¶1dissenting. I agree with the various statements of law cited in the majority opinion. Especially do I agree with the statement, “The district court is vested with wide discretion in adjusting the financial obligations of the parties and its exercise of that discretion will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of a showing of dear abuse.” However, after carefully reviewing the record I cannot conclude, as does the majority, that the trial court made the division of property under the mistaken belief that the manner of its acquisition was the controlling factor considered in the ultimate division of the property. This condusion by the majority is based solely upon the apparent unequal division of the property between the parties. It does not take into consideration the other factors bearing upon the question.
¶2Assuming that the trial court was laboring under this erroneous belief, the proper function of this appellate court should be to reverse the judgment and remand the case with instructions to the trial court to correct its erroneous belief and enter a proper judgment based upon all factors bearing upon the question. The impropriety and difficulties arising from the action of this appellate court in entering a substitute judgment for that of the trial court is apparent in the disposition of the case made by the majority opinion. The final cash judgment in favor of the wife is entered for $48,250.00 but, being uncertain as to how such judgment could be collected and enforced, the court in the opinion remands the case to the trial court for it to decide on the terms of payment “after a hearing, if necessary”. I believe this court has ignored the rules of law stated in the opinion as well as its role as an appellate court. Therefore, I register my dissent.