Beard v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

9 federal appellate · 6 district · 51 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 68 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “* * * We find no constitutional requirement that an indictment allege a prior conviction or convictions in any particular manner or in any particular place, so long as any such prior offenses are clearly stated as the basis for increased punishment if the accused is convicted of the current offense charged against him. Neither do we find any constitutional requirement that the jury must pass on the accused's alleged prior convictions at the same time that it passes upon the alleged current offense.”

   5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Lane v. Warden · Richard Lane v. Warden, Maryland Penitentiary

2. “"The binding effect of an admission by a stipulation in open court, such as we have here, is generally admitted, and such an admission dispenses with the need for producing evidence in usual form to prove the fact so admitted. * * * Wharton, op. cit., [2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.)] § 645, applies the general rule specifically to admissions of prior convictions, saying: `When the accused confesses the fact of the prior conviction, it is generally held that the state need not prove the fact, * * *.' "Some courts have adopted the view that notwithstanding an admission by the accused of a prior conviction, there must still be a finding thereof by the jury. See State v. Cardwell, 332 Mo. 790 , 60 S.W.2d 28 and Murmutt v. State, Tex.Cr. App., 63 S.W. 634 . In the Cardwell case the penalty was to be fixed by the jury. Cases which follow this view make a distinction between a waiver of proof of a fact and a waiver of a finding by the jury of an admitted fact. Such a distinction would have force in a situation where the accused seasonably sought to withdraw the admission and controvert the fact admitted, but that is not the situation here. "The Supreme Court of Iowa has held that the admission in open court of a prior conviction dispenses not only with other proof of such a conviction, but also with the necessity of a jury finding of such conviction. State v. Ganaway, 243 Iowa 1316 , 55 N.W.2d 325 ; State v. Shepard, 247 Iowa 258 , 73 N.W.2d 69 . In the instant case the def”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Armstrong

3. “The binding effect of an admission by a stipulation in open court, such as we have here, is generally admitted, and such an admission dispenses with the need for producing evidence in usual form to prove the fact so admitted. * * * Wharton, op. cit., [2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence (12th Ed.)] § 645, applies the general rule specifically to admissions of prior convictions, saying: `When the accused confesses the fact of the prior conviction, it is generally held that the state need not prove the fact, * * *.'”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Armstrong