216 So. 2d 391 - Smith v. Smith’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"* * * constitute a contributing or a proximate cause of the separation and continuous living apart, the ground for the divorce."”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Deramus v. Deramus · 345 So. 2d 168 - Moon v. Moon

2. “"When the wife has not been at fault, and she has not sufficient means for her support, the court may allow her, out of the property and earnings of the husband, alimony which shall not exceed one-third of his income when: 1. The wife obtains a divorce; 2. The husband obtains a divorce on the ground that he and his wife have been living separate and apart, or on the ground that there has been no reconciliation between the spouses after a judgment of separation from bed and board, for a specified period of time; or 3. The husband obtained a valid divorce from his wife in a court of another state or country which had no jurisdiction over her person. "This alimony shall be revoked if it becomes unnecessary, and terminates if the wife remarries."”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Deramus v. Deramus · 239 So. 2d 494 - Adler v. Adler

3. “"We see nothing in our construction of Article 160 which is absurd or which is inconsistent with the traditional principle of our law that only the wife who has not been at fault shall be entitled to demand alimony after divorce. This principle was finally vindicated in Sachse v. Sachse, 150 So.2d 772 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1963) after the inconsistency of some applications of the pre-1964 Article 160 had been hinted at in McKnight v. Irving, 228 La. 1088 , 85 So.2d 1 (1956), particularly in Justice Macaleb's concurring opinion therein. These ideas were further developed in The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1955-56 Term 17 La.L.Rev. 294, at pps. 308-309, where PROFESSOR ROBERT A. PASCAL discusses McKnight v. Irving . There can be no doubt that the purpose of the 1964 amendment to Article 160 was to follow the principle, enunciated in these authorities, that the wife at fault should not recover alimony, even though she obtains the divorce. The definition of `fault' as given in Felger v. Doty [ 217 La. 365 , 46 So.2d 300 (1950)], supra, has been followed in Vicknair v. Vicknair, 237 La. 1032 , 112 So.2d 702 ; Chapman v. Chapman, 130 So.2d 811 (La.App.) and Vinot v. Vinot, 239 La. 587 , 119 So.2d 474 . The essence of this definition is that fault is conduct which constitutes grounds for separation or divorce, other than mere living separate and apart for a specified period of time. In the present case the husband has alleged cruel treatment, an attempt against his life an”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 364 So. 2d 1015 - Bruner v. Bruner · 345 So. 2d 168 - Moon v. Moon