215 W. Va. 331 - Ark Land Co. v. Harper’s Empirical Analysis
2004
Citation profile
14 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on 198 W. Va. 329 - Public Citizen, Inc. v. First National Bank in Fairmont · 196 W. Va. 35 - Murphy v. Smallridge · 160 W. Va. 610 - Murredu v. Murredu · Lynch v. Union Institution for Savings · 181 W. Va. 71 - Bishop Coal Co. v. Salyers
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 14 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In a partition proceeding in which a party opposes the sale of property, the economic value of the property is not the exclusive test for deciding in whether to partition in kind or by sale. Evidence of longstanding ownership, coupled with sentimental or emotional interests in the property, may also be considered in deciding whether the interests of the party opposing the sale will be prejudiced by the property's sale. This latter factor should ordinarily control when it is shown that the property can be partitioned in kind, though it may entail some economic inconvenience to the party seeking a sale.”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““[partition by sale, when it is not voluntary by all parties, can be a harsh result for the eotenant(s) who opposes the sale. This is because “‘[a] particular piece of real estate cannot be replaced by any sum of money, however large; and one who wants a particular estate for specific use, if deprived of his rights, cannot be said to receive an exact equivalent or complete indemnity by the payment of a sum of money.’” Wight v. Ingram-Day Lumber Co., 195 Miss. 823 , 17 So.2d 196, 198 (1944)(quoting Lynch v. Union Inst. for Savings, 159 Mass. 306 , 34 N.E. 364, 364-365 (1893)). Consequently, “[pjartition in kind ... is the preferred method of partition because it leaves cotenants holding the same estates as before and does not force a sale on unwilling cotenants.” Powell, § 50.07[4][a]. The laws in all jurisdictions “appear to reflect this longstanding principle by providing a presumption of severance of common ownership in real property by partition in-kind[.]” Craig-Taylor, 78 Wash. U.L.Q. at 753. “Thus, partitioning sale statutes should be construed narrowly and used sparingly because they interfere with property rights.” John G. Casagrande, Jr., Acquiring Property Through Forced Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 Boston C.L.Rev. 755, 775 (1986). See also Syllabus, in part, Smith v. Greene, 76 W.Va. 276 , 85 S.E. 537 (1915)(“The right to a partition of real estate in kind, as required by the common law, cannot be denied, where demanded, unless it affirmatively appea”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Joint owners of land are entitled to have partition in kind. . . . A sale cannot be decreed in a partition suit unless it appears, by report of commissioner or otherwise by the record, that partition cannot be conveniently made, and also that the interests of those interested in the land or its proceeds will be promoted by a sale.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.