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214 Mass. 294

Cotting v. Otis Elevator Co.

Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court · decided 1913-04-01

<p>Equity Jurisdiction, For exoneration from secondary liability.</p> <p>While a suit in equity may be maintained, by one secondarily liable to a third person for a debt, against the person primarily liable to compel him to satisfy the debt and thus to relieve the plaintiff, such a suit cannot be maintained where the plaintiff does not concede his liability but avers merely that the third person asserts that he is liable.</p> <p>A landowner agreed with a merchant to erect for and, when completed, to let to him a building suitable for his use and equipped with moving stairways, and for the purpose of carrying out that agreement made a contract with a manufacturer for the installation of moving stairways in the building, the manufacturer agreeing to make necessary repairs without expense to the landowner for a period of one year, if the repairs were made necessary by imperfections or. defects in materials or workmanship. The manufacturer brought an action in another State against the merchant, seeking payment for repairs alleged to have been made upon the stairways when the merchant had occupied the building for less than a year, and the merchant called upon the landowner for indemnification, contending that the repairs were made necessary by faulty materials and workmanship employed in the installation of the stairways, for which the landowner was responsible to him under their agreement. While the action in the other State was pending and the liability therein was undetermined, the landowner brought a suit in equity here against the manufacturer and the merchant, alleging the foregoing facts and seeking to have the manufacturer compelled to indemnify the plaintiff against claims by the merchant and enjoined from prosecuting the action in the other State. The manufacturer demurred. Held, that the demurrer should be sustained, because on the allegations of the bill the plaintiff did not concede that he was under any liability to the merchant, but alleged merely that the merchant asserted that he was liable.</p>

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1913-04-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 7 later decisions — most recently May 1961

1 federal appellate · 6 state decisions

30191319201930194019501960decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Sheldon, J.

¶1There is no doubt that a plaintiff who is either a surety or has in equity the rights of a surety for an actual debt, or. who is under a merely secondary liability for the discharge of an existing obligation, may in equity compel his principal, or the person who by contract with himself or with his privity has incurred the primary liability, to pay the debt or perform the obligation and thus free the plaintiff from a charge or burden which, to his relief, ought to be borne by the principal or the primary debtor. If it were necessary to cite authorities for this undisputed proposition, those referred to by the plaintiffs in their brief would abundantly establish it. But the plaintiff who seeks such relief must be under an existing and admitted liability to the burden *297or charge from which he seeks to be relieved, or at least the facts must be such as necessarily to create such a liability. Antrobus v. Davidson, 3 Mer. 569, 580. Hughes-Hallett v. Indian Mammoth Gold Mines, 22 Ch. D. 561, Ascherson v. Tredegar Dry Dock & Wharf Co. [1909] 2 Ch. 401, 409. In the case of In re Richardson, [1911] 2 K. B. 705, as in most of the other cases relied on by the plaintiffs, there was such an admitted liability.

¶2In the case at bar the plaintiffs do not concede that they are under the liability from which they seek to be exonerated. Their allegations go no further than to say that if Siegel or Vogel or the Siegel Company shall hereafter sue them and shall succeed in showing that they are liable for a breach of their agreement to construct a substantial building suitable for the stipulated purposes, then that liability of these plaintiffs will not be due to any independent act or omission of their own, but solely to the breach by the Otis Company of the terms of its contracts with the plaintiffs. Indeed, there is no direct averment that the Otis Company has committed such a breach; the allegation is merely that the Siegel Company so claims. The bill cannot be maintained upon such averments.

¶3We need not consider whether this difficulty goes absolutely to the merits of the plaintiffs’ right to relief, or whether the bill could have been maintained if Pepper, acting really as the agent and for the benefit of the Otis Company, had recovered a judgment in New York against the Siegel Company upon claims which arose merely by reason of the Otis Company’s breach of its agreements with the plaintiffs, and if the plaintiffs admitted their liability to the Siegel Company for the amount of such judg-; ment. This demurrer must be sustained in any event; and under the agreement of the parties stated in the report the bill must be dismissed with costs.

¶4So ordered. ',

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