Townsend v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

22 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 22 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"To obtain the right of a speedy public trial provided by section 10 of our Bill of Rights, as legislatively defined by the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, it is incumbent upon the accused incarcerated in a penal institution of this state to comply with all provisions of the Act, including the preparation of his written request for disposition of detainer to be addressed to the court in which the indictment, information or complaint is then pending against him and to the county attorney charged with the duty of prosecuting it.” Brimer v. State, 195 Kan. 107 , Syl. ¶ 2, 402 P.2d 789 (1965).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sweat v. Darr · In Re Habeas Corpus Application of Sweat

2. ““At the time of appellant’s trial the general legislative definition of a speedy trial was found in K.S.A. 62-1431 and 62-1432, providing for trial within two or three terms of court, depending on whether the accused was in jail or free on bond. Those statutes were repealed in 1970 by what is now K.S.A. 1973 Supp. 22-3402. [Citation omitted.] So long as the statutory deadlines are met, an accused is not heard to claim a denial of a speedy trial. [Citations omitted.] “As to inmates of a penal institution, however, those statutes are inapplicable. Inmates’ rights are governed solely by the detainers act. [Citations omitted.] In State v. Brooks, [ 206 Kan. 418 , 479 P.2d 893 (1971)], we held: ‘Where a prosecution is pending against an accused confined in a state penal institution for another offense, the definition of a speedy trial and the procedure for relief are governed by the provisions of the Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act, K.S.A. 62-2901 et seq., and the provisions of K.S.A. 62-1431 have no application.’ (Syl. ¶ 1.) “. . . He had a constitutional right to a speedy trial, but that right was defined in the detainer’s act. He concedes as much.” (Emphasis added.) Townsend, 215 Kan. at 487-88 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Angelo

3. ““The Uniform Mandatory Disposition of Detainers Act (K.S.A. 22-4301 et seq.) and the Agreement on Detainers (K.S.A. 22-4401 et seq.) are parallel acts designed for the purpose of securing a speedy trial to a defendant incarcerated in a penal institution either in this state or in another state. To invoke the strict 180 day limitation on time of trial under either of the two detainers acts it is incumbent upon an accused to substantially comply with all the provisions of the applicable act.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Sweat v. Darr