216 So. 3d 313 - State v. Cofer’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “'the factfinder's role as weigher of the evidence' by reviewing 'all of the evidence ... in the light most favorable to the prosecution.' " McDaniel v. Brown , 558 U.S. 120 , 134, 130 S.Ct. 665 , 674, 175 L.Ed.2d 582 [ (2010) ] (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) ). When so viewed by an appellate court, the relevant question is whether, on the evidence presented at trial, " any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Guillory · State v. Johnson

2. “(1) A homicide which would be murder under either Article 30 (first degree murder) or Article 30.1 (second degree murder), but the offense is committed in sudden passion or heat of blood immediately caused by provocation sufficient to deprive an average person of his self-control and cool reflection. Provocation shall not reduce a homicide to manslaughter if the jury finds that the offender's blood had actually cooled, or that an average person's blood would have cooled, at the time the offense was committed ....”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Guillory · State v. Guidry

3. “The standard of review in a sufficiency of the evidence claim is "whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found proof beyond a reasonable doubt of each of the essential elements of the crime charged." State v. Leger , 05-11, p. 91 (La. 7/10/06), 936 So.2d 108 , 170, cert. denied , 549 U.S. 1221 , 127 S.Ct. 1279 , 167 L.Ed.2d 100 (2007) (citing Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307 , 99 S.Ct. 2781 , 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979), and State v. Captville , 448 So.2d 676 (La.1984) ). The Jackson standard of review is now legislatively embodied in La.Code Crim.P. art. 821. It does not allow the appellate court "to substitute its own appreciation of the evidence for that of the factfinder." State v. Pigford , 05-477, p. 6 (La. 2/22/06), 922 So.2d 517 , 521 (citing State v. Robertson , 96-1048 (La. 10/4/96), 680 So.2d 1165 , and State v. Lubrano , 563 So.2d 847 (La.1990) ). The appellate court's function is not to assess the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence. State v. Smith , 94-3116 (La. 10/16/95), 661 So.2d 442 . The factfinder's role is to weigh the credibility of witnesses. State v. Ryan , 07-504 (La.App. 3 Cir. 11/7/07) , 969 So.2d 1268 . Thus, other than insuring the sufficiency evaluation standard of Jackson , "the appellate court should not second-guess the credibility determination of the trier of fact," but rather, it should defer to the rational credibility and evidentiary determinations of”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Johnson