¶1MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
¶2Plaintiff Jerrold Davis (âPlaintiffâ), an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center (âStatevilleâ), alleges that Defendants, officials at Stateville and the Illinois Department of Corrections, violated his Eighth Amendment rights by subjecting him to cruel and unusual prison conditions. Second Am. Compl. [22]. On August 3, 2016, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiffs case for failure to state a claim. Defs.â Mot; Dismiss [24]. Defendants argue that, viewed objectively, Plaintiffs allegations are not sufficiently serious to establish a constitutional violation. Mem. Supp. Defs.â Mot. Dismiss [25]. For the reasons explained below, Defendantsâ motion is denied.
¶3I. Background
¶4Plaintiff has been an inmate at Stateville Correctional Center since 2006. Second Am. Compl. [22] ¶ 3, Ex. B. Plaintiff alleges that during his incarceration, Defendants have subjected him to deplorable living conditions that have exacerbated his asthma, increased his risk of bone cancer and fungal diseases, and caused leukemia. Id. ¶¶ 9, 21, 30, 36.
¶5Specifically, Plaintiff first alleges that Statevilleâs water supply includes excessive amounts of âmicrobiotic,â âinorganic,â and âradioactiveâ contaminants; âpesticides and herbicidesâ; and âorganic chemicals.â Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff further claims that the water supply contains radium, alpha emitters, copper, and lead. Id. ¶¶ 21-24. Plaintiff alleges that, due to these impurities, the water âis. often dark brownâ and âmalodorous.â Id. ¶ 25. He asserts that extended radium exposure may cause bone cancer, and that the radium and alpha *904emitters are the cause and aggravators of his leukemia. Id. ¶¶ 9, 21, 23.
¶6Plaintiff next alleges that Defendants âhave allowed numerous birds to fly freelyâ throughout the prison's living units and cafeteria. Id. ¶ 27. Plaintiff claims that these birds cause communicable and fungal diseases such as histoplasmosis, psittacosis, alveolitis, avian influenza, and campylo-bacteriosis. Id. ¶¶ 28-30. Additionally, Plaintiff claims that mice âroam in and out of cells regularlyâ and that there âare massive infestations of roaches and spidersâ in the inmatesâ cells and shower area. Id. ¶ 31. Plaintiff alleges that the roach infestation resulted in two roaches being removed from his right ear canal on June 26, 2016, and that he continues to experience âear pain, interference with sleep and psychological damage.â Id. ¶ 32.
¶7Third, Plaintiff claims that inadequate ventilation causes the air he breathes to be âthick with dust, hair, pest and bird dander, airborne viruses and wool fibers.â Id. ¶ 35. He further alleges that the vents in numerous cells are covered with steel plates that prevent air circulation. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff maintains that the resultant atmosphere exacerbates symptoms from his asthma. Id. ¶ 36.
¶8Finally, Plaintiff alleges that his cell is unsanitary due to Defendantsâ refusal to distribute adequate cleaning supplies on a regular basis. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff claims he is provided disinfectant for his cell only once a week and must share the disinfectant with the twenty-nine other cells in his gallery. Id. ¶¶ 42-43. He alleges that, due to these deficiencies, his cell and shower area cannot be adequately cleaned and that the resultant toxic mold can result in neurological damage and cancer. Id. ¶¶ 46-47.
¶9Plaintiff claims that Defendants are aware of the aforementioned conditions but have refused to adequately alleviate the problems. Id. ¶¶ 26, 33-34, 38, 48-49. Plaintiff argues that, combined, these conditions amount to cruel and unusual punishment and that Defendantsâ knowing disregard for Plaintiffs living situation constitutes deliberate indifference.
¶10II. Legal Standard
¶11A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) âchallenges the sufficiency of the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.â Gen. Elec. Capital Corp. v. Lease Resolution Corp., 128 F.3d 1074, 1080 (7th Cir. 1997). To survive a motion to dismiss, the claim must first comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure by providing âa short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,â Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), such that the defendant is given âfair noticeâ of what the claim is âand the grounds upon which it rests.â Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)).
¶12Second, the complaint must contain âsufficient factual matterâ to âstate a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.â Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955). That is, the allegations must raise the possibility of relief above the âspeculative level.â E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Servs. Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007). A claim has facial plausibility âwhen the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.â Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955). The plausibility standard âis not akin to a âprobability requirement,â but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.â Williamson v. Curran, 714 F.3d 432, 436 (7th *905Cir. 2018). The âamount of factual allegations required to state a plausible claim for relief depends on the complexity of the legal theory alleged,â but âthreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.â Limestone Dev. Corp. v. Vill. of Lemont, 520 F.3d 797, 803 (7th Cir. 2008). In evaluating the complaint, the Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiff. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.
¶13As to the alleged deprivations of Plaintiffs confinement, to sufficiently plead a claim under the Eighth Amendment, Plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) the alleged condition, viewed objectively, is sufficiently serious; and (2) Defendants acted with subjective deliberate indifference towards the condition. Board v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 479-80 (7th Cir. 2005); Delaney v. DeTella, 256 F.3d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 2001).
¶14Regarding the first element, prison conditions may be âharsh and uncomfortable without violating the Eighth Amendmentâs prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.â Dixon v. Godinez, 114 F.3d 640, 642 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834,114 S:Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994)). The Eighth Amendment âdoes not require prisons to provide prisoners with more salubrious air, healthier food, or cleaner water than are enjoyed by substantial numbers of free Americans.â Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472-73 (7th Cir. 2001). Rather, âextreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.â Turner v. Miller, 301 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2002). Plaintiff must show that the alleged deprivations, viewed objectively, are so serious as to amount to the denial of âthe minimal civilized measure of lifeâs necessities.â Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. 1970 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981)).
¶15Regarding the second element, âdeliberate indifferenceâ means âsubjective awareness.â Riccardo v. Rausch, 375 F.3d 521, 526 (7th Cir. 2004). The relevant in quiry is whether Defendants âactually knew about [Plaintiffs] condition, not whether a reasonable official should have known.â Qian v. Kautz, 168 F.3d 949, 955 (7th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Deliberate indifference âis more than negligence and approaches intentional wrongdoing.â Johnson v. Snyder, 444 F.3d 579, 585 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Collignon v. Milwaukee County, 163 F.3d 982, 988 (7th Cir. 1998)). Plaintiff must allege that Defendants âacted with the equivalent of criminal recklessness.â Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 777 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting Borello v. Allison, 446 F.3d 742, 747 (7th Cir. 2006)). That is, âa plaintiff must establish that the official knew of the risk (or a high probability of the risk) and did nothing.â Pope v. Shafer, 86 F.3d 90, 92 (7th Cir. 1996).
¶16III. Discussion
¶17Plaintiffs Second Amended Complaint alleges that, considered in their totality, Statevilleâs contaminated water, pest infestation, inadequate ventilation, and insufficient cleaning supplies amount to an Eight Amendment violation. Second Am. Compl. [22] ¶ 17. Accepting Plaintiffs allegations as true and drawing all reasonable inferences therefrom, Plaintiff sufficiently states a claim upon which relief may be granted.
¶19While a prisoner âis not constitutionally entitled to perfectly filtered water,â a âdenial of drinkable water, even for a few days, may be actionable.â Riley-el v. Illinois, No. 13-CV-5768, 2014 WL 3396531, at *2-*3 (N.D. Ill. July 10, 2014) (citing Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d 823, 830 (7th Cir. 2011)). Plaintiffs claims about Statevilleâs water supply are not novel, nor are Defendantsâ proffered critiques. In Jones v. Hardy, for example, the plaintiff brought an Eighth Amendment claim on the grounds that Stateville water âwas contaminated with radium and rust, prison employees did not drink it, and Plaintiff experienced diarrhea and nausea as a result.â No. 11-CV-699, 2012 WL 1133797, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2012). The plaintiff further alleged that the water, which possessed a âsmelly odor and rust color,â caused stomach discomfort that would âdouble him over in pain,â induced âa lot of joint pain,â and possessed high levels of radium âknown to cause cancer.â Jones, No. 11-CV-699, ECF No. 13 at 14, 18. As in the present case, the defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the âconditions were not so deficient to amount to a constitutional violation.â Jones, 2012 WL 1133797, at *2. Rejecting the defendantâs claim, the court found that â[c]ontrary to the Defendantâs contention, the Court cannot determine the severity of the conditions at this stage of this case.â Id. at *3. According to the court, the plaintiffs complaint âsufficiently plead[ed] the seriousness ofâ the contaminated water to state an Eighth Amendment violation.
¶20Similarly, in Riley-el v. Illinois, the plaintiff alleged that Stateville water was âtainted by radium,â was âbrown in color,â and âsmelled of sewage or rotten eggs.â 2014 WL 3396531, at *2. The plaintiff further claimed that âbecause of the contaminated water, he developed headaches, stomach pains, [and] diarrhea,â and that âexposure to the contaminated water could lead to cancer.â Id.On these allegations, the court denied a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The defendants, like Defendants here, argued that dismissal was warranted because the plaintiff presented âno evidence connecting his stomach pains and diarrhea to the alleged tainted water.â Id. at *3; see Defs.â Reply [31] 3 (âPlaintiff.. .lacks any factual support whatsoever for these allegations.â). The court held, however, that there âis no requirement at this stage of litigation that Plaintiff provide evidence, just that he state a plausible claim.â Riley-el, 2014 WL 3396531, at *3. The same reasoning applies here.
¶21Finally, the plaintiff in Truidalle v. Taylor alleged that Stateville water was polluted âwith dangerous toxins and dirty and filthy substances,â was âroutinely rusty, brown, and malodorous,â and âsmell[ed] as if it ha[d] been over-treated with chlorine.â No. 11-CV-1170, 2011 WL 6780690, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 23, 2011) (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiff further claimed that the water âexceeded maximum allowable levels of radiumâ linked to bone cancer and that â[t]he prison, along with towns in the Joliet area, issue[d] occasional âboil orders.ââ Id.The plaintiff alleged that consuming the water caused âa burning sensation,â diarrhea, stomach pains, âa lump on his scrotum,â and âcysts and moles growing on his body.â Id.The plaintiff also allegedly suffered from âa stroke and a heart attack,â âgastro-intesti-nal issues,â âacid reflux disease,â and âhigh blood pressureâ while incarcerated. Id.Denying the defendantsâ motion to dismiss, the court held that such allegations were âsufficiently seriousâ to allege a constitutional claim. Id.at *3-*5.
¶22Plaintiffs water allegations, as those in Jones, Riley-el, and Tmidalle, sufficiently raise a plausible cause of action. Defen*907dantâs reliance on Carroll v. DeTella, 255 F.3d 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2001) is misplaced. In Carroll, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants after an Illinois prison inmate claimed that his drinking water was contaminated with radium and lead. Id. at 471. As court noted in Truidalle, however, Carrollwas decided at the summary judgment stage âon the basis of a more fully developed record.â 2011 WL 6780690, at *4; see also White v. Monohan, 326 Fed.Appx. 385, 387 (7th Cir. 2009) (distinguishing Carroll on same grounds and reversing dismissal of Eighth Amendment claim for contaminated water). Moreover, the only injury asserted in Carrollwas âpossibleâ bladder cancer as opposed to the concrete injuryâleukemiaâPlaintiff claims to have sustained here. 99-CV-2443, 2000 WL 20711, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 10, 2000); see also Truidalle, 2011 WL 6780690, at *4 (distinguishing Carrollon grounds that it merely âinvolved fear of heightened cancer riskâ). Carroll, therefore, âdoes not necessarily preclude the instant caseâ at this juncture. Truidalle, 2011 WL 6780690, at *4.
¶23B. Pest Infestation
¶24A âprolonged pest infestation, specifically a significant infestation of cockroaches and mice,â may be considered a deprivation sufficient to constitute a constitutional violation. Sain v. Wood, 512 F.3d 886, 894 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1431 (7th Cir. 1996)). The Court must consider âhow extensive the infestation of a prisonerâs cell is, what the infesting pests are, what odors or bites or risk of disease they create, what particular psychological sensitivities the prisoner was known to have... and how long the infestation continues.â Thomas v. Illinois, 697 F.3d 612, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2012).
¶25In Antonelli, the prisoner plaintiff alleged that cockroaches and mice were âeverywhere,â âcrawling on his body,â âconstantly awakening him,â and âcausing the environment to be unsanitary.â 81 F.3d at 1431. The plaintiff further alleged that the prison received only two pest-control sprayings over sixteen months. Id.The district court dismissed the plaintiffs claim on the grounds that, given the periodic sprayings, it failed to sufficiently plead deliberate indifference on the part of prison personnel. Id.The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that two sprayings in sixteen months âmay have been seriously insufficientâ and did not ânecessarily show that the defendants were less than deliberately indifferent.â Id.The court stated that, as alleged, the pest infestation constituted âa prolonged deprivation seriously impacting on [the plaintiffs] healthâ that âshould not have been dismissed.â Id.
¶26Twelve yĂ©ars later, in Sain, the Seventh Circuit distinguished its Antonelliholding. In Sain, a civilly committed plaintiff alleged that his cell âwas infested with roaches.â Id. at 889. Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that, during his approximately six-year confinement, he âsaw roaches crawling around his cell,â and âcoming from under his bed and out of cracks in the wall and sink,â and thĂĄt âhe was bitten by a cockroach twice.â Id. at 889, 894. The plaintiff conceded, however, that an exterminator visited his cell âevery month or month and a halfâ or in specific response to the plaintiffs complaints. Id. at 894. The court held that, on these facts, while the conditions of the plaintiffs detention âwere certainly unpleasant,â they did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id.
¶27Since Sain, courts in this circuit have compared the particular circumstances of an alleged pest infestation with those presented in Antonelliand Sain. Compare, e.g., Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1007 (7th Cir. 2016) (finding pest infestation resulting in exacerbated asthma, âskin breakouts,â and psychological harm suffi*908ciently serious); White v. Monahan, No. 07-CV-437, 2013 WL 587511, at *7-*9 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 14, 2013) (finding five-year exposure to roaches, mice, bees, and wasps that resulted in near-daily insect bites sufficiently serious) with Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304, 312 (7th Cir. 2015) (finding allegations of âmere presence of laundry list of pestsâ without contact with plaintiffs person or property or claims of physical, psychological, or property damage not sufficiently serious); Allen v. Engelson, No. 14-CV-9398, 2016 WL 4245514, at *4-*5 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2016) (finding six-day exposure to mice and birds where mouse merely crossed inmateâs mattress and bird droppings landed on bed sheet not sufficiently serious).
¶28In Lyons v. Vergaraâa recent decision from this Districtâthe plaintiff alleged that his cell was âvirtually overrun with pests,â including âcockroaches, spiders, earwigs, and mice.â No. 14-CV-9564, 2016 WL 4493455, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 2016). The plaintiff further contended that he âwitnessed his cellmate having to have an insect removed from his ear canal,â and that as a result, he suffered from insomnia âdue to his great fear of experiencing the same trauma.â Id.Both the plaintiff and his cellmate âpurportedly slept with tissue in them ears to ward off bugs.â Id.The court found that these facts âcould support a finding that the infestation problem was âserious,â for purposes of constitutional analysis.â Id.
¶29Here, Plaintiffs allegations mirror those presented in Lyons. Moreover, Plaintiffs claims cover approximately a ten-year periodâseven-and-a-half times longer than the sixteen-month period presented in An-tonelli, and over one-and-a-half times longer than the six-year confinement in Sain. Additionally, contrary to Sain, where no evidence of physical harm was presented, Plaintiff alleges that two cockroaches were physically removed from his right ear canal. As in Lyons, Plaintiff alleges that this physical invasion has resulted in âpsychological damageâ and âinterference with sleep.â Second Am. Compl. [22] ¶ 32. Taking Plaintiffs allegations as true, as we must, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficiently serious conditions to survive a motion to dismiss.
¶30C. Inadequate Ventilation
¶31The Seventh Circuit has âcontinually espoused a prisonerâs right to adequate ventilation.â Bd. v. Farnham, 394 F.3d 469, 487 (7th Cir. 2005); Martin v. Tyson, 845 F.2d 1451, 1456 (7th Cir. 1988); Shelby County v. Westlake, 798 F.2d 1085, 1087 (7th Cir. 1986). When the plaintiff alleges âdirect physical manifestation of the harm caused by the poor ventilation, as well as the quite likely possibility for future health problemsâ he has satisfied the objective prong of an Eighth Amendment violation. Farnham, 394 F.3d at 486.
¶32In Famham, state prison inmates alleged that their jailâs heating and air flow system âissued a constant flow of black fiberglass dustâ that caused frequent nosebleeds and exacerbated one of the plaintiffs pre-existing asthma. Id. at 473, 475. Evidence indicated that the jail vents were vacuumed only once during the alleged time period, and that âthe jail was dusty and dirty all the time.â Id. at 474. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the defendantsâ motion for summary judgment and held that such allegations were âsufficient to constitute an objectively serious harmâ under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 486.
¶33Subsequently, in Myrick v. Anglin, the Seventh Circuit applied Famham in the context of a motion to dismiss. 496 Fed. Appx. 670, 675 (7th Cir. 2012). The plaintiff, an eight-year inmate, alleged unconstitutional conditions of confinement because, inter alia, he was âexposed to dust.â Id. at *909673-74. Unlike Farnham, however, the plaintiff did not allege severe physical manifestations, and only claimed that the dust âcaused him pain and difficulty breathing.â Id. at 675. Nevertheless, the court, citing Famham, reversed the district courtâs dismissal of the plaintiffs complaint. Id. The court affirmed that â[c]om-plaints of inadequate ventilation may state a claim for reliefâ and held that the plaintiffs claim was ânot so implausible that the district court could dismiss it at the pleading stage.â Id.
¶34Finally, in Ames v. Randleâalso from this Districtâthe plaintiff alleged that âthe vent intended to allow fresh air to flow into his cell [was] covered with a steel plate,â âthe exhaust fans [were] not used,â âand most windows [were] screwed shut.â 933 F.Supp.2d 1028, 1031 (N.D. Ill. 2013). The plaintiff claimed that the lack of ventilation caused air quality to be poor and air temperature to routinely exceed 90 degrees, which consequently undermined his health. Id.Specifically, the plaintiff claimed that he suffered from âfungal infections,â âan infection in the lining of his heart,â and âfrequent respiratory infections.â Id. at 1035. The defendants argued that the air was ânot so objectively harsh as to give rise to a claim of cruel and unusual punishment.â Id.The court disagreed, finding âlittle difficulty in concluding that the alleged conditions [were] plainly serious enough to satisfy the first prong of the two-step inquiry.â Id.
¶35Pursuant to Farnham, Myrick, and Ames, at this stage, Plaintiff raises a plausible Eighth Amendment claim. Plaintiff not only describes air quality (or lack thereof) comparable to the aforementioned cases, but also alleges a direct physical manifestation of the harm caused by the poor ventilationâaggravation of his asthma. Defendantsâ reference to Dixon v Godinez, 114 F.3d 640 (7th Cir. 1997), is inapposite. Although Dixonfound a plaintiffs inadequate ventilation claim meritless due to a lack of âbacking from medical or scientific sources,â id. at 645, âDefendants ignore the fact that Dixonwas decided on a motion for summary judgment.â Ames, 933 F.Supp.2d at 1036. Contrary to Defendantsâ assertions, whether evidence supports Plaintiffs allegations âis not an issue to be decided on a motion to dismiss, and is left for another day.â Id.
¶36D. Lack Of Adequate Cleaning Supplies
¶37Unhygienic conditions, âwhen combined with the jailâs failure to provide detainees with a way to clean for themselves with running water or other supplies, state a claim for relief.â Budd v. Motley, 711 F.3d 840, 843 (7th Cir. 2013) (reversing dismissal where jail failed to furnish cleaning supplies and conditions of detention included overcrowded cells, broken windows, cracked toilets, leaking water, extensive rust, mold, and spider webs); Vinning-El v. Long, 482 F.3d 923, 924-25 (7th Cir. 2007) (reversing summary judgment where prisoner was held for six days without sanitation items in cell contaminated with human waste and non-functioning sink and toilet); Johnson v. Pelker, 891 F.2d 136, 139-40 (7th Cir. 1989) (reversing summary judgment where prisoner was denied cleaning supplies and confined for three days to cell smeared with human waste and no running water).
¶38As the above cases indicate, the Seventh Circuit has recognized Eighth Amendment violations for deprivations of cleaning supplies âonly in extreme circumstances.â Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016). Plaintiff, however, âis entitled to have his complaint evaluated as a whole,â particularly where, as here, he combines his allegations into a single claim. Id.Some âconditions of confinement may establish an Eighth Amendment viola*910tion in combination when each alone would not do so.â Id.(quoting Gillis v. Litscher, 468 F.3d 488, 498 (7th Cir. 2006)). Similarly, an âadverse condition of confinement, if endured over a significant time, can become an Eighth Amendment violation even if it would not be impermissible if it were only a short-term problem.â Id.
¶39In Gray, the plaintiff, a fifteen-year Stateville inmate, claimed to see cockroaches âat least every other day, and sometimes as often as every few minutes.â Id. at 1003-04. He further alleged that mice ate his food, birds left their droppings on the floors and walls, and that the cell house was infested with insects. Id. at 1004. Although prison officials attempted to remove the birds every three months, utilized a pest control company once a month, and washed the floors every other day, the plaintiff maintained that the dander and feces remained in difficult-to-reach places. Id.The plaintiff further claimed that the prisonâs regulation of cleaning supplies contributed to the unsanitary conditions. Specifically, the plaintiff alleged that he received only one towel, which was replaced every eight months, and did not have access to mops, brooms, or buckets. Id.He also asserted that, although he was given watered-down disinfectant spray and permitted to purchase soap or detergent at the commissary, he was not permitted to store such chemicals in his cell. Id.The plaintiff alleged that, combined, the conditions of his confinement exacerbated his asthma and caused skin rashes. Id.
¶40The district court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding that ânone of the conditions Gray described were so bad that they violated the Eighth Amendment.â The Seventh Circuit reversed. The court acknowledged that the plaintiffs claims of pest infestation or lack adequate cleaning supplies, standing alone, âmay not describe a sufficiently serious condition to meet the first element of the Eighth Amendment test.â Id. at 1005. Taken together, however, âthe myriad infestations and his lack of access to adequate cleaning suppliesâ were sufficient to support a finding that the prison âdeprived [the plaintiff] of the basic human need of rudimentary sanitation in violation of the Eighth Amendment.â Id.
¶41Plaintiffs allegations warrant similar treatment here, particularly at this stage of the proceedings. Viewing Plaintiffs cleaning supplies allegations in conjunction with his other accusations discussed supra, Plaintiff has pleaded sufficiently serious hygienic conditions to survive a motion to dismiss.
¶42IV. Conclusion
¶43Defendantâs Motion to Dismiss [24] is denied. Defendants are directed to file an answer or other responsive pleading within twenty-one days of the date of this order.
¶44. Defendants' motion focuses solely upon the objective seriousness of Plaintiff's alleged living conditions; it does not challenge the sufficiency of Plaintiff's claim as it relates to deliberate indifference. See Mem. Supp. Defs.â Mot. Dismiss [25], Therefore, the second prong of the Eighth Amendment analysis will not be further discussed.