Volume 214 — Michigan Reports

Case-made from superior court of Grand Rapids; Dunham (Major L.) J. Assumpsit by the city of Grand Rapids against the Grand Trunk Railway System for the amount of an assessment for street improvements. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

), J. Bill by Frank W. Fletcher against Frank W. Fletcher and Allan M. Fletcher, executors of the will of George N. Fletcher, .deceased, and Allan M. Fletcher and Grace Fletcher-King for an accounting. From the decree rendered, all parties appeal.

<p>Intoxicating Liquors — Criminal Law — Constitutional Law— Search Warrant — Questions Raised.</p> <p>In a prosecution for a violation of the liquor law (Act No. 338, Pub. Acts 1917), held, that the questions of the constitutionality of section 25 of said act, under which the search warrant was issued, and the competency of the evidence obtained by means thereof, were properly raised by defendant, and the conviction should therefore be set aside; said statute having been declared unconstitutional.</p>

<p>Habeas . Corpus — Courts — De Facto Court — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>Where plaintiff was convicted in the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit of practicing medicine without a license, he cannot properly be discharged upon habeas corpus, since said court is a de facto court, and the constitutionality of the act (Act No. 369, Pub. Acts 1919), creating it cannot be attacked in said proceeding.</p>

) J. Bill by Winifred C. Robertson and others against Fred M. Boylan and another to try the title to certain land. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal.

), J. Assumpsit by Archie C. Utter and Albert R. Thomson, copartners, as Utter & Thomson, against Charles W. Leach and another for the amount of a bond. Judgment for defendants on a directed verdict. Plaintiffs bring error.

Burget), J. Assumpsit by Albert E. Beebe against Michael M. Cullinane for breach of a contract for the sale of certain potatoes. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

), J. Louis C. Wassmus was convicted of promoting a lottery, and sentenced to imprisonment for 4 months in the Detroit house of correction.

) J. Bill by John Nolan against Rosetta Nolan for a divorce. Defendant filed a cross-bill alleging a conspiracy between plaintiff, Thomas Nolan, and others. Prom a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

), J. Assumpsit by Patrick W. Dinnan against the Bloomfield Hills Land Company for a balance due on a sale of land. Judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto. Plaintiff brings error.

<p>1. Attorney and Client — Escape of Debtor — Assent of Attorney not Binding on Client.</p> <p>In an action against a judgment debtor and his sureties on the bond given for the jail limits, where the declaration counted upon an escape, the fact that plaintiff’s attorney-might have known of and assented to defendant’s going-beyond the limits would not amount to an assent upon the part of plaintiff, since an attorney has no authority by virtue of his employment to bind his client by the discharge of a debtor from arrest except on payment in full of the judgment.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error — Attorney and Client — Harmless Error.</p> <p>"Where defendant failed to connect plaintiff with any efforts her attorney might have made in getting defendant out of the county, she was entitled to a directed verdict, and therefore defendant was not prejudiced by the submission to the jury of the question as to- whether said attorney was connected with defendant’s escape.</p> <p>3. Attorney and Client — Contingent Pee — Lien on Judgment-for Services — Discharge of Debtor.</p> <p>That plaintiff’s attorney’s compensation was to be one-half" of what he recovered, would at most give him only a lien on the judgment for his services, and would give him no-authority to discharge the debtor without payment in full, of the judgment.</p>

), J. Summary proceedings by Lun F. Mikesell against John A. Wade for the possession of leased premises. There was judgment of restitution before the commissioner, and defendant appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

<p>1. Negligence — Pleading—Duty Created by Ordinance Must be Pleaded — Franchises.</p> <p>A mere common-law declaration in an action for negligence will not support proof of a duty created by an ordinance unless pleaded, and whether the ordinance is a part of defendant’s franchise or not is immaterial.</p> <p>2. Street Railways — Pleading—Negligence—Excessive Speed— Ordinances — Franchises—Evidence—Admissibility.</p> <p>In an action against a street railway company, where the declaration counted upon the excessive speed at which defendant’s car was operated when it collided with plaintiff’s automobile causing the damages sought to be recovered, but not pleading the city ordinance limiting to 12 miles an hour the rate of speed at which street cars should run in said city, it was not admissible in evidence although it is a part of defendant’s franchise.</p>

), JJ. Bill by (William S. Thomas and others against the board of supervisors of Wayne county and others to enjoin the maintenance of a tract index and the furnishing of abstracts of title to land. From the decree rendered, all parties appeal.

), J. Bill by Wallace H. Masters and others against the board of supervisors of Alger county and the county of Alger to enjoin the maintenance of a tract index and the furnishing of abstracts of title to land. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

), J. Bill by Eugene J. Stephenson, receiver, against Marie C. Purchase to reach certain trust funds. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

), J. Quo warranto by the people of the State of Michigan, by Albert H. Perkins, prosecuting attorney, on the relation of Charles S. Riley and others, against Duane W. Crankshaw and others to try the title to the office of trustees of the school board for the township of Hadley. Judgment of ouster. Defendants bring error.

Mandamus by the city of Lansing against 'Willis B. Perkins, presiding circuit judge of Eaton county, to vacate an order denying a motion to dismiss an injunction.

), J. Replevin by the city of Alma! against A. R.' Purcell for the possession of certain well drilling machinery; Judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict. Defendant brings error.

Isabel M. Patón presented her claim for compensation against the Port Huron Engine & Thresher Company for the accidental death of her husband in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the Michigan Mutual Liability Company, insurer, bring certiorari.

Mandamus by the General Necessities Corporation to compel Fred W. Brennan, acting circuit judge of Wayne county, to vacate an order denying a motion for an extension of time to settle a bill of exceptions.

Mandamus by the General Necessities Corporation to compel Fred W. Brennan, acting circuit judge of Wayne county, to vacate an order denying a motion for a new trial.

<p>1. Arrest — Capias ad Respondendum — Declaration—Affidavits —Statutory Requirement.</p> <p>The statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, §§ 12415, 12416) does not require the declaration and supporting affidavits to be filed before or at the time of the issuance of a writ of capias ad respondendum, it being sufficient if they are furnished the judge or commissioner who indorses the bail, and are returned and filed with the original writ after service.</p> <p>2. Same — Affidavits—Sufficiency—Personal Knowledge of Affiant — Common Knowledge.</p> <p>Affidavits, in substance, that plaintiff is a minister of the gospel, that defendants were engaged in publishing and circulating a newspaper in the city of Detroit under a certain name, that certain newspaper articles which are libelous were published therein, setting them out at length, that the articles are untrue and libelous, field, sufficient to support the issuance of writs of capias ad respondendum, in an action for libel, and not open to the objection that it was not alleged as being sufficiently within the personal knowledge of affiants, since it appears that the facts constituting the libel charged were common knowledge to those who knew the parties and had read the articles, and were not peculiarly within the knowledge of any particular person.</p>

), J. Louis Harris was convicted of manslaughter, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 5 nor more than 15 years in the State prison at Jackson.

), J. Charles Mayhew was convicted of violating the liquor law, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 6 months nor more than 1 year in the State prison at Jackson.

), J. Bill by Arthur O. Hadley, individually and as administrator de bonis non of the estate of Emmaus G. Owen, deceased, and others, against Marion J. Henderson, Ida Alban and the Michigan Home Missionary Society for the construction of a will. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendant society appeals.

), J. Bill by the Detroit United Railway against the city of Detroit and others to enjoin the performance of a contract for the construction of a street railway. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

), J. Garnishment proceedings by Frank Culotta and Willett S. Jull, copartners as Culotta & Jull, against the Detroit United Fruit Auction Company, garnishee defendant of the National Growers & Shippers Sales Company. Judgment for plaintiff. Garnishee defendant brings error.

<p>1. Nuisance — Criminal Liability — Ordinances—Landlord and Tenant.</p> <p>Where tenants are in the possession and control of leased premises, the owner thereof is not criminally liable under an ordinance prohibiting the “owner or occupant or other person having the control or management” of the premises from allowing “any nuisance to exist or remain” thereon, although the evidence shows that toilets charged to constitute a nuisance by the discharge of offensive odors by reason of the lack of light and ventilation were so constructed by defendant. Wiest and Bird, JJ., dissenting.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error — Ordinances—Recorder’s Court.</p> <p>Certiorari, and not error, is the proper remedy to review ordinance cases disposed of in the recorder’s court of the city of Detroit.</p>

), J., Summary proceedings by Ira L. Miller against Elwyn Pond for the possession of leased premises. There was judgment for defendant before the commissioner, and plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

), J. Bill by George D. Bradley and others against Frederick B. May and others for the specific performance of a contract. From an order denying a motion to dismiss, defendants May appeal.

Habeas corpus proceedings by Charles F. Adams against William Hulbert, Allie M. Hulbert and John B. Montgomery, superintendent of the State public school, to obtain the custody of Donavieve Adams, his daughter.

<p>Appeal and Error — Trial—Warranty—Written Contract— Submission of Question to Jury.</p> <p>In an action for the purchase price of certain cows, where defendant claimed damages by way of recoupment for the breach of a claimed warranty, said warranty consisting of the written statements of plaintiff in a letter to defendant that “in good condition I believe that they will weigh about 1,200 pounds,” and “the cattle are all right in every way,” and the trial judge, against plaintiff’s contention that said writing was for the court to construe, submitted to the jury, under instructions favorable to defendant’s contention, the question as to whether said statements amounted to a warranty, held, that, if any one has. occasion to complain, it is not defendant.</p>

Aate Nieminen presented his claim for compensation ag-ainst the Isle Royale Copper Company for accidental injuries received in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant brings certiorari.

Henry Stammers presented Ms claim for compensation against the Banner Coal Company for accidental injuries received in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the. Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, insurer, bring certiorari.

Fidelia Crane presented her claim for compensation against Leonard, Crossette & Riley for the accidental death of her husband in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the Southern Surety Company, insurer, bring certiorari.

John Zoltowski presented his claim for compensation against the Ternes Coal & Lumber Company for an accidental injury in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the commissioner of insurance (State accident fund), insurer, bring’ certiorari.

Carrie Bresee and another presented their claim for compensation against the Clark Equipment Company for the accidental death of their decedent in defendant’s employ. From an order' awarding compensation, defendant brings certiorari.

), J. Certiorari by Frank Jean against Henry Moeller, drain commissioner of Bay county, and others to review the proceedings in establishing a drain. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff brings error.

), J. Petition by the people of the State of Michigan, on the relation of William Liebnitz, against Phoebe L. Patterson to determine defendant’s right to hold the office of justice of the peace. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

), J. Daniel J. Kellar was convicted of robbery while armed, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 10 nor more than 25 years in the State prison at Jackson.

), J. Kate Redmon presented a claim against the estate of Anthony Sieber, deceased, for services rendered. The claim was allowed in part only by the commissioners, and plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

), J. Bill by D. Adelbert Clark and another against Joseph B. Beckenstein and Walter H. Clark to enjoin summary proceedings before a commissioner, and for an accounting. From the decree rendered, plaintiffs and defendant Clark appeal.

<p>1. Justices of the Peace — Right to Hold Office Not Subject to Collateral Attack — Acts of De Facto Officer Vaud.</p> <p>In a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter, the right of the municipal justice, who issued the warrant and before whom the examination was held, to hold the office will not be inquired into, since the acts of a de facto officer are valid.</p> <p>2. Criminal Law — Information—Right of Accused to be Informed of Offense Charged.</p> <p>The right Of an accused to be fully informed of the nature of the charge against him relates, so far as the information is concerned, solely to the charge and not to the evidence in support thereof.</p> <p>3. Same — Involuntary Manslaughter — Acts Relied Upon.</p> <p>An information charging defendant with involuntary manslaughter by reason of his driving his automobile while in an intoxicated condition, forbidden by Act No. 164, Pub. Acts 1917, and thereby causing the death of deceased, held, sufficient, although the specific act or acts which brought about the death were not set out; defendant’s contention that said offense was not malum in se but merely malum prohibitum because forbidden by statute under a penalty not being tenable.</p> <p>4. Same — Voluntary Intoxication Malum In Se.</p> <p>Voluntary intoxication is an offense not only malum pro,hibitum but malum in se, wrong in and of itself,</p> <p>5. Same — Involuntary Manslaughter — Information—Sufficien"cy.</p> <p>In an information charging involuntary manslaughter committed while perpetrating an unlawful act not amounting to a felony, it is sufficient to allege the unlawful act with sufficient particularity to identify it, and then to charge that as a consequence the defendant caused the death of the deceased, and there is no need to aver in detail the specific acts of the accused; while in case of manslaughter arising out of some negligence or fault in doing a lawful act to. a grossly negligent manner and from which death results, the duty which was neglected or improperly performed must be charged as well as the acts of the accused constituting failure to perform or improper performance.</p> <p>On the question of intoxication of person operating automobile in highway, see note in L. R. A. 1917A, 313;</p> <p>Intoxication as affecting homicide by negligent operation of automobile, see note in L. R. A. 1918B, 957.</p> <p>6. Same — Conviction of Inferior Offense on Same Transaction Not a Bar — Former Jeopardy.</p> <p>Defendant’s contention that his conviction in the municipal court, after the accident and before the death of deceased, of the crime of driving an automobile while intoxicated on the occasion in question is a bar to the prosecution for manslaughter, claiming former jeopardy, is without merit, since the former conviction was for a misdemeanor and did not and could not include the present charge.</p> <p>7. Same — Date of Offense Charged — Statutes—Information— Sufficiency.</p> <p>Where, the complaint and the second count of the information charged the offense to have been committed on the 20th, the date deceased died, while the third count charged the offense to have been committed on the 8th, the date of the accident, defendant’s contention that he could not toe convicted of manslaughter committed on the 8th because he had not been so charged is without force under the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 15746), since time is not of the essence of the offense.</p> <p>8. Same — Trial—Instructions—Defenses—That Different Medical Treatment Would Have Prevented Death No Defense.</p> <p>Defendant was not entitled to have the case submitted to the jury under the theory that he would not be guilty of manslaughter if different or more skilful medical treatment might or would have prevented the death, since it would be no defense to show that other or different medical treatment might or would have prevented the natural consequences flowing from the wounds inflicted through his culpable negligence.</p> <p>9. Homicide — Involuntary Manslaughter While Intoxicated— Intent.</p> <p>It is not the law that one who commits the crime of manslaughter while under voluntary intoxication and because of such intoxication must be sober enough to fully realize that in his intoxicated condition he might do something to kill another; intoxication being the gravamen of his offense and the greater the degree thereof the- more aggravated the offense; intent not being involved.</p> <p>10. Criminal Law — Plea oit Guilty — Evidence—Sufficiency.</p> <p>Where defendant was convicted in the municipal court, on his plea of guilty, of the misdemeanor of driving his car on the occasion in question, while intoxicated, and urged such conviction in bar of this prosecution, it cannot he said that there was no evidence to show that he was driving the car.</p>

Louise Billiet presented for probate the last will of Matheus Ver Vaecke, deceased. The will was allowed in the probate court, and Henry Ver. Vaecke and others appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for contestants. Proponent brings error.

<p>Parties — Interveners—Attachment—Statutes—Mandamus.</p> <p>Under 3 Comp. Laws 1315, § 12362, plaintiff may not be permitted to intervene for the sole purpose of moving a dissolution of attachment against her property, since that would not be “in subordination to and in recognition of the propriety of the main proceeding,” required by the statute as a condition of intervention.</p>

), J. Bill by Dennis H. Dwyer, executor and trustee under the will of Francis P. Dwyer, deceased, and as survivor of the partnership of Dwyer & Dwyer, against Mary Bohan and others for a discovery of the property of the estate and partnership. Defendant Bohan filed a. cross-bill for an accounting. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant Bohan appeals.

), J., presiding. Bill by Edgar Demrick against Minnie Demrick for a divorce: On petition of defendant for a modification of the decree awarding alimony. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Appeal from Muskegon; Vanderwerp (John), J.</p> <p>Bill by Frank P. Forrest against Mary Felch Forrest for a divorce. From, a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p>

Clair; Tappan (Harvey), J. Bill by the Standard Oil Company against Mary C. Murray for the specific performance of a land contract.. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

(Watson), J. Bills by the Sandusky Grain Company and the Ionia Hardware Company against Borden’s Condensed Milk Company and others to enforce mechanic’s liens. Defendant Borden company filed a cross-bill to enforce liability against the Maryland Casualty Company as surety on the bond of the contractor. From the decree rendered, defendants Borden Company and Maryland Casualty Company appeal.

), J., presiding. Assumpsit by Sam Kane and another against the Detroit Life Insurance Company on certain policies of insurance. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant brings error.

), J. Mandamus by Harry L. Shupert and another to compel Andrew J. Edwards, treasurer of Ingham county, to accept a sum as payment of a mortgage tax, and to issue a certificate showing the amount secured. From an order denying the writ, plaintiffs bring certiorari.

), J. Bill by the Security Investment Company against Saul H. Meister and another to quiet title to land. Defendant Meister filed a cross-bill to reinstate a land contract and for specific performance. From a decree for defendant Meister, plaintiff appeals.

Bill by Blanche C. Outhwaite against Lincoln Rodgers and others to enjoin an interference with plaintiff’s water rights in a certain building and for a partition of said building. From the decree rendered, both parties appeal.

), J., presiding. Bill by Mary Lewandowski against Andrew Nadolny, individually and as administrator of his wife’s estate and as guardian of his minor child, for the cancellation of a deed. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

), J., presiding. Bill by the Acme Lumber Company against the Modern Construction Company, Minnie McAuliff and the Wayne County & Home Savings Bank to enforce a mechanic’s lien. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant McAuliff appeals.

), J. William Hastings was convicted in justice’s court of violating the fish law. Upon appeal to the circuit court, a verdict of not guilty was directed by the court. The people bring error under Act No. 159, Pub. Acts 1917.

), J., presiding. Assumpsit in justice’s court by Harry Rubin against Crowley, Milner & Company for goods sold and delivered. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict. Defendant brings error.

Mandamus by William L. Thiedemann to compel the State board of dental examiners to issue a license for the practice of dentistry in this State.

Clair; Law (Eugene F.), J. Bill by William H. Watkins against Clarence B. Minor and others for the specific performance of an optional land contract. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

), J. Bill by William Pratt against Edna M. Corns, administratrix of the estate of Fred Judson, deceased, to enjoin the enforcement of a judgment. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

, presiding. Assumpsit by the Skillman Lumber Company against John C. Love, doing business as the J. C. Love Lumber Company, for breach of a contract for the sale of certain lumber. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

Assumpsit by the people of the State of Michigan, for the use and benefit of the Lapeer County Bank, against William F. O’Connell and another as sureties on an official bond. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants bring error..

), J. John Hahn was convicted of a felonious: assault, and was sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 18 months nor more than 3 years in the Detroit house of correction.

), J. Bill by George Waller, administrator of the estates of Arthur N. Greene and Otto C. Carpel, deceased, and others, against John P. Lieberman for the specific performance of a land contract. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal.

), J. Assumpsit by the Clinton Grain Company against Jay F. French and John C. Wallace, copartners as J. F. French & Company, for a balance due under a contract for the purchase of hay. Judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict for less than the amount claimed. It brings error.

), J. Bill by the township of Avon and others against the Detroit United Railway to enjoin the collection, of passenger rates under the provisions of Act No. 382, Pub. Acts 1919. From an order perpetually staying proceedings, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Error to Wayne; McDonald (John S.), J., presiding.</p> <p>Case by Henrietta Niman against the Detroit United Railway for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

), J. Bill by the village of Plainwell against the Eesley Light & Power Company to enjoin defendant from increasing its rates. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

), J. William Bunde, guardian of August Bunde, presented a claim against the estate of Fred Bunde, deceased, for services rendered. The claim was allowed by the commissioners, and defendant appealed to the circuit, court. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

), J. Assumpsit in justice’s court by James H. Steinhoff against George Bullock for installments due on a land contract. Defendant pleaded the general issue with notice of set-off. There was judgment of no cause for action, and defendant appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error.

<p>1. Courts — Rule of Law Laid Down to be Applied in Subsequent Proceedings.</p> <p>A rule of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision of a cause is to be applied upon the same state of facts in all subsequent proceedings in the cause.</p> <p>2. Carriers — Street _ Railways — Negligence—-Tracks Intervening Between Car and Depot.</p> <p>Where a street railway company stops a car where other tracks are between it and the depot, the rights of people having business with such depot and the duty of the company towards them are the same as if all of the intervening space between the depot and the car constituted the platform, and it is negligence on its part to allow another ear to run between the alighting passenger and the depot.</p> <p>On duty to look and listen before crossing track' of electric road, see notes in 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 254; 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1224.</p> <p>On injury to street car passenger who, upon alighting, passes around car, and is struck by car on another track, see notes in 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729; 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 887.</p> <p>3. Same — Contributory Negligence — Right to Assume Intervening Track Clear.</p> <p>A passenger, while not absolved from the duty of exercising care for his safety, has the right to assume that the tracks intervening between the place where he alights and the station will be kept safe while he is crossing, and the mere fact that he fails to look and listen before attempting to cross such tracks does not, as a matter of law, constitute contributory negligence.</p> <p>4. Same — Look and Listen Rule Not Strictly Applicable to Passenger.</p> <p>The rule requiring one about to cross a railroad track to look and listen does not apply in all its strictness to a passenger who alights from a street car and passes behind it to cross the intervening track to reach the depot.</p> <p>5. Trial — Motion for Directed Verdict — Plaintiff’s Evidence Must be Considered Most Favorably on Defendant’s Motion.</p> <p>On a motion by defendant for a directed verdict plaintiff’s testimony must be considered in the' light most favorable to her.</p> <p>6. Carriers — Street Railways — Passenger Crossing Intervening Track — Contributory Negligence — Question for Jury.</p> <p>Whether plaintiff, on alighting from a street car, was guilty (of contributory negligence in attempting to cross an intervening track between it and the depot, when she was struck by a moving car, held, under the evidence, a question of fact for the jury.</p> <p>7. Same — Trial—Instructions—Issuer Presented.</p> <p>Defendant’s complaint that in the charge undue emphasis was given to the question of defendant’s negligence and insufficient instruction given as to the question of plaintiff’s contributory negligence, 'held, not supported by the record, the charge as a whole properly submitting the issues to the jury.</p> <p>8. Trial — Argument of Counsel — Right to Argue Law.</p> <p>Counsel has the right to argue his theory of the law to the jury.</p> <p>9. Carriers — New Trial — Excessive Verdict.</p> <p>A verdict for $6,680, held, under the evidence, not excessive.</p>

Case-made from Van Buren; Des Voignes (L. Burget), J. Condemnation proceedings in justice’s court by the village of Paw Paw against Barbara Flook. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant appeals.

), J. Bill by Cuthbert L. Vosburgh and another against Bert F. Middleditch and others to enjoin the payment of a sum due under a building contract. A. Harvey’s Sons Manufacturing Company was permitted to intervene claiming an amount due for materials furnished under the contract. From a decree for intervener, plaintiffs and defendant Middleditch appeal.

), J. Case by Freeman Moffit against the White Sewing Machine Company and another for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant company brings error.

), J. Mandamus by Catherine McCarthy to compel James Couzens and others, constituting the pension committee of the fire department of the city of Detroit, to grant a pension. From an order granting the writ, defendants bring certiorari.

), J. Carmelo V. Di Pietro was convicted of receiving stolen- property, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 1 nor more than 5 years in the State prison at Jackson.

<p>Witnesses — Corporations—Testimony as to Matters Equally Within Knowledge of Deceased Officer.</p> <p>In an action on a contract brought by one corporation against another, the vice-president of the plaintiff corporation may not testify to matters which, if true, would be equally within the knowledge of the deceased vice-president of the defendant corporation and not within the knowledge of any surviving officer or agent of the corporation, said testimony being within the inhibition of 3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12553.</p>

<p>1. Divorce — Desertion.</p> <p>On a hill for divorce by the husband on the grounds of desertion, where there was no failure or misconduct on the part of plaintiff shown, he was entitled to a decree.</p> <p>2. Same — Aiamony—Nominal Amount — Maintenance of Child.</p> <p>Where plaintiff at the time of the hearing had no property, and was employed at farm labor at $50 per mouth, while defendant was earning $105 per. month, a decree making a nominal provision in lieu of dower, requiring plaintiff to pay defendant’s taxable costs, including an attorney fee of $80, and directing the payment by plaintiff of $3 per week for the child until the further order of the court, the child having a good home with defendant’s parents at a keeping charge of $3 per week, was equitable.</p> <p>On the question of modification of decree of divorce because of changed conditions, see note in 44 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1026.</p>

Mandamus by Nellie Bowman to compel Arthur Webster, circuit judge of Wayne county, to vacate an order denying an attachment for the nonpayment of alimony.

Cross-appeals from Kent; McDonald (John S.), J. Bill by the townships of Lowell and Bowne against Robert B. Patterson, drain commissioner of Kent county,, and others to enjoin the construction of a drain. From the decree rendered, all parties appeal.

), J., presiding. Bill by Anna B. Lawton against Viola L. Campau and others for the cancellation of a deed. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

), J. Bill by Henry P. Goldstein against Harry Applebaum and others for the execution and delivery of a land contract. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

M.), J., presiding. Assumpsit by Charles E. Baker against the Northern Assurance Company, Limited, of London, England, on a policy of insurance. Judgment for plaintiff for less than amount claimed. He brings error.

Bill by Ella Radford, an infant, by her next friend, against Carlton Radford for separate maintenance. Defendant filed a cross-bill for the annulment of the marriage. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

), J. Bill by Idella M. Power against Elwood C. Palmer and another to set aside certain deeds. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

), J. Bill by the Acme Lumber Company against Hugh Swanston and others to enforce a, mechanic’s lien. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant Swanston appeals.

<p>X. Fixtures — Mortgages—Rule as to When Articles Not Attached Become Subject to Mortgage.</p> <p>No specific rule can be laid down designating when articles not permanently attached to the realty become subject to a mortgage thereon.</p> <p>2. Same — Evidence—Intent—Question for Jury.</p> <p>In an action of replevin by a mortgagee against the mortgagor of vineyard land to recover the possession of certain machinery removed from a grape juice plant on said land by defendant after foreclosure, evidence held, to present a question for the jury as to whether said machinery, not attached to the freehold at the time the mortgage was executed, became subject to the mortgage.</p> <p>3. Evidence — Replevin—Mortgages—Conversation and Letters Admissible.</p> <p>Where the question at issue was whether it was the intention of the parties that equipment for a grape juice plant not yet attached to the freehold should become a permanent accession to the freehold and thus become subject to the mortgage thereon, talk between the parties and letters, from the mortgagor to mortgagee were admissible in evidence over objection that it tended to alter, vary, enlarge, and change the written mortgage.</p> <p>4. Replevin — Right to Possession — Proof.</p> <p>Plaintiff in replevin must prove that he was entitled to the possession of the property described in the writ on the day of its issue.</p> <p>5. Appeal and Error — Evidence—Harmless Error.</p> <p>In an action of replevin brought by a mortgagee against the mortgagor of vineyard land to recover the possession of machinery in a grape juice plant removed by defendant from said land after foreclosure, claimed by him not to be covered by said mortgage, evidence that plaintiff had paid the claims of vendors of certain of the' property replevined after the action was begun, held, not prejudicial to defendant, since the jury were properly instrueted that the only question for them to pass upon, aside from damages, was whether the mortgage covered the property described in the writ.</p> <p>6. Witnesses — Adverse Witness — Impeachment.</p> <p>Where counsel for plaintiff called defendant for cross-examination under the statute (3 Comp. Laws 1915, § 12554), and, when he had concluded, counsel for defendant examined him at length on the entire issue presented, plaintiff was properly permitted, after defendant had rested, over objection of defendant, to introduce testimony tending to impeach him.</p> <p>7. Estopped — Party Invoking Must Have Been Prejudiced.</p> <p>In order that the conduct of a party should constitute an estoppel, it must appear that the other party had acted to his prejudice, relying on it.</p> <p>8. Same.</p> <p>Plaintiff was not estopped from claiming, in an action of replevin, that certain machinery in a grape juice plant was covered by.his mortgage on the realty because as attorney for a creditor in defendant’s bankruptcy proceedings he had claimed that a part of the machinery was personalty, where defendant had not acted to his prejudice, relying thereon.</p>

<p>1. Negligence — Trials-Admission and Rejection of Testimony.</p> <p>In an action for personal injuries caused by being struck by defendant’s automobile at or near a street intersection, held, no reversible error in the court’s rulings on the admission and rejection of testimony as to the nature of plaintiff’s injuries, no claim being made that the verdict is excessive, and a full cross-examination of plaintiff having been permitted.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error — Striking Answer Cured by Later Reception of Answer.</p> <p>There was no reversible error in striking out the answer of witness that at the time of collision the car was going very slow, where he afterwards testified that it was going 8 or 9 miles an hour.</p> <p>3. Same — Word Omitted in Transcript Corrected by Judge in Certificate.</p> <p>Where the trial judge instructed the jury that a violation of the provisions of the ordinance regulating speed “is not in and of itself negligence,” but in the transcript of testimony furnished defendant’s attorney the word “not” was inadvertently emitted, it was not error for the judge to state in Ms certificate that he used the word “not” in said instruction.</p> <p>4. Same — Charge as. Whole Considered Rather Than Certain Sentences.</p> <p>Where the charge of the court fairly presented to the jury the claims of the parties and the law applicable thereto; error alleged on certain sentences thereof will not be considered.</p> <p>5. Negligence — Contributory Negligence — Conflicting Testimony Presents Question for Jury.</p> <p>Where there was a sharp conflict in the testimony as to the conduct of the plaintiff, the question of his contributory negligence was properly one for the jury.</p>

), J. Bill by Frank L. Clark and another against Walter F. Johnson and others to correct a mistake in a land contract. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendants Johnson appeal.

), J. Bill by Shirley Cook and another against Harriet Sadler and others to quiet title to certain land, and for an accounting. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

<p>1. Vendor and Purchaser — Forfeiture—Waiver.</p> <p>Attempted forfeiture or rescission, by notice of a land contract may be waived and is waived by subsequent acts clearly inconsistent with an intent to exercise the right, such as the acceptance of interest upon a note given as part of the purchase price and the renewal of same and its subsequent payment.</p> <p>2. Same — Payment of Note — Duty of Vendor — Waiver.</p> <p>Although a note given as part of the consideration of a land contract was a separate obligation, and was negotiable, it could not be enforced, after forfeiture or rescission, if it remained in the hands of the original parties, and if plaintiffs intended to insist on their forfeiture of the contract, it was their duty to refuse payment tendered thereon and return the note to defendants, and the acceptance of payment amounted to waiver of their right to forfeit.</p> <p>3. Same — Forfeiture—Ejectment—Payment of Tax on Contract After Action Begun.</p> <p>In ejectment to recover the possession of land sold by plaintiffs on land contract, after notice of forfeiture for default, the trial judge was not in error in permitting plaintiffs, during the progress of the trial, to pay the tax on the land contract imposed by statute (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 4268 et seq.) and afterwards receive the contract in evidence.</p> <p>4. Same — Right to Forfeit While in Default on Tax.</p> <p>As to whether grantors could legally forfeit a land contract while they were in default in the payment of said tax, — quwre.</p>

<p>Error to Wayne; Marschner (Adolph F.), J.</p> <p>Case by Henry Van Goosen against Lewis T. Barium for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

), J., presiding. Bill by Leonard B. Orloff Company against Walker & Company to set aside a default judgment, and to stay an execution. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Insurance — Life Insurance — Default—Lapsed Policy — Reinstatement — Health Certificate — Evidence—Question for Jury.</p> <p>In an action on an insurance policy on the life of plaintiff’s wife, where the defense was that the policy had lapsed, the controverted question as to whether defendant’s agent, at the time the premium was paid, told plaintiff that a health certificate would he unnecessary as a condition of reinstatement, held, properly submitted to the jury.</p> <p>2. Same — Neglect op Agent — Neglect op Company — Estoppel.</p> <p>If the agent informed plaintiff that no health certificate was necessary, and plaintiff was never informed to the contrary until after the loss occurred, defendant would be liable although it in fact demanded a health certificate and wrote said agent to procure same, since the neglect of the agent would be the neglect of defendant.</p>

Bill by Edith Bird and others against Frank A. Couchois and another, copartners as Couchois Brothers, for specific performance of a lease. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendants appeal.

), J. Bill by Charles E. Kirby and another against the city of Monroe and others to enjoin the issuance of certain bonds. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiffs appeal.

), J. Assumpsit by Antonio Dinovo and others, copartners as the Dinovo Fruit Company, against Charles; McClintick, doing business as McClintick & Compány,. for the breach of a contract for the sale of certain melons. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant brings error.

Amy Savage presented her claim for compensation against the city of Pontiac for the accidental death of her husband in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant brings certiorari.

William H. Myers presented his claim for compensation against the Wadsworth Manufacturing Company for accidental injuries in defendant’s employ: On petition of defendant and the General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Limited, insurer,, to discontinue payments under an agreement. From an order denying the petition, defendants bring certiorari.

Certiorári to Industrial Accident Board. Henry Geis presented his claim for compensation against- the Packard Motor Car Company for accidental injuries in defendant’s employ: On petition of defendant to discontinue payments. From an order denying the petition, defendant brings certiorari.

Maggie W. Kostamo presented her claim for compensation against the H. G. Christman Company for the accidental death of her son in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the General Accident, Fire and Life Assurance Corporation, Limited, insurer, bring certiorari.

Mildred Shaw and others presented their claim for compensation against the Packard Motor Car Company for the accidental death of their decedent in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant brings certiorari.

<p>1. Taxation — Exemption—Property op University of Michigan Exempt.</p> <p>"Where defendant leased certain lots in the city of Detroit owned by the University of Michigan, and erected thereon certain buildings which, under the terms of the lease, were to be the property of the University, a tax levied on said buildings as personal property and assessed against defendant was void, the property of the University being the property of the State and therefore exempt from taxation.</p> <p>2. Same — Tax on Building Not Tax on Leasehold.</p> <p>Where the record shows that the tax was against the building, it cannot properly be said to be a tax on defendant’s leasehold interest.</p> <p>3. Same — Curative Statutes — Jurisdiction.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s contention that the curative statute (1 Comp. Laws 1915, § 4098) providing that “No tax assessed upon any property * * * shall be held void * * * on account of any irregularity in any assessment,” etc., should be invoked to cure the defect and hold that there was really an assessment of defendant’s leasehold interest cannot be sustained, since upon the record the board of assessors never attempted to assess defendant’s leasehold rights and therefore never acquired jurisdiction, and curative statutes can never cure want of jurisdiction.</p> <p>4. Same — Taxability of Leasehold Interest Moot Question.</p> <p>The question of the taxability of defendant’s leasehold interest, not being before the court, will not be considered.</p> <p>This indenture, made this 15th day of November, A. D. 1911, between the regents of the University of Michigan, a body corporate, created by the Constitution of the State of Michigan (hereinafter called the lessor), and Edwin S. George, of the city of Detroit, Wayne county, Michigan (hereinafter called the lessee), witnesseth:</p> <p>GRANT.</p> <p>I. That the said lessor, for and in consideration of the rents hereinafter reserved, and of the covenants and agreements hereinafter expressed on the part of the lessee to be kept, performed and fulfilled, has demised and leased, and hereby does demise .and lease unto the lessee all those certain premises situate and being in the city of Detroit, county of Wayne and State of Michigan, described as follows, to-wit:</p> <p>Dot ‘D’ of the James: A. Jones re-subdivision of lots one (1), two (2) and three (3) of the Ira Davis subdivision of Park lot sixty (60), according to the plat thereof as recorded in liber 7 of plats, page 49; and also lot twelve (12) of the subdivision of Park lots sixty-one (61) and sixty-two (62), according to the plat thereof as recorded in liber 1 of plats, page 128, Wayne county registry;</p> <p>To have and to hold said premises with all the rights, privileges, easements, hereditaments and appurtenances thereto belonging unto the said lessee for and during the term of forty (40) years from and after the first day of January, in the year of our Lord one thousand and nine hundred and twelve, on the terms and conditions hereinafter specified, unless said term shall be sooner terminated as hereinafter provided.</p> <p>Said lessor does covenant, bargain and agree to and with said lessee that at the time of the ensealing and delivery of these presents It is well seized of the above leased premises in fee simple, and that they are free from all incumbrances whatsoever, and that it will warrant and defend the same against all lawful claims whatsoever accruing against said property prior to January 1st, 1912, and also against all claims whatsoever accruing thereafter, by, through, or under the lessor.</p> <p>RENTAL.</p> <p>II. In consideration whereof, said lessee hereby covenants and agrees to pay the lessor as rental for said demised 'premises,; at the office of the treasurer of the University of Michigan, at Ann Arbor, Michigan, the sum of twenty-five hundred dollars ($2,500) per annum for the first ten (10) years of said term, payable in equal monthly installments of two hundred and eight and 34/100ths dollars ($208.34) each, in advance, on the first day of each month during said ten years.</p> <p>A rental of thirty-nine hundred dollars ($3,900) per annum for the second ten (10) years of said term, payable in equal monthly installments of three hundred and twenty-five dollars ($325) each, in advance, on the first day of each month during the said second ten (10) years.</p> <p>A rental of five thousand' dollars ($5,000) per annum for the third ten (10) years of said term, payable in equal monthly installments of four hundred and sixteen and 67/100ths dollars ($416.67) each, in advance, on the first day of each month during said third! ten (10) years.</p> <p>A rental of six thousand dollars ($6,000) per annum for the last ten (10) years of said term, payable in equal monthly installments of five hundred dollars ($500) each, in advance, on the first day of each month during said last ten (10) years.</p> <p>All of which rents shall be payable in lawful gold coin of the United States of America of the present standard of weight and fineness, provided that acceptance by said lessor at anytime of any portion of the- whole of said rent 'in any other money than gold coin shall amount to a payment of the rental, to the amount so paid, but shall not be a waiver or release of the right of said, lessor afterwards to insist upon and have all future payments of such rents made in such gold coin.</p> <p>It is agreed that all rent that shall not be paid when due shall bear interest at the rate of six (6%) per cent, per annum from the date when the same is payable until the same shall be paid by said lessee.</p> <p>ERECTION OF NEW BUILDING AND INSURANCE.</p> <p>III. The lessee further covenants and agrees that he will construct upon said premises at some time during the term, of this lease a building, or buildings, whose cost shall be at least the sum of fifty thousand dollars ($50,000); such building or buildings may be erected at different times and in parcels as lessee may wish, which, however, shall be so designed and constructed that ultimately they will constitute one building; and said lessee agrees to furnish said lessor written evidence, satisfactory to it, that said building has cost at least that sum. And said lessee further covenants and agrees that he will not use or permit said premises, or any part thereof to be used for any unlawful purpose, or for a saloon, or for any purpose which will constitute a nuisance.</p> <p>The said lessee further covenants and agrees to keep all buildings erected upon said premises during the term of this lease, which can be damaged by fire, insured against loss by fire in companies satisfactory to said lessor, and in an amount equal at least to fifty (50%) per cent, of their value.</p> <p>In the event that the building or buildings which may be erected upon said premises are destroyed, or partially destroyed by fire, the lessee covenants and agrees to re-construct or restore such building or buildings within a reasonable time, so that said building or buildings shall be in as good condition and of as good construction as they were before such fire; and as security for the performance of this covenant it is agreed that all fire insurance shall be' payable to said lessor which may be used by said lessee in the reconstruction or restoration of said building or buildings; Provided: That in case said lessee shall not so reconstruct or restore said building or buildings within a reasonable time after such fire, then said lessor may reconstruct or restore said building or buildings and use all moneys received on fire insurance for the purpose of defraying the cost of such reconstruction or restoration, and the balance, if any, shall go to said lessee.</p> <p>The lessee further covenants and agrees that all boilers, elevators, or other machinery in the building or buildings which may be erected on said premises shall be insured in the name of said lessee against accident in some responsible casualty company or companies, to be approved by said lessor, and In case of damage or destruction of said building or buildings by casualty or accident to said boilers, elevators on machinery, or in case of damage by casualty to said boilers, elevators and machinery, all provisions, conditions, covenants and agreements of every nature herein contained, relating to damage or destruction by fire, shall apply fully in like manner to any damage or destruction by casualty or accident; and said lessee further covenants and agrees that he will save said lessor harmless from all damage on account of injuries to person, life or property in, on or about said building or buildings by reason of such damage or destruction by casualty or accident to such boilers, elevators and machinery, or on account of fire, or any other cause beyond the control of said lessor.</p> <p>And said lessee further covenants and agrees that in case the lessor shall, without any neglect or fault on its part, be made a party to any litigation commenced by or against the said lessee, then the lessee shall pay all reasonable costs and attorney fees incurred or imposed upon the lessor hereto.</p> <p>CARE OF PREMISES, REPAIRS, ETC.</p> <p>IV. Said lessee further covenants and agrees that he will keep all buildings erected on said premises in good repair and will keep the sidewalks on and adjoining said premises in good repair and free from snow, ice and other obstructions; and that all health and police regulations shall in all respects and at all times be fully complied with by the said lessee, and the said lessor kept harmless and indemnified at all times against any loss, damage, cost or expense by reason of the failure so to do in any respect, or by reason of any accident, loss or damage resulting to persons or property by reason of any use which may be made of .said premises, or by reason of any act or thing done upon said premises by or through the act or negligence of said lessee or -his assigns, or any of his agents or representatives.</p> <p>TAXES AND PUBLIC CHARGES.</p> <p>V. Said lessee further agrees to pay, within six months after they are payable, during the entire term of this lease, all water rates, and all lawful taxes and assessments, general and special, extraordinary as well as ordinary, and all public charges of every kind and description that may be levied or assessed or become due upon or against said premises and upon any building or buildings which may be erected thereon, as hereinbefore provided, or upon any building, addition or improvement of any kind which may at any time during said term be placed thereon, and also all such taxes, assessments or public charges as shall or may become due or be levied or assessed upon the leasehold interest in said property vested in said lessee or in said lessor by this indenture; and the said lessee hereby agrees that he will procure at the time of payment and forthwith deliver to the said lessor, either original or duplicate receipts of the proper officers for the payment of all such taxes, assessments or charges.</p> <p>In case of the failure, neglect or refusal of the lessee' to pay any such taxes or assessments or other charges within six months after the same shall become due and payable, or in the case of the sale of said property, or any part thereof for the non-payment of any of such, charges, taxes or assessments, then and in that case, this lease shall, at the option of said lessor, cease and determine; or, in case of such failure, neglect or refusal, said lessor may, at its option, elect to pay such unpaid charges, taxes or assessments or to buy any tax titles outstanding upon said premises, or any part thereof, by reason of the default of said lessee in the payment thereof, and may treat the sum or sums so paid as so much additional rent due forthwith and have the same remedy or remedies, for the nonpayment thereof as are given it by law or by the terms of this lease for the non-payment of the rents hereinbefore reserved.</p> <p>ASSIGNMENT.</p> <p>VI. The said lessee further covenants and agrees not to sell or assign this lease, or any interest therein, without the written assent of the lessor, and such assent shall not release the lessee from any of his obligations hereunder.</p> <p>The said lessee further covenants and agrees that said written assent by the lessor shall operate as a license to assign only to the party or parties named in the said written assent and that said written assent shall in no way impair the obligations of the above covenant, which shall remain in full force and operation.</p> <p>It is not intended to hereby limit or abridge the right of said lessee to sub-let said premises, or any part thereof, which privilege he has, subject to the limitations and conditions herein contained.</p> <p>It is further agreed that the joint signature of the lessor and lessee shall be required in all cases to an instrument in writing, whereby any person other than said lessee may directly or indirectly acquire the right to use or occupy any portion of any street or alley upon which said property abuts.</p> <p>FORFEITURE.</p> <p>VII. This lease is upon express condition that said lessee shall punctually perform all of his covenants and agreements herein set forth; that, time is of the essence of this contract; that if said rents, or any past thereof shall be in arrears and unpaid for a period of thirty (30) days after they are payable, as above provided, or, if said taxes, and insurance premiums, or any part thereof, shall be in arrears and unpaid for a period of six (6) months after the same are payable, or if default be made in any of the other covenants of this lease, and such default continue for sixty (60) days after notice is given by the lessor to the lessee, then it shall and may be lawful for the lessor to re-enter into and repossess the said premises, and the said lessee and each and every other occupant to remove and put out.</p> <p>Said lessor may bring suit for and collect all sums which may have accrued in its favor under this lease, and all damages it may have sustained on account of the breach of this lease by said lessee. But said lessee may, at any time before the expiration of said sixty (60) days, pay all moneys due and make all repairs and do all things mentioned in and required to be done by the notice given by the lessor to the lessee, Provided, That in case any rent shall become due under this lease, demand for the payment of such rent, or for the possession of such premises is hereby waived, according to the provisions of section 11164 of the Compiled Laws of 1897.</p> <p>It is further covenanted and agreed that all buildings, fixtures and improvements situate on said premises shall belong to said lessor and that said lessee hereby expressly covenants and agrees that upon the termination of this lease for any cause aforesaid, be will at once surrender and deliver up the above described premises, together with all the improvements thereon, to the lessor.</p> <p>VIII. All notices required by this lease shall be in writing, and shall specify the breach of covenants and in what particular default is claimed to have been made, and may be served either personally or by mailing such notice to- the party to be served at his post-office address in Detroit, Michigan, or at such address as shall have been furnished by the lessee to the lessor id. writing. If no service can be made upon said lessee in the manner aforesaid, such notice may be served by posting same in some conspicuous place upon said premises.</p> <p>It is further agreed that no waiver of a breach In any of the covenants of this lease shall be construed to be a waiver of any succeeding breach of the same or any other covenant.</p> <p>POSSESSION.</p> <p>IX. Said lessor covenants and agrees that the said lessee on performing all of the covenants and agreements aforesaid on his part, shall and may at all times during said term, peacefully, quietly have, hold and enjoy the said demised premises for and during the term hereby granted.</p> <p>TO EXTEND TO HEIRS.</p> <p>X. It Is further agreed that all of the covenants, agreements, conditions and undertakings herein contained shall extend to and he binding upon the representatives, heirs, executors, administrators, successors and assigns of the respective parties hereto, as if they were in all cases named, and these covenants shall be construed as covenants running with the land.</p> <p>In witness whereof, the said lessor has caused its corporate seal to be hereto affixed, and these presents to be subscribed by its president and secretary; and the said lessee has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first above written.</p> <p>Signed, sealed and delivered in presence of:</p> <p>Beulah B. Davis, Georgie E. Jackson, Harold H. Emmons, A. G. Finley.</p> <p>The Regents of the University of Michigan.</p> <p>Harry B. Hutchins, President.</p> <p>Shirley W. Smith, Secretary.</p> <p>Edw. S. George (L. S.)</p> <p>(The foregoing instrument was duly signed and acknowledged on November 15, 1911.)</p>

), J. Case by Philip Gee, Jr., an infant, by his next friend, against Albert Brunt for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

), J. Assumpsit by Earle A. Gardner against the Michigan Employers Casualty Company for commissions on the sale of stock. Judgment for defendant non obstante veredicto. Plaintiff brings error.

), J. Case by John Morain and another against Gustave Tesch and another for fraud in the exchange of real property. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants brings error.