¶1 Evidence of speed in excess of tbe statutory limits is prima facie evidence “that tbe speed is not reasonable or prudent and that it is unlawful.” Public Laws 1935, cb. 311, sec. 2. It is, therefore, prima facie evidence of negligence. Woods v. Freeman, 213 N. C., 314. A prima facie showing carries tbe case to tbe jury for it to say whether or not tbe crucial and necessary facts have been established; Woods v. Freeman, supra; Cox v. R. R., 149 N. C., 117, 62 S. E., 884; Brock v. Ins. Co., 156 N. C., 112, 72 S. E., 213; unless plaintiff’s evidence is such that tbe conclusion that plaintiff’s intestate was guilty of contributory negligence is tbe only reasonable conclusion to be deduced from tbe testimony. Mulford v. Hotel Co., 213 N. C., 603. If tbe record discloses any evidence of contributory negligence it is not of sufficient probative force to require tbe conclusion as a matter of law that tbe deceased by bis conduct proximately contributed to bis injury and death.
¶2 There is likewise sufficient evidence that tbe car driven by defendant’s daughter was in use as a family car to require tbe submission of an appropriate issue thereon.
¶3 The judgment below is
¶4 Reversed.