215 Cal. App. 4th 596 - In re Stoneroad’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'reflect[ ] due consideration of the specified factors as applied to the individual prisoner in accordance with applicable legal standards.' " ( Shaputis II , at p. 210, 134 Cal.Rptr.3d 86 , 265 P.3d 253 , quoting [ In re ] Rosenkrantz, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 677 , 128 Cal.Rptr.2d 104 , 59 P.3d 174 , and citing Lawrence, supra, 44 Cal.4th at p. 1204 , 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 , and [ In re Shaputis (2008) ] 44 Cal.4th [1241,] 1260-1261, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 213 , 190 P.3d 573 [ ( Shaputis I ) ].)' ( Stoneroad, supra, 215 Cal.App.4th at p. 616 , 155 Cal.Rptr.3d 639 .) We are required to affirm a denial of parole 'unless the Board decision does not reflect due consideration of all relevant statutory and regulatory factors or is not supported by a modicum of evidence in the record rationally indicative of current dangerousness, not mere guesswork.' ( Ibid . ) "The nexus to current dangerousness is critical. ' Lawrence and Shaputis I "clarified that in evaluating a parole-suitability determination by either the Board or the Governor, a reviewing court focuses upon 'some evidence' supporting the core statutory determination that a prisoner remains a current threat to public safety-not merely 'some evidence' supporting the Board's or the Governor's characterization of facts contained in the record.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Poole

2. “' "Subdivision (b) of [Penal Code] section 3041 provides that a release date must be set 'unless [the Board] determines that the gravity of the current convicted offense or offenses, or the timing and gravity of current or past convicted offense or offenses, is such that consideration of the public safety requires a more lengthy period of incarceration for this individual,' " ' and mandates that the Board 'normally' set a parole date for an eligible inmate, and must do so unless it determines [that] an inmate poses a current threat to public safety. ( [ In re ] Prather [ (2010) ] 50 Cal.4th [238,] 249, 112 Cal.Rptr.3d 291 , 234 P.3d 541 [ ( Prather ) ], quoting In re Lawrence (2008) 44 Cal.4th 1181 , 1202, 82 Cal.Rptr.3d 169 , 190 P.3d 535 ( Lawrence ).) As a result, parole applicants have a 'due process liberty interest in parole' and ' "an expectation that they will be granted parole unless the Board finds, in the exercise of its discretion, that they are unsuitable for parole in light of the circumstances specified by statute and by regulation.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Poole

3. “Unlike the parole suitability determination, which focuses on whether the inmate is currently dangerous and is governed by his or her postconviction behavior, the setting of the base term is designed to insure life prisoners do not serve terms disproportionate to the culpability of the individual offender. The proportionality of a sentence turns entirely on the culpability of the offender as measured by 'circumstances existing at the time of the offense .' ( In re Rodriguez (1975) 14 Cal.3d 639 , 652 [ 122 Cal.Rptr. 552 , 537 P.2d 384 ]....”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. In re Palmer