improper as to amount to fraud.</p> <p>6. Same—the cost of maintaining improvement board cannot be raised by assessment. The proviso to section 94 of Local Improvement act, as amended in 1901, (Laws of 1901, p. 117,) providing that in cities of less than 100,000 inhabitants a sum not exceeding six per cent of the amount of the assessment may be, by ordinance, applied “toward the payment of the aforesaid costs and other costs of making and collecting the assessment,” does not authorize the inclusion of the cost of maintaining a board of local improvements, or any expense except the cost of making and collecting the particular assessment.</p> <p>7. Same—effect where ordinance provides for illegal costs. If a provision of a special assessmént ordinance fixes a certain amount to be raised for costs, some of the purposes being illegal and inseparable from the legal ones, the provision should be eliminated and the assessment reduced by the amount specified therein.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. R. W. Hilscher, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Philip Stein, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from- the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Conspiracy—when indictment charges conspiracy at common law. An indictment against corporations engaged in mining coal, charging them with conspiracy and that the object of the conspiracy was unlawful, sufficiently charges conspiracy at common law, without setting out the means whereby the conspiracy was to be accomplished; nor is it necessary that the object of the conspiracy constitute an offense against the criminal law, for which an individual might be indicted and convicted.</p> <p>2. Same—combination to prevent competition in sale of coal is a common law conspiracy. A combination between independent producers of coal to prevent competition in its sale is inimical to trade and commerce, detrimental to the public and unlawful, and amounts to a common law conspiracy, regardless of what may be done in furtherance of the conspiracy.</p> <p>3. Same—common law as to regulating and fixing prices is in force in Illinois. The common law upon the subject of regulating and fixing prices of a commodity has not been abrogated in Illinois by the adoption of sections 46 and 130 of the Criminal Code, relating, respectively, to conspiracy to do an illegal act and to influencing or attempting to influence the price of a commodity or to corner the market therefor.</p> <p>4. Same—section 46 of Criminal Code not repealed by Antitrust act of i8pi. Section 46 of the Criminal Code, in so far as it relates to a conspiracy to do an illegal act injurious to the public ■ trade or to prevent competition, was not repealed by the Anti-trust act of 1891, since the gist of the offense under section 46 is the conspiracy to do the act, whereas the offense under the act of 1891 is the doing of the act itself.</p> <p>5. Trusts and combines—Anti-trust act not limited to corporations organised to transact business in this State. A corporation doing business in Illinois is amenable to the Anti-trust act of 1891 for violation thereof, regardless of where the corporation was organized or whether it was organized “for transacting or conducting any kind of business in this State.”</p> <p>6. Same—one violating Anti-trust act may be prosecuted by indictment. Under section 1 of the Anti-trust act of 1891, (Laws of 1891, p. 207,) in case of violation of the provisions of the act the State may prosecute by indictment, or under the provisions of section 7 may bring an action of debt to recover the fine imposed by the act. '</p> <p>7. Same—absolute monopoly not essential to unlawful combination. The fact that a combination to fix the price of a commodity and prevent competition among members of the combination does not give the association a complete monopoly of the trade in the territory in which the members of the association transact business does not relieve the members from criminal responsibility in forming the combination.</p> <p>8. Same—fact that the association is voluntary does not relieve members from legal effect of their acts. The fact that an association having for one of its objects an act which is illegal and against public policy is a voluntary organization, having no written articles of association, does not relieve the members thereof from the legal effect of their acts, and as soon as the unlawful combination is formed all members are bound by the acts of the others in furthering the objects of the combination.</p> <p>9. Same—defense cannot be predicated upon unconstitutional law. Defense to an action against coal mining corporations for a violation of the Anti-trust act of 1891 cannot be predicated upon the proviso to section 1 of that act, added in 1897, (Laws of 1897, p. 298,) since such proviso is unconstitutional, and no right can be predicated upon an unconstitutional law.</p> <p>10. Indictment—when an indictment for conspiracy sufficiently charges an illegal intent. An indictment under section 46 of the Criminal Code, charging that the defendant corporations unlawfully, fraudulently, maliciously, wrongfully and wickedly conspired and agreed together to do an illegal act, in effect charges the conspiracy to have been formed with a fraudulent or malicious intent to wrongfully and wickedly do an illegal act.</p> <p>11. Propositions oe daw—section 42 of Practice act does not apply to criminal case tried without jury. Section 42 of the Practice act, relating to propositions of law, does not apply to the trial of a criminal case without a jury, particularly where all questions of law are properly preserved for review by motion to quash, motion to exclude the evidence and motions for new trial and in arrest of judgment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. Frank Harry, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Jersey county; the Hon. Charles S. White, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Elbridge HanEcy, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appear from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse Hordom, Judge, presiding.

Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. This is a petition, filed by the appellant on August 6, 1902, in the circuit court of Cook county against the appellee, as general superintendent of police of the city of Chicago, for a writ of mandamus, directed to appellee as such general superintendent, commanding him forthwith to restore appellant to the position of “foreman of the repair shop” of the police department of the city of Chicago, held by him previous to March 19, 1902; and…

<p>1. Child labor—employer’s liability where a child unlawfully employed is injured. If a child under fourteen years old, employed in violation of the Child Labor law of 1903, is injured, while doing the work he is directed to do by his employer, by the machinery with which he is working, the employer is liable, irrespective of the question of the contributory negligence of the child.</p> <p>2. Same—employer must ascertain age of a child. In order to avoid a violation of the Child Labor act of 1903 the employer must ascertain, at his peril, that the persons he employs are those whom he may lawfully employ under the statute,</p> <p>3. Same—effect of child’s misrepresentation of his age. The fact that a child employed by a manufacturing company falsely represented himself to be over fourteen years old does not preclude him from maintaining an action to recover for an injury resulting from his unlawful employment nor furnish a defense for his employer.</p>

<p>1. Special taxation—power of court to permit amendment of objections. Allowance of amendments to objections filed in a special tax proceeding or granting permission to file additional objections are matters within the sound discretion of the court, which will not be reviewed unless the discretion has been abused.</p> <p>2. Same—effect of amendment of i8p¿ limiting special taxes to benefits. The only effect of the amendment of 1895 to section 17 of article 9 of the City and Village act (Laws of 1895, p. 100,) was to take from the city council the power to conclusively determine the question of benefits in case of special taxation and to commit that question to the county court to be tried by a jury.</p> <p>3. Same—council has sole power to- determine the proportion of special tax to be borne by city. The city council has sole power to determine what proportion of a special tax levied to pay for an improvement shall be borne by the city, and this question cannot be reviewed by the courts.</p> <p>4. Same—what question to be tried by jury in special tax case. The only question to be tried by the jury, on application to confirm a special tax, is whether the tax exceeds the special benefit which will accrue to the property from the making of the improvement.</p> <p>5. Same—what questions cannot be considered on application to confirm special tax. Whether the property specially taxed for an improvement is taxed more than its “proportionate share” of the cost of the improvement, or whether the tax is assessed upon part, only, of the property benefited, are questions which cannot be considered on application to confirm the tax.</p> <p>6. Same—special tax assessed according to frontage not necessarily invalid. Notwithstanding the amendment of 1895 to section 17 of article 9 of the City and Village act, which is repeated as the proviso to section 35 of the Local Improvement act of 1897, a special tax assessed according to frontage is valid if it does not exceed benefits specially accruing to the property from the improvement.</p> <p>7. Evidence—when plat should not be admitted. A plat made by a witness should not be admitted in evidence in a special taxation case where the witness himself testifies that the plat is not correct.</p> <p>8. Trial—city has right to open and close in arguing a special tax case. The city has the affirmative of the issue in a pro'ceeding to confirm a special tax, and has the right to open and close the argument to the jury notwithstanding the fact that the tax roll, when given in evidence, is prima facie evidence of the correctness of the amounts of the tax.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors—assigned errors not argued are waived. Unless errors assigned in the Appellate Court are presented and argued in that court they will be regarded as waived on further appeal to the Supreme Court.</p> <p>2. Same—whether note sued upon was paid is question of fact. Whether the note sued upon has been paid is a question of fact where the evidence is conflicting, upon which question the judgment of the Appellate Court, sustaining that of the trial court following the verdict of the jury, is final.</p> <p>3. Bills and notes—defendant relying on agreement with the agent of payee must show authority. A defendant to a suit on a note who seeks to take advantage of the act of plaintiff’s agent in canceling the note under an alleged agreement between the defendant and the agent has the burden of proving the authority of the agent to make the agreement or that the plaintiff ratified the action.</p> <p>4. Same—what does not estop party from showing conditions under which check was endorsed. The presence upon the face of a check of the words “in payment of note,” when the check was endorsed by the payee of the note, does not preclude the person so endorsing the check from showing that it was endorsed for another purpose than the payment of the note; and she may show the conditions under which the check was endorsed, it being a question of fact for the jury whether such conditions existed.</p>

<p>1. Special assessments—when want of jurisdiction must appear on face of record. Want of jurisdiction to render a judgment of confirmation of a special assessment must, where the question arises upon application for judgment of sale of the assessed property, appear upon the face of the record to be available as a defense, and cannot be shown aliunde.</p> <p>2. Same—how far want of property owners’ petition affects the judgment. Want of proper petition of property owners for an improvement to be paid for by special assessment, though effective in a direct appeal from the confirmation judgment, if proper objection was interposed, is not available on application for judgment of sale to satisfy the assessment. •</p> <p>3. Same—when confirmation judgment is defective but not void. A judgment of confirmation entered over objection, without a valid petition of property owners, though vulnerable to a direct attack is not absolutely void, and after the term at which it was entered has expired the trial court may refuse to set such judgment aside on motion.</p> <p>4. Evidence—when record of case where ordinance was held invalid is not admissible. The reversal of a confirmation judgment has no effect upon the judgment as to other property the owners of which did not appeal, and the record of the appealed case is not admissible, upon an application for judgment of sale against the other property, for the purpose of showing that the ordinance was held invalid by the Supreme Court in that case.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on' appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. TuTpiill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Joseph E. Gary, Judge, presiding.</p> <p>This is an appeal from a judgment of the Branch Appellate Court for the First District, affirming a judgment for $5000.00 rendered against the appellant company in favor of the appellee in the Superior Court of Cook county in an action on the case, prosecuted to recover damages on account of the death of Joseph H. Rose.</p> <p>The declaration consists of two counts. The first alleges that on and prior to June 28, 1897, appellant was an Illinois corporation; that the city council of Chicago passed an ordinance, granting to appellant the right to construct, maintain, operate and use on certain streets in Chicago a line of wires, or other electric conductors, for the transmission and distribution of electricity upon certain terms contained in the ordinance; that a part of said ordinance was as follows : “All conductors and wires, owned and operated by the said company under the provisions of this ordinance, shall be properly insulated, and all overhead conductors, used by said company, shall be protected by guard-wires or other suitable mechanical device or devices;” that appellant accepted said ordinance, and, under the same, conducted an electrical business; that on May 10, 1901, appellant had a certain wire, used as a conductor of electricity, and heavily charged therewith, running north and south on Parnell avenue within said city; that said wire was suspended above the ground upon poles and extended .across -Sixty-seventh street; that, by virtue of the ordinance, it was appellant’s duty to maintain said wire in a properly insulated condition, arid have it protected by guard-wires, or other suitable mechanical device, but that it wantonly and negligently permitted said wire to become and remain in an improper and defectively insulated condition, and unprotected by guard-wires, or other suitable mechanical device, as required by said ordinance; that Rose was employed as a lineman by the Chicago Telephone Company, which had certain wires, íunning across on poles at the intersection of Sixty-seventh street arid Parnell avenue as aforesaid; that, while Rose in the discharge of his duty was on one of said telephone poles, and exercising ordinary care, etc., said telephone wire, by reason of appellant’s wire not being protected as aforesaid, came in contact with the same, and, by reason of appellant’s wire not being properly insulated as aforesaid, it discharged a sufficient current of electricity through the said telephone wire, and into the body of Rose, as to cause him to fall from the pole to the ground, as a result of which he was then and there killed; and that he left surviving him a widow, the appellee herein, and three children, his next of kin.</p> <p>The second count charges that it was necessary for the reasonable safety of those, who might be required to work with or about said wires, or who should be brought into contact with appellant’s said wire, that appellant should maintain said wire in a properly insulated condition, but that it wantonly and negligently suffered and permitted its said wire to remain in an improper and defectively insulated condition.</p> <p>The following are the material facts: ■ Appellee’s intestate, who was a lineman in the employ of the Chicago Telephone Company, about forty-three years old at the time of his death, met his death at the corner of Parnell avenue, a street in Chicago running north and south, and Sixty-seventh street, running east and west, in the said city. A line of the Chicago Telephone Company’s poles and wires extended along the south side of Sixty-seventh street, and a line of appellant’s electric light poles and wires extended along the east side of Parnell avenue. The appellant’s electric light wires passed under the wires and cable of the telephone line, about two feet lower than the lowest telephone wire or cable. There were two of appellant’s electric light wires, each carrying a current of 2000 volts, while on each of the telephone poles there were five cross-arms, each having pins for ten wires. The distance between these wires on each cross-arm was about twelve inches, except the two next to the pole, which were sixteen inches apart to allow for the pole. At the south-west corner of Parnell avenue and Sixty-seventh street stood one of the telephone company’s poles, designated as pole No. 2. One hundred and twelve and three-fourths feet east of this pole was another telephone pole—the one, at which deceased was at work-—designated as pole No. 1. One electric light pole was nineteen feet north of Sixty-seventh street, while the next one south was sixty-four feet south of Sixty-seventh street—which was about seventy feet wide—making these two poles about one hundred and fifty-three feet apart. The lowest cross-arm of the telephone poles was thirty feet, and the electric light cross-arm twenty-eight feet and two inches above the ground. One of the witnesses states that there was only one and one-half feet between the electric light wire and the telephone wire above it. From pole No. 2 to the electric light wires was thirty-six feet, and from the electric light wires to pole No. 1 was seventy-six feet. The telephone line crossed the electric light wires at practically the middle of the electric span, which was about one hundred feet. There were from thirty-six to forty wires on the telephone poles. Stretched along on the telephone poles was a steel cable, or “messenger,” firmly attached to the poles, used to support a- large number of telephone wires, enclosed in a lead tube or casing. This was attached to the pole twenty-two inches beneath the lowest cross-arm of pole No. 1, and three feet and-nine inches below the lowest cross-arm of pole No. 2. The cross-arms were about twenty-three inches apart.</p> <p>On May 10, 1901, the deceased, and four or five other members of his gang, .left their work at some other part of the telephone lines, and came to the corner above described at about 2 :3o P. M., their aim being to take down two dead wires, which extended east from the west side of Parnell avenue to Stewart avenue, and extend a new wire along on the third or middle cross-arm, beginning at pole No. 2, and running east. The plan was to cut off the dead wire, or wire not in use, on the bottom cross-arm of the telephone pole, and attach it to the new wire, and by this means draw the new wire from pole 2 to pole 1, it being the intention to get the new wire across and above the electric light wires. The dead wire, which was on the lowest cross-arm and was to be cut at pole No. I, was to be taken up to the middle cross-arm about four feet above, and the new wire was to be fastened to it at the west pole, and then the new wire drawn across from pole No. 2 to pole No. 1, and so on.</p> <p>The" deceased climbed pole No. 1, which was about sixty to seventy feet east of Parnell avenue, and Clark, another of the men, went up pole No. 2 at the south-west corner of Parnell avenue and Sixty-seventh street. Clark stood with one foot on the lower cross-arm and the other leg hooked over the next cross-arm above, and in this position on the west side of the pole detached the old wire from the pin on the bottom cross-arm, raised it to the middle cross-arm, and united it to the end of the new wire, and fixed it so as to hold it at that point. The deceased at pole No. i" stood on the' steel cable on the west side of the pole facing south-east, the wire which they were raising being on the south side of the pole. The deceased waited for Clark to get his end up on the third arm and spliced before going further, and, when Clark finished fastening the new wire to the old^ he placed his hand in the loop of the wire, and holding it that way, placed his hand on the cross-arm, touching a guy wire which was there. Clark said: “All right,” to the deceased who was already waiting, and thereupon the deceased cut the wire just west of the cross-arm preparatory to carrying it higher. In some manner, after it was cut, the wire came in contact with the electric light wire beneath it, and Clark and deceased both received an- electric shock. Clark did not receive the full force of the shock, and then only through a small part of the hand, but it made him jump, although he did not fall. The deceased, however, was standing on the cable, which, in turn, was grounded, thus completing a circuit with the electric light and telephone wires. At the same time when Clark received the shock, deceased cried out, “Oh 1” and a flash was' seen at his end of the wire. After this exclamation deceased- was seen by his fellow-workmen hanging to the cross-arm with his arms, having lost his foothold. He hung there a few seconds without saying anything further, or being able to regain his footing, and then fell to' the sidewalk beneath, and died in a half hour or so afterwards. Upon, examination it was found that the telephone wire had been burned in two where it came in contact with the electric light wire.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Partition—when objection to commissioners’ report is properly overruled. An objection to the report of the commissioners, based upon the ground that it is erroneous in stating that the property is not susceptible of fair division, is properly overruled where no evidence is offered in support of the objection.</p> <p>2. Same—decree of partition or sale may be entered before estate is settled. Partition may be made, or, if the premises are not divisible, a decree of sale may be entered, before the expiration of the time allowed by law for probating claims against the estate, but in such case the court should make such order with reference to the application of the proceeds of the sale as will protect the interests of the claimants.</p> <p>3. Appeals and Errors—objection not covered by assignments of error not considered. Objections to a decree will not be considered on appeal, though urged in the brief and argument, if they are not covered by the assignments of error.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Brown county; the Hon. S. A. Hubbard, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Information for disbarment.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. A. H. ChETlain, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appear from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon, Erbridge HanEcy, Judge, presiding. Tills was an action of assumpsit commenced by the plaintiffs, for the use of Frederick M. Kantzler, against the defendants, in the circuit court of Cook county.

Appear from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. R. W. HirschER, Judge, presiding. This is an action on the case, brought by appellee in the circuit court of Iroquois county, to recover damages for the killing of his team of horses, and injury to a team of mules, wagon and harness, by being struck by a train of appellant.

E. P. Vail, Judge, presiding. On February 28, 1890, Paul J. Sorg, (now deceased,) father of the appellees Sorg, who was then the owner of the premises known as 178 Quincy street, in the city of Chicago, executed to one William J. Gunning a lease thereon for the term of ninety-nine years, at the annual rental of $1800, payable in advance, in quarterly installments of $450.

Axel ChyTraus, Judge, presiding. Appellee, the Gunning System, filed its bill in the superior court of Cook county in which it sought to have declared null and void two ordinances of the city of Chicago, and also praying for an injunction restraining appellants from in any way interfering with its business.