¶1concurring specially.
¶2I concur in Divisions 2, 3, and 4 and in the judgment. I am troubled, however, by the issue raised in Division 1 of the majority opinion.
¶3It is certainly true that OCGA § 24-9-61.1 (a) places the decision whether to allow a victim to remain in the courtroom squarely within the trial judge’s discretion. Georgia case law provides little guidance, however, as to what would constitute an abuse of discretion. In my view, the cases cited by the majority are not exactly on point. In both Barfield v. State, 170 Ga. App. 796, 797 (2) (318 SE2d 219) (1984) and Miller v. State, 155 Ga. App. 54, 55-56 (4) (270 SE2d 466) (1980), the defendant was charged with aggravated battery under OCGA § 16-5-24 (a) by causing “bodily harm to another ... by seriously disfiguring [her] body.” In those cases the physical condition of the victim was an essential element of the offense. In Watts v. State, 200 Ga. App. 54, 56 (6) (406 SE2d 562) (1991), the victim testified (and was then permitted to remain in the courtroom). It is clear, therefore, that her physical condition was in no way comparable to that of the victim in this case.
¶4This court has found no abuse of discretion in allowing the State to exhibit to the jury a three-year-old victim of aggravated assault, for the purpose of displaying the scar from his wound, Cail v. State, 194 Ga. App. 584, 585 (1) (391 SE2d 444) (1990), or in permitting the *165State to display an infant to the jury, where the defendant was charged with aggravated cruelty to children and aggravated battery. Harmon v. State, 208 Ga. App. 271, 272-273 (2) (430 SE2d 399) (1993). On the other hand, we have found an abuse of discretion when relatives of the victim repeatedly disrupted courtroom proceedings with uncontrolled emotional outbursts, Price v. State, 149 Ga. App. 397-400 (1) (254 SE2d 512) (1979), and when relatives of the victim were permitted to sit at the prosecution table without a showing by the State that their presence was necessary for an orderly presentation of the case. Walker v. State, 132 Ga. App. 476 (208 SE2d 350) (1974).
¶5Although not as prejudicial, perhaps, as the situation in Price, supra, the presence in this case of the comatose victim slumped in a wheelchair throughout the trial surely could not have been ignored by the jury. It was likely to disturb and stir them despite having absolutely no probative value. Nevertheless, I can agree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in permitting her presence.
¶6The court gave careful consideration to the issue, and endeavored to balance the rights of the victim with those of the defendant. Ultimately, concluding that his discretion was very broad, he allowed the victim to remain but placed sensible restrictions on her presence: no medical attention could be administered to her in the courtroom and she could stay only if she was absolutely quiet. In addition, he gave direction to the State, cautioning it that the victim could be pointed out — introduced, so to speak — to the jury, but not “constantly” referred to during the trial.
¶7It appears clear to me, however, that the real error lies in the prosecution’s disregard of this last instruction from the court. The State exceeded the limits set by the court. Indeed, it exceeded the bounds of both responsible prosecutorial conduct and simple fairness. It certainly did far more than point out or “introduce” the victim to the jury; it in fact did refer to this victim “constantly.” In addition, the State had two different witnesses point out the victim. I believe this was unacceptable in light of the court’s direction. It prejudiced and inflamed the jury, and it resulted in “wrong or oppression” sufficient to warrant interference by this court. Lemley v. State, 245 Ga. 350, 353-354 (3) (264 SE2d 881) (1980).
¶8Unfortunately, however, the defense objected only once to the State’s actions in this regard, and that objection was not made on the ground that the State had exceeded the limits set by the court. Any error inherent in the State’s conduct therefore was not preserved for review. As a result, I am constrained to agree with the majority that the judgment must be affirmed.