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← 214 So. 2d 589 - Armstrong v. State

214 So. 2d 589 - Armstrong v. State’s Empirical Analysis

1968

Citation profile

61
cited by 61 later decisions
1
cited 1 times by the Supreme Court
4
states following
August 2018
most recently cited

1 federal appellate · 57 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 61 later decisions (1 by the Supreme Court) — most recently August 2018 · most notably Gray v. Mississippi (1987), 454 So. 2d 445 - Billiot v. State (1984)

1 federal appellate · 57 state decisions

280196819701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Brady v. State of Maryland · Witherspoon v. Illinois · Bumper v. North Carolina · Jencks v. United States · Clewis v. Texas

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 61 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The proper method of bringing the death penalty to the attention of the special veniremen is for the trial judge to inform them that they have been summoned as veniremen in a capital case and that a verdict of guilty could result in the infliction of the death penalty. The judge should then ask them if any member of the panel has any conscientious scruples against the infliction of the death penalty, when the law authorizes it, in proper cases, and where the testimony warrants it. If there are those who say that they are opposed to the death penalty, the trial judge should then go further and ask those veniremen, who have answered in the affirmative, whether or not they could, nevertheless, follow the testimony and the instructions of the court and return a verdict of guilty although that verdict could result in the death penalty, if they, being the judges of the weight and worth of the evidence, were convinced of the guilt of the defendant and the circumstances warranted such a verdict. Those who say that they could follow the evidence and the instructions of the court should be retained, and those who cannot follow the instructions of the court should be released. The mere fact that a venireman is opposed to the death penalty does not disqualify him as a juryman, if he can do his duty as a citizen and juror and follow the instructions of the court, and where he is convinced of the defendant's guilt he can convict him although the verdict of the jury may result in the death ”
    14 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. “"* * * [T]he defendant should be permitted to inspect tangible evidence which may be used against him or which may be useful in his defense. This does not mean that a defendant may peruse the private files of a prosecuting attorney or examine his private notes. It does mean, however, that the concept of `due process' and `fair trial' requires that material, tangible evidence must not be concealed from the defendant who is accused of crime. There is no good reason why the defendant in a civil case should be entitled to more liberal right to tangible evidence in the possession of his adversary under the authority of section 1659, Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated (1956) than is a person under a serious criminal charge."”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “If a special venire facias is ordered and the jury box is empty, the trial judge is authorized to order the clerk to issue a special venire facias directing the sheriff to summon as many jurors as may be necessary, not less than forty. § 1795, Miss.Code 1942 Ann. (1956); Riley v. State, 208 Miss. 336 , 44 So.2d 455 (1950). Moreover, the statutory method of selecting jurors is directory, not mandatory, and unless it is shown that the method used was fraudulent or such a radical departure from the method prescribed by the statute as to be unfair to the defendant or to prevent due process of law, this Court will not reverse. Boyd v. State, 204 So.2d 165 (Miss. 1967); Ladner v. State, 197 So.2d 257 (Miss.1967); Wiggins v. State, 224 Miss. 414 , 80 So.2d 17 (1955). ( 214 So. 2d at 594 ).”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.