Hill v. Wilson’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 65 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 87 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A] wholly independent intervening act could be held to be the sole proximate cause of resultant injuries. If on the other hand the intervening act be one the likelihood of which was definitely increased by the defendant’s act, or one which in fact was caused by the defendant’s act, it is not a superseding proximate cause of injuries incurred by reason of it. “An intervening act of a human being . . . which is a normal response to the stimulus of a situation created by the actor’s negligent conduct is not a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor’s conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about.” Restatement, Torts, 443. “The fact that an intervening act of a third person is negligent in itself or is done in a negligent manner does not make it a superseding cause of harm to another which the actor’s negligent conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about if, (a) the actor at the time of his negligent conduct should have realized that a third person might so act, or (b) a reasonable man knowing the situation existing when the act of the third person was done would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third person had so acted, or (c) the intervening act is a normal response to a situation created by the actor’s conduct and the manner in which it is done is not extraordinarily negligent.” Restatement, Torts, 447. Compare Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (1927), with Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an Act (1920), 33 Harvard L. Rev. 633. And ”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Southern Helicopter Service, Inc. v. Jones · Walton v. Tull

2. ““Negligence in a tort defendant is one thing, and proximate causation as a relation between negligence and injury is a separate and different thing. Yet the two things shade into each other. “Actionable negligence itself is a relational concept. There is no such thing as ‘negligence in the air’. Conduct without relation to others cannot be negligent; it becomes negligent only as it gives rise to an appreciable risk of injury to others. Acts done in a vacant field or by a lone traveler on a highway may not be negligent; the same acts done in a crowded city or in heavy highway traffic may well be negligent. The concept of actionable negligence is relational because an act is never negligent except in reference to, or toward, some person or legally protected interest. In other words, a negligent act is one from which an ordinary prudent person in the actor’s position — in the same or similar circumstances — would foresee such an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act, or to do it in a more careful manner.””

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Sander v. Kristof · 163 F. Supp. 764 - Johnson v. Stewart

3. ““We have repeatedly held that, during the term of court at which a judgment is rendered, the court has the inherent power to set aside the judgment, and it may do so without stating any cause. Appellant refers to the statute and numerous authorities, but they all refer to setting aside judgment after the term of court in which they were rendered. We know of no case, and our attention has been called to none, that prohibits a court from controlling its orders and judgments during the term in which they were entered. It therefore becomes unnecessary to set out the evidence taken on the motion to set aside the judgment. It was proper, of course, for the court to hear evidence, if he wished to do so, in order to determine whether the judgement should be set aside.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Robbins v. Guy