¶1dissenting.
¶2I respectfully dissent.
¶3We should keep in mind that interest is compensation allowed by law for the use, detention, or forbearance of money or its equivalent. See, Peters Trust Co., Trustee, v. Hecht, 118 Neb. 390, 224 N.W. 866 (1929); 45 Am. Jur. 2d Interest and Usury §1 (1969).
¶4In Kullbom v. Kullbom, 209 Neb. 145, 306 N.W.2d 844 (1981) (Kullbom I), this court determined that the marital estate included Terrence’s vested interest in pension and profit-sharing trusts; that Nancy and Terrence were each entitled to one-half of the value of the trusts; and that the trusts had a value of $75,133.25. This court then stated in Kullbom I: ‘‘We conclude that an equitable division of the marital property requires that Nancy be awarded 50 percent of the stipulated value of the trusts in question, in the amount of $37,566.75. However, since it is obvious that the appellee will not receive the value of such trusts until some unspecified time in the future, we conclude that he should not be required to pay Nancy the additional sum represented by her share of the trusts until he receives it . . . .” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 154, 306 N.W.2d at 849. The decision in Kullbom I did not impose on Terrence a present obligation to pay Nancy any specific amount based on the value of the trusts. There was no monetary judgment granted to Nancy. Rather, after de*151termining the value of Nancy’s interest, the court in Kullbom I imposed a trust on distributions made to Terrence from the pension and profit-sharing trusts. This “fixed percentage” method also preserves Nancy’s one-half of any increase attributable to her interest in the trusts. See, Pinkowski v. Pinkowski, 67 Wis. 2d 176, 226 N.W.2d 518 (1975); Bloomer v. Bloomer, 84 Wis. 2d 124, 267 N.W.2d 235 (1978). In this manner, when there is any distribution to Terrence or his designees, Nancy will be entitled to her proportionate share of any distribution from the trusts.
¶5The majority relies on Cumming v. Cumming, 193 Neb. 601, 228 N.W.2d 296 (1975), for support of its action. In Cummingthe petitioner was entitled to a share in her deceased father’s estate. The decree of dissolution required the petitioner to pay her husband $37,000 when the petitioner’s distributive share was assigned from her father’s estate. This court in Cummingheld: “[Ijnterest on the $37,000 payment, or any unpaid balance thereof, from petitioner to respondent shall accrue from the date of the decree of distribution assigning to petitioner her share of [her father’s estate].” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 605, 228 N.W.2d at 299. The situation in Cummingis no different from Kullbom I, because both cases involve assessment of interest on distributions receivable at an unspecified time in the future.
¶6Assessing interest from the date of the decree of dissolution in Kullbom I may deprive Nancy of interest earned by the trusts at a rate greater than the statutory rate borne by judgments. Equity would better be served by the assessment of interest at the statutory rate from the date when Nancy is entitled to receive her proportionate share of any distribution from the trusts. With the problems created by the assessment of interest in Kullbom II, Kullbom III is a possibility.