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← 215 U.S. 233 - United States v. Corbett

United States v. Corbett’s Empirical Analysis

215 U.S. 233 · 1909

Citation profile

170
cited by 170 later decisions
30
cited 30 times by the Supreme Court
7
states following
March 2017
most recently cited

56 federal appellate · 7 district · 30 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 170 later decisions (30 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 2017 · most notably Securities & Exchange Commission v. C. M. Joiner Leasing Corp. (1943), United States v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co. (1961)

56 federal appellate · 7 district · 30 state decisions

320190919101920193019401950196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Cochran v. United States · Evans v. United States · United States v. Hartwell · United States v. Keitel

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 170 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““But the argument is that, however cogent may be the considerations just stated, they are here inapplicable, because the statute is a criminal one, requiring to be strictly construed. The principle is elementary, but the application here sought to be made is a mistaken one. The rule of strict construction does not require that the narrowest technical meaning be given to the words employed in a criminal statute, in disregard of their context and in frustration of the obvious legislative intent. United States v. Hartwell, 6 Wall. 385 [ 18 L. Ed. 830 ]. In that case, answering the contention that penal laws are to be construed strictly, the court said (page 395): “ ‘The object in construing penal as well as other statutes is to ascertain the legislative intent. * * * The words must not be narrowed to the exclusion of what the Legislature intended to embrace; but that intention must be gathered from the words, and they must be such as to leave no room for a reasonable doubt upon the subject. * * * The rule of strict construction is not violated by permitting the words of the statute to have their full meaning, or the more extended of two meanings, as the wider popular, instead of the more narrow technical, one; but the words should be taken in such a sense, bent neither one way nor the other, as will best manifest the legislative intent.’ “It is to be observed that the rule thus stated affords no ground for extending a penal statute beyond its plain meaning. But it inculcates tha”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““The rule of strict construction does not require that the narrowest technical meaning be given to the words employed in a criminal statute in disregard of their context and in frustration of the obvious legislative intent.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.