Volume 216 — Michigan Reports

), J. John Sybisloo was convicted of violating the liquor law, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 6 months nor more than 1 year in the State prison at Jackson.

), J., presiding. Bill by Timothy A. Birney and another against T. Willard Ready and another for the specific performance of a land contract. Defendants filed a cross-bill praying to be decreed sole owners and for an accounting. From a decree for defendants, plaintiffs appeal.

), J. Case by David C. Apps, by his next friend, against Reuben Walters for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error.

), J., presiding. Bill by Alicia Lansing and others against Milton H. Perry to enjoin the construction of a garage. From a decree for defendant, plaintiffs appeal.

<p>Error to Livingston; Collins (Joseph. H.), J.</p> <p>Case by Nina Cord against Fred Pless for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

<p>1. Evidence — Negligence—Intoxication—Witnesses — Rebuttal.</p> <p>In an action for personal injuries caused by defendant taxicab company’s automobile, where a doctor had testified in behalf of defendant that when plaintiff was brought to the hospital, after the accident, he was intoxicated, testimony by plaintiff that he was not intoxicated, that the doetor had threatened to strike him, and that he had some money taken from him at the hospital, field, admissible as explaining the attitude of mind of the witness.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Eeeoe — Repetition of Questions — Good Faith.</p> <p>Repeatedly asking questions to which objections were sustained, where it does not appear that they were not asked in good faith, field, not reversible error.</p> <p>3. Negligence— Contributory Negligence — Intoxication — Due Care.</p> <p>While the intoxication of a pedestrian will not estcuse due care on his part in traveling over a highway, no greater care is required of him than is required of one in his sober senses.</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error — Instructions — Refusal of Requested Instruction — Intoxication.</p> <p>Where the question of plaintiff’s intoxication was in dispute, and the trial court had Instructed the jury that in determining the question as to whether or not the plaintiff did exercise due care and caution, they should take into consideration the question of whether he was intoxicated or not, and, if so, whether he was intoxicated to that degree that he could not exercise due care and caution, it was not reversible error to refuse defendant’s requested instruction on the subject of intoxication, where, in response to the inquiry of the court, “Is there anything else?” counsel did not suggest that the subject had not been fully covered.</p>

), J., presiding. Bill by Harry Goodman against Fred H. Wobig and another for specific performance of a contract.- From a decree for plaintiff, defendant Wobig appeals.

), J. Bill by Edmund L. Ebert against Walter J. Parle and another for the foreclosure of a land contract. From an order denying a motion to award a fund arising from the sale of crops under a chattel mortgage provision of the contract, plaintiff appeals.

Exceptions before judgment from Dickinson; Flannigan (Richard C.), J. Andrew Corsi was convicted of assault and battery, and Pasquale Sandrini was convicted of assault with intent to do great bodily harm less than the crime of murder.

), J. Bill by the Diamond Lumber Company against Robert E. Anderson and Edward T. Corwin, copartners as Anderson & Corwin, and another for specific performance of a lumbering contract. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

), J. Mandamus by William A. Harrington to compel the board of supervisors of Otsego county to allow a claim. From ail order denying the writ, plaintiff brings certiorari.

<p>Error to Kent; McDonald (John S.), J.</p> <p>Case by Charles H. Mapes against Everett Boersma for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.</p>

A.), J. Assumpsit by the C. A. S. Engineering Company against the H. J. Walker Company for commissions on the sales of certain goods. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

<p>1. Seduction — Evidence—Sufficiency.</p> <p>In an action for the seduction of plaintiff, a girl of 21 years of age, evidence tending to show that she vías backward' mentally, that she had little knowledge of the ways of the world, and that defendant, an experienced man of the world, induced her to submit to his sexual embraces by means of false protestations of love and affection, held, sufficient to warrant the,trial judge in submitting the case to the jury, although there was no promise of marriage. Mooke and Bird, JJ., dissenting.</p> <p>2. Same — Intercourse Alone Insufficient..</p> <p>Seduction is not committed where illicit intercourse is induced simply to gratify a lustful passion on the part of both.</p> <p>3. Judgment — Non Obstante Veredicto.</p> <p>Where there was sufficient evidence to present a .case for the jury, the trial judge properly refused to enter a verdict for' defendant non obstante veredicto.</p> <p>4. Seduction — Definition.</p> <p>Seduction may be defined to be the act of persuading or inducing a woman of previous chaste character to depart from the path of virtue by the use of any species of arts, persuasions, or wiles which are calculated to have, and do have, that effect, and resulting in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces oi the person accused.</p> <p>5. Same — Declaration—Sufficiency—Variance.</p> <p>The declaration, which informed defendant of the case he would be expected to meet, was sufficient, although in some regards it used general language where specific allegations would have been more appropriate; there being no question of variance.</p>

), J. Base Allie was convicted of larceny from the person, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 21/2 nor more than 5 years in the State prison at Jackson.

), J. Bill by Mary Warner against John Henry Kerr and another to set aside a deed on the ground of undue influence and mental incompetency. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

Burget), J. Assumpsit by Lee Harley and another against the Hartford Fruit Growers & Farmers Exchange for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant brings error.

Burget), J. Bill by John L. Pangburn against Floyd Sifford and another for the specific performance of a land contract. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

Cross-appeals from Kalamazoo; Weimer (George V.), J. Bill by Jennie E. Brender and another against Anna E. Stratton to enjoin an action of ejectment and to set aside a deed. From the decree rendered, both parties appeal.

), J. Robert Garner was convicted of an assault with intent to commit the crime of rape, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 2% nor more than 10 years in the State prison at Jackson.

), J.,'presiding. Bill by Hiram Dennis against Mohammed E. Sly-man and others to rescind an exchange of real and personal property on the ground of fraud. From a decree for plaintiff against defendant Slyman, he appeals.

<p>1. Deeds — Logs and Logging — Time Limit to Remove Timbee— Reversión.</p> <p>Under a deed conveying the timber upon certain land with the right to cut and remove the same at any time within three years, providing that all timber remaining thereafter should revert to grantors, and further providing for an extension of time of two years “if conditions require it,” the timber remaining upon the land at the end of three years reverted to and became the property of grantors’ vendee of the land, where no extension was requested, claimed, or given, and no conditions shown requiring an extension.</p> <p>2. Logs and Logging — Replevin—Defenses—Taxation.</p> <p>Where plaintiff’s land had been bid in to the State for taxes, but the period of redemption therefrom had not yet expired, his title was not so divested thereby as to preclude his maintaining an action of replevin for forest products unlawfully cut from said land by another.</p> <p>3. Same — State’s Right to Assert a Lien No Defense.</p> <p>Nor is it a defense to such action that, under 1 Comp. Laws 1915, §§ 4112, 4154, 4155, forbidding the cutting of timber upon lands upon which taxes remain unpaid, the State may assert a right to timber cut' therefrom and seize same for payment of taxes.</p> <p>4. Same — Laches—Estoppel.</p> <p>The finding of • the court below that plaintiff was not estopped from maintaining said action because of his laches in permitting defendant to cut timber and his . requesting payment of taxes, held, sustained by the record.</p> <p>As to the effect of the expiration of time for removal of timber, see note in 47 L. R. A. (N. S.) 882.</p> <p>As to title to timber when wrongfully severed, see note in 32 L. R. A. 422.</p>

), J. Bill by Lettie Nott against Martha Gundick for partition of certain real estate: On appeal of defendant from an order affirming an award of the commissioner on settlement of the decree.

), J. Bill by Fred W. Barney and others against Oliver W. Barney to enjoin an action of ejectment and to quiet title to land. Defendant filed a cross-bill to quiet title and for an accounting. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff Barney appeals.

), J. Daniel Donovan was convicted of having burglars’ tools in his possession, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 5 nor more than 10 years in the State prison at Jackson.

), J. Charles McDonald was convicted of receiving a bribe, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 2 nor more than 10 years in the State prison at Jackson.

Quo warranto by Alfred E. Campbell against Douglas E. Murray to try the title to the office of supervisor of Big Rapids township, Mecosta county. Judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict. Defendant brings error.

Mandamus by Frank A. Giles and others to compel Emmett E. Luce and others, comprising the board of- education of the rural agricultural school district of Napoleon township, Jackson county, to call an election. From an order denying the writ, plaintiffs bring certiorari.

Mandamus by Alex. J. Groesbeck, governor and chairman of the State administrative board, and Frank E. Gorman, State treasurer, to compel Oramel B. Fuller, auditor general, to draw his. warrant for the payment of certain salaries.

Mandamus by Oramel B. Fuller, auditor general, to compel the board of supervisors of Wayne county to spread the State tax as apportioned by the State board of equalization for the year 1921.

<p>1. Appeal and Error — Issues Raised by Parties Controlling— Questions Renewable — Amicus Cuele.</p> <p>Although general leave was granted to file briefs as amicus curies, in view of the fact that the issues are controlled by the parties to the case, the Supreme Court will not consider new issues raised in said briefs, but will consider only the issues raised by the parties.</p> <p>2. Corporations — Franchise Fee — Taxation — Specieio Tax— Statutes.</p> <p>The “annual franchise fee” required by Act No. 85, Pub. Acts 1921, to be paid by corporations at the time of filing their annual reports with the secretary of State, as required by part 5, chap. 2, § 5, Act No. 84, Pub. Acts 1921, is held to be a specific tax.</p> <p>3. Same — Franchise “to be” and “to do.”</p> <p>The franchise “to be” a corporation is a right belonging to the corporators, while the franchise “to do” is a right belonging to the corporation.</p> <p>4. Constitutional Law— Corporations — Taxation — Franchise Fee — Primary School Fund.</p> <p>Section 1, Art. 10, Const. 1909, providing that “all subjects of taxation now contributing to the primary school interest fund under present laws shall continue to contribute to that fund,” construed, and hold, to retain the then sources of revenue to the primary school interest fund, including the specific tax on the franchise to be a corporation in this State and all increases in such tax, but not to include the tax on the franchise to do business as a corporation in this State.</p> <p>5. Same — Statutes—Amendments.</p> <p>In view of the rule that all doubts should be resolved in favor of the validity of legislation, even if Act No. ' 182, Public Acts 1891, was infirm because the tax raised from the franchise to be a corporation was thereby appropriated to the general fund of the State rather than to the primary school interest fund (section 1, Art. 14, Const. 1850), it was not such1 a nullity as to prevent said infirmity being cured by the amendment of Act No. 46, Pub. Acts 1897.</p> <p>On right to be a corporation as a franchise within constitutional or statutory provisions subjecting franchises to taxation as property, see note in 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 255.</p> <p>6. Same — Taxation—Statutes—Construction—Validity.-</p> <p>Although section 8, Act No. 85, Pub. Acts 1921, is in conflict with section 1, Art. 10, Const. 1909, in that it appropriates the tax raised upon the franchise to be a corporation to the general fund of the State rather than to the primary school interest fund, said invalidity does not affect the rest of the act, and the appropriation therein of the annual tax upon the franchise to do business as a corporation within this State to the general fund is a valid exercise of the legislative will.</p> <p>7. Taxation — Powers of Legislature to Classify — Constitutional Law.</p> <p>The legislature has the power to classify for purposes of taxation, and it is the abuse of said power, and not its exercise, that is within the constitutional inhibition.</p> <p>8. Constitutional Law — Corporations— Classification — Taxation — Specific Tax.</p> <p>That Act No. 85, Pub. Acts 1921, provides for a minimum and maximum tax to be paid by corporations for the franchise to do business in this State, based upon the amount of capital stock, does not render it invalid because in conflict with section 4, Art. 10, State Const., providing for uniformity of taxation, or with the 14th Amendment to the Federal Constitution, providing for equality under the laws, 'although under the classification in said act there is a difference in the percentage of tax on the capital stock paid by the small corporation and the large one.</p>

), J. Case by Nina McCall Rock, an infant, by her next friend, against Thomas J. Carney and others for the unlawful restraint of plaintiff’s liberty in a detention hospital for treatment. Judgment for defendants on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error.

M.), J. Case by Ed. M. Struble, road commissioner of Arcada township, Gratiot county, and another against the Republic Motor Truck Company, incorporated, and others for wilful injuries to certain highways. Judgment for defendants on a directed verdict. Plaintiffs bring error.

), J. Henry Liebiotka was convicted of violating the liquor law, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 1 nor more than 2 years in the house of correction in Ionia.

Clair; Law (Eugene F;), J. Emma Stephenson presented a claim against the estate of Orlando M. Stephenson, deceased, for services rendered. . The claim was allowed in part in the probate court, and the estate appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for contestant on a directed verdict. Claimant brings error.

Assumpsit by Theron C. Rice-Wray against Ferdinand Palma for commissions on the sale of certain banking property. Judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict for less than amount claimed. He brings error. Defendant was engaged in the private banking and steamship, ticket business in Detroit, having two places of business.

Bill by Charles E. Habel against William E. Jeannot for an accounting and the transfer of certain corporate stock. Defendant filed a cross-bill for the specific performance of an option contract. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

Marie King and others presented their claim for compensation against the Peninsular Portland Cement Company for the accidental death of plaintiffs’ decedent in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation defendant and the Michigan Mutual Liability Company, insurer, bring certiorari.

Sylvia Punches presented her claim for compensation against the American Box Board Company for the accidental death of her husband in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the Michigan Employers Casualty Company, insurer, bring certiorari.

Julia Sebo presented her claim for compensation against Libby, McNeil & Libby, for the accidental •death of her husband in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corporation, Limited, insurer, bring certiorari.

Herman Gratopp, Minnie O’Connor, Kenneth Davis, and Noel Moon presented claims for compensation against the Carde Stamping & Tool Company for accidental injuries in defendant’s employ. The Employers’ Liability Assurance Corporation, Limited, and the General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corpora.tion, Limited, were named as insurers. From an order awarding compensation against the General Accident, Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, Limited, it brings certiorari.

B,. C. Hubbard, guardian of Kenneth, Raymond, Ford and Forrest Weeks, presented his claim for compensation against the Republic Motor Truck Company for the accidental death of their decedent in defendant’s employl From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the Travelers Insurance Company, insurer, bring certiorari.

William R. Walker presented his claim for compensation against the city of Port Huron for accidental injuries received in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant brings certiorari.

Joseph Brower presented his claim for compensation against W. H. Isgrigg & Son, a copartnership, for accidental injuries in defendant’s employ. From an order awarding compensation, defendant and the. State accident fund, insurer, bring certiorari.

), J. Case by the Wayne Soap Company, for the use and benefit of the Fidelity & Casualty Company of New York, against the Michigan State Telephone Company and another for the amount of a death award paid under the workmen’s compensation law. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant telephone company brings error.

<p>Error to Berrien; White (Charles E.), J.</p> <p>Case by Dorothy Levy against the Israelite House of David for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

Burget), J., presiding. Case by Alexander Clifford against the Detroit United Railway for personal injuries. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error.

), J. Case by Benjamin F. Douglas against Gunlek A. Bergland for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error. Defendant owns and operates a sawmill at Berg-land, on the shore of Lake Gogebic. The lake is navigable and of considerable proportions, being 17 miles in length and 3 miles in width at certain places. The village of Bergland has a population of about 400.

<p>1. Trial — Evidence—Admissions—Cross-Examination—Directed Verdict.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s testimony, on cross-examination, that before starting to drive across the street car track, where his view was obstructed by standing cars, he saw danger, held, not tantamount to an admission that he saw the car which struck him coming back from the “Y,” requiring a directed verdict in favor of defendant.</p> <p>2. Same — Evidence—Witnesses—Credibility for Jury.</p> <p>It was proper to permit plaintiff, on re-examination, to explain what he meant by his statements on cross-examination, and the credibility of such testimony was for the jury.</p> <p>3. Street Railways — Contributory Negligence — Notice of Danger.</p> <p>The rule does not require that the traveler must abstain from crossing railroad or street car tracks at all at the peril of being held guilty of contributory negligence because he has notice of danger, but that with such knowledge and notice he must use due care.</p> <p>4. Appeal and Error — Objection Based on Erroneous Conclusion.</p> <p>Defendant’s objection to an instruction of the court, based upon its erroneous conclusion that plaintiff had admitted that he saw the car which struck him coming, and not otherwise objected to, held, without merit.</p> <p>5. Municipal Corporations — Ordinances—Classification—Street Railways — Police Power.</p> <p>An ordinance of the city of Flint, limiting the speed of single-truck street cars to 12 miles an hour, while permitting double-truck cars to run 15 miles an hour, is a reasonable exercise of the police power of the city, within the discretion of the legislative branch of its government, and is not open to the objection that said classification invalidates it.</p> <p>On duty of operator of automobile when near street cars, see note in 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 493.</p> <p>On excessiveness of damages in actions for personal injuries other than death, see note in L. R. A. 1915F, 30.</p> <p>6. New Trial — Evidence — Hearsay — Affidavits — Impeaching Verdict — Compromise Verdict.</p> <p>An affidavit of a physician that one of the jurors had stated to him that the verdict was arrived at by each juror setting down the amount he thought plaintiff should recover and dividing the sum by the number of jurors was hearsay and not competent evidence of what took place in the jury room.</p> <p>7. Same — Juror May Not Impeach Verdict.</p> <p>The rule inhibiting the oral testimony of a juror in open court for the purpose of impeaching the verdict of the jury is alike applicable to an affidavit of the juror for the same purpose after the verdict is rendered and the jury discharged.</p> <p>8. Same — Damages—Evidence—Great Weight of Evidence.</p> <p>Where there was testimony tending strongly to show that plaintiff was suffering from neurosis as a result of the injury sued on, and had also received a permanent injury to the spine, it cannot be said that a verdict in his favor was against the great weight of the evidence, although the testimony was somewhat in conflict.</p> <p>9. Damages — Excessive Verdict.</p> <p>A verdict for $10,941.66 cannot be said to be excessive where there was testimony that as a result of the Injuries plaintiff had been unable to work for two years, resulting in a loss in earnings of $6,700, that his automobile was smashed, that he had doctors’ bills to pay, and less than $4,000 of the verdict represented his sufferings for two years and his future earnings.</p>

), J. Assumpsit by Irving Downing against John L. Underwood for breach of a contract for the sale of certain cattle. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

), J. Bill by Samuel Potaschnik against Leo Kaimola and another for the specific performance of a land contract. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

), J. Bill by the city of Grand Rapids against the Consumers Power Company to enforce a franchise contract. Perry Schurtz was permitted to intervene. From an order vacating the permission to intervene, petitioner appeals.

<p>Error to Kent; McDonald (John S.), J.</p> <p>Case by Carrie E. Gates against Richard Landon for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

' Error to Menominee; Flannigan (Richard C.), J. Case by the American Insurance Company of Newark, N. J., against Jacob J. Martinek for failure to cancel a policy of insurance. Judgment for plaintiff non obstante veredicto. Defendant brings error.

), J., presiding. Bill by the Hartwick Lumber Company against Louis Chonoski and others to foreclose a mechanic’s lien. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants Chonoski appeal.

), J. Walter Purman was convicted of receiving a stolen automobile, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 2 nor more than 5 years in the Detroit house of correction.

Clair; Law (Eugene F.), J. Bill by Joseph J. Gannon and another against Joshua Stansfield for the specific performance of a land contract. From a decree for plaintiffs, defendant appeals.

<p>Error to Kent; Lamb (Fred S.), J., presiding.</p> <p>Case by Robert V. Mundy against John S. McDonald for libel. From an order granting a motion to dismiss, plaintiff brings error.</p>

<p>1. Criminal Law — Involuntary Manslaughter — Evidence — Remarks as to Speed of Automobile by Witness — Res Gestas.</p> <p>In a prosecution for involuntary manslaughter charged to have been caused by defendant’s negligent driving of his automobile, testimony by a witness that while he was standing listening and watching the automobile, he made the comment that he believed a car was coming at a very rapid speed, and that he said something was sure to happen, was admissible as tending to show that witness’ attention had been particularly called to the car at the time, and that he distinctly remembered the occasion, especially since there is force in saying that the statement was part of the res gestee of the occurrence.</p> <p>2. Same — Cross-Examination as to Testimony at Coroner’s Inquest.</p> <p>Error in sustaining objection to a question on cross-examination of people’s witness as to his testimony upon the coroner’s inquest that the car in which deceased was riding was coming from the north was not reversible, where the testimony of defendant as well as that of all the other witnesses in the case was to the effect that it was coming from the east, and not from the north, and witness was interrogated later on the subject and answered.</p> <p>3. Same — Evidence—Conclusion.</p> <p>Striking out the answer of a witness, on direct-examination, that the driver of the car in which deceased was riding acted very much like a person intoxicated, was not reversible error, since it was merely an expression of opinion, and especially where witness later was permitted to describe in detail all of the actions which he claimed indicated intoxication.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>Nor was there any error in striking out the answer of said witness to the question, “Did you make a special and purposeful effort to discover from the breath of the driver whether he had been drinking or not?” where he had already gone into detail as to the actions and conduct of the driver as bearing upon the question of his intoxication.</p> <p>On evidence as to speed of automobile, see note in 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 778.</p> <p>On opinion evidence as to speed of automobile, see note in L. R. A. 1918A, 705.</p> <p>5. Same — Prosecuting Attorney — Opening Statement.</p> <p>The trial court was not in error in permitting the following statements, to be made by the prosecuting attorney in his opening statement to the jury: In speaking of what he expected to prove by a certain witness: “They watched it, and the unspoken thought in the mind of R. was, as he will tell you, something is going to happen,” nor, in speaking of another witness, “She gave just a glance, saw the closed car approaching Jefferson street to cross over Jefferson and to proceed west on Grand;” the objection being very technical; reasonable latitude must be given counsel' in making an opening statement.</p> <p>6. Same — Trial—Instructions—Presumption of Innocence.</p> <p>The instruction of the trial court that defendant “is presumed, gentlemen, to be innocent until proven guilty . beyond a reasonable doubt,” although the only reference to the subject, is not open to the objection that it was not an adequate charge upon the subject of the presumption of innocence, in the absence of any request to charge thereon.</p> <p>7. Same — Reasonable Doubt.</p> <p>Upon the subject of reasonable doubt, the instruction of the trial court that “A reasonable doubt is a fair, honest doubt, growing out of the evidence in the case and based . upon common sense and judgment. It is such a doubt that leaves your mind in such a condition that you cannot say that you have an abiding conviction, to a moral certainty, of the ‘truth of the charge here made against this respondent. It is not an imaginary doubt nor a doubt based upon sympathy but just what it says — a reasonable doubt," field, very full and complete.</p> <p>8. Same — Instructions as to Credibility of Defendant.</p> <p>An instruction by the trial judge that the jury should give defendant’s “testimony the same consideration as the testimony of any other witness except insofar as you may inquire into his motive and any interest he may have in the outcome of the case,” after instructing them that it was their duty to determine who wa3 telling the truth, and that it was for them to determine what inferences should be drawn from the testimony and what weight and credit should be given it, is not open to the objection that the court singled out the defendant in instructing the jury as to the credibility of witnesses, for the court might well have) gone further and instructed them that the defendant had an interest in the outcome of the case, which they might take into consideration.</p> <p>9. Same — Assignments Too General.</p> <p>Assignments in criticism of the charge as a wholes as argumentative of the people’s case and in not charging the defendant’s theory of the case, held, too general to receive consideration, and an unjust criticism, since defendant’s theory of the case was stated very fully and fairly.</p> <p>10. Same — Instructions as to Right of Way — Motor Vehicles.</p> <p>Where defendant had testified that he was going north and the car with which he collided was going west, there was no error in the instruction of the trial judge that the car going west had the right of why, since, as to who would have the right of way, under such circumstances, under the law, there can be no question.</p>

), J. Assumpsit in justice’s court by George W. Parker against Ray Baldwin for the amount of a note. There was judgment for defendant, and plaintiff appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

<p>Error to Bay; Snow (Ernest A.), J., presiding.</p> <p>Case by Robert V. Mundy against Guy V. Hoard for slander. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

), J., presiding. Bill by Lenore Green against Frank Green for a divorce. Defendant filed a cross-bill asking for a divorce. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

<p>1. Trial — Instructions—Personal Injuries — Permanent Injury —Damages.</p> <p>In an action for personal injuries caused by defendant’s automobile colliding with a light wagon in which plaintiff was riding with, her husband, where there was testimony tending to show permanent injury, the trial court was not in error in instructing the jury that if they found permanent injuries they might award damages therefor.</p> <p>2. Appeal and Error — Excessive Verdict — New Trial.</p> <p>A complaint that the verdict is excessive will not be reviewed on error, where the question was not brought to the attention of the trial court by a motion for new trial.</p> <p>3. Same — Mortality Tables — Saving Question for Review.</p> <p>Where, upon the trial, the only objection to the introduction of the mortality table was that there was no testimony of permanent injuries, defendant is in no position to urge, on error, that it was prejudicial error to admit the table because it did not appear that plaintiff was a person in normal good health before the injury complained of. •</p> <p>4. Negligence — Motor Vehicles,— Duty to Carry Sufficient Light.</p> <p>The driver of an automobile at night is required by law to have such lights as will show objects immediately in front of him, and he must have his machine under such control as not to overtake and run down people within the scope of his lights. ~</p> <p>5. Trial — Negligence—Instructions—Motor Vehicles — Duty to Carry Sufficient Light.</p> <p>In view of defendant’s admission that a lantern, the only light on his automobile, would not light up the road, that he couldn’t see anything ahead of him, that he continued to operate his car without being able to see ahead of him, and that he did not know of the presence of the wagon in which plaintiff was riding, or that it was within a mile of him, until he hit it, there was no error in the instruction of the court helow that it was defendant’s duty to have such lights as would show objects immediately in front of him, that he was required, by law to have his car under such control as not to run down other vehicles within the' scope of his lights, etc.</p> <p>On duty of operator of automobile as to lights, see notes in 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 489; 51 L. R. A. (N. S.) 996.</p> <p>On validity and construction of regulations as to automobile lights, see notes in L. R. A. 1918B, 916; 11 A. L. R. 1226.</p> <p>On excessiveness of damages in actions for personal injuries other than death see note in L. R. A. 1915F, 30.</p> <p>6. Appeal and Error — Dismissal—Review.</p> <p>The question of defendant’s right to appeal, where the bill of exceptions was not signed within 80 days, was not before this court for review on plaintiff’s assignment of error upon the action of the court below in overruling a motion; to dismiss the appeal; the proper practice being by motion in this court to dismiss the writ of error.</p>

), J. Frances Gray was convicted of sharing in the proceeds of prostitution, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 1 nor more than 5 years in the Detroit house of correction.

), J. Edwin S. George was convicted of violating an ordinance of the city of Detroit, and sentenced to pay a fine of $100 or imprisonment for 30 days in the Detroit house of correction.

), J. Mandamus by Charles L. Brown, chairman of the board of auditors of Kent county, to compel Robert G. Hill, county clerk, to deliver to plaintiff all claims and bills chargeable against said county. From an order denying the writ, plaintiff brings certiorari.

), J. Bill of interpleader by the board of county road commissioners of Calhoun county against the Southern Surety Company and the Jackson City Bank to determine the ownership of certain funds due under road contracts. From a decree for defendant surety company, defendant bank appeals.

M.), J. Bill by A. Jay Ecker against Roy C. Ecker and others to set aside certain deeds and assignments of mortgages, and for an accounting. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

), J., presiding. • Ulysses Collins was convicted of murder in the first degree, and sentenced to imprisonment for life in the branch of the State prison at Marquette.

<p>Error to Ionia; Davis (Frank D. M.), J.</p> <p>Case by Alvin E. Norris against the Elmdale Elevator Company for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

<p>Error to Wayne; Des Voignes (L. Burget), J., presiding.</p> <p>Case by John D. MacDearmid against the Detroit United Railway for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

), J. Bill by John C. Howe against the Patrons’ Mutual Fire Insurance Company of Michigan, Limited, to set aside an arbitration and award on a policy of insurance. From a decree for plaintiff, defendant appeals.

), J. Bill by Irving Furst against Adolph Kruschwitz and another for the specific performance of a land contract. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants appeal.

), J., presiding. Assumpsit by Van Keuren-Rogers-Templeton Company against the Parker Rust Proof Company of America for commissions on the sale of certain stock. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

<p>Error to Wayne; Webster (Arthur), J.</p> <p>Case by Ida Brown against the Detroit United Railway for personal injuries. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p>

Mandamus by Andrew Lorimer and George D. Lorimer, copartners as John Lorimer’s Sons, to compel John H. Goff, circuit judge of Wayne county, to vacate an order denying a motion to set aside a judgment.

), J. Bill by Robert Stuart against August Dorow and another for the specific performance of an optional land contract. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

), J., presiding. Assumpsit by Charles E. Heliker against the county of Oakland for taxes paid under protest. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error.

), J. Assumpsit by John C. McDonald against the Acme Lumber Company for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict. Defendant brings error.

<p>Error to Wayne; Goff (John H.), J.</p> <p>Assumpsit by Elson H. Whitney against Charles E. Chadsey on certain promissory notes. Judgment for defendant on a directed verdict. Plaintiff brings error.</p>

), J, Assumpsit in justice’s court by Marion Wozniak against George Ford for fraud in the sale of a motorcycle. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

Assumpsit by John O. Reed against David Stott Flour Mills, Incorporated, for breach of a contract for the sale of flour. Judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict. Defendant brings error'.

), J. . Case by Frederick T. Reese and another against Mary A. O. Elliott for fraud in the sale of certain land. Judgment for plaintiffs. Defendant brings error.

), J. Adolph J. Ochenfels was convicted of receiving stolen property, and sentenced to imprisonment for 90 days in the Detroit house of correction.

<p>Error to Calhoun; North (Walter H.), J.</p> <p>Assumpsit by Edwin R. Meech against Jacob Veenstra for goods sold and delivered. Judgment for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.</p>

), J., presiding. Bill by the James S. Holden Company against the William Tait Realty Company and others for the specific performance of a land contract. From a decree dismissing the bill, plaintiff appeals.

), J. Bill by Hattie Hutchinson against Edith Hattendorf and others for partition of certain property under an agreement regarding the probate of a will. From a decree for plaintiff, defendants Hattendorf appeal.

), J. Assumpsit by the Producers Stone & Gravel Company against the Chicago Bonding & Surety Company and another for a balance due on a contract for certain stone. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant surety company brings error.

<p>Insurance — Payment of Premium — Liability of Insurer.</p> <p>Where defendant insurance company’s agent had in his possession money belonging to plaintiff, and said agent, who had authority to collect the premiums, insured plaintiff’s automobile in defendant company with the understanding and agreement that a part of the mbney in said agent’s possession should be used to pay the premium, but he neglected to send same to defendant until after the car was stolen, defendant was liable to plaintiff for the loss, notwithstanding more than 15 days had elapsed between the issuance of the policy and the loss, and a clause in the policy provided that the premium must be paid on or before 15 days from the date of issue thereof, and if not so paid the liability of the company ceased until such payment was made, since payment by plaintiff was as effectually made as though the agent had handed plaintiff the money owing him and he had handed it back for such purpose.</p>

<p>1. Libel and Slander — Newspaper Article — Publics Officials.</p> <p>In. considering whether a newspaper article is libelous per se, it must be read in its entirety, and the words used must be taken in their plain and natural meaning, and considered in the sense they would be understood by those who read them.</p> <p>2. Same — Newspapers—Privilege—Public Officials,</p> <p>While the interests of society require that immunity be granted to newspapers in the discussion of public questions, and that fitting comment and criticism may be indulged in regarding the conduct of public officials, this privilege is limited, and does not extend to protect against false statements, unjust inferences; or imputations of unworthy motives.</p> <p>3. Same — Libelous. Per Se.</p> <p>If the facts and the comment and criticism thereon in a newspaper article, when applied to plaintiff, are of such a nature as tended to blacken his reputation or subject him to public hatred, contempt, or ridicule, their publica* tion is libelous per se.</p> <p>4. Same — Pub Etc Officials — Newspapers.</p> <p>A newspaper article in effect charging. that the old city government felt a grievance over the result of the election adopting a new form of government, that such grievance affected the judgment of the council in awarding certain public improvement contracts prematurely with the spirit of “getting even,” and that said action could “hardly be said to be a creditable monument to their public service,” but not charging corruption, official misconduct, dereliction of duty, or that the action was from base, sordid, ■ or wicked motives, held, not libelous per se, in an action based thereon by the mayor.</p>

), J. Solly Bauer was convicted of an attempt to unlawfully take, possession of and drive away a motor vehicle, and sentenced to imprisonment for not less than 11/2 nor more than 3 years in the State prison at Jackson.

Clair; Tappan (Harvey), J. Case by E. B. Muller. & Company against Walker D. Hines, director general of railroads, and the Pere Marquette Railway Company for damages to plaintiff’s building. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants bring error.

), J., presiding. Bill by Fred R. Dolsen, against Thomas D. Kearney, administrator with the will annexed of the estate of Gideon P. Benton, deceased, Gideon C. Benton and others for the specific performance of a land contract. Defendants filed a cross-bill to have such contract reformed. From a decree for defendants, plaintiff appeals.

<p>Error to Ottawa; Cross (Orien S.), J.</p> <p>Case by Ossin Corey against Frederick and Carl Harte!, copartners as Hartel Brothers, for personal injuries. Judgment for defendants. Plaintiff brings error.</p>

Assumpsit in justice’s court by Estelle Vanderberg against the Detroit & Cleveland Navigation Company for breach of a contract of carriage. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.

<p>1. Master and Servant — Negligence — Assumption of Risk — Particular Class of Work — Safe Place.</p> <p>Where plaintiff was employed to sink some large stones on a farm, a particular class of work with which he was familiar, he assumed the risk incident thereto, and the fact that the employer, who happened to he present, suggested that “we will dig under it a little,” which plaintiff was doing, without having provided for himself a runway, when he was injured, would not render the employer liable for failure to provide plaintiff with a safe place to work, since he in no way interfered with the manner of doing the work.</p> <p>On application of workmen’s compensation statutes to persons engaged in farming, see notes in L. R. A. 1917D, 147; L. R. A. 1918F, 202; 7 A. L. R. 1296.</p> <p>2. Same — Wokkmjsn’s Compensation Act — “Farm Laborer.” Plaintiff, at the time he was injured, was a “farm laborer”</p> <p>within the meaning of the workmen’s compensation act (2 Comp. Laws 1915, § 5424) exempting farm laborers from its provisions, although his employer’s principal business was conducting a general store, since it is not the business of the employer, but the character of the work itself, which determines the class of the employment.</p>

), J., presiding. Assumpsit by Joseph D. Palmerlee against the Republic Acceptance Corporation for a balance due on a contract of employment. Judgment for plaintiff on a directed verdict. Defendant brings error.

Bill by Mary Ehlen against Frank Ehlen for a divorce. Defendant filed a cross-bill asking for a divorce. From a decree for defendant, plaintiff appeals.

), J. Assumpsit in justice’s court by Cartley I. Curry against Arthur I. Shears for an amount due for certain ice. There was judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appealed to the circuit court. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.