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← 216 W. Va. 696 - Conrad v. Conrad

216 W. Va. 696 - Conrad v. Conrad’s Empirical Analysis

2005

Citation profile

8
cited by 8 later decisions
1
states following
June 2017
most recently cited

8 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on 196 W. Va. 535 - Banker v. Banker · 160 W. Va. 514 - Nichols v. Nichols · 195 W. Va. 384 - Stephen L.H. v. Sherry L.H. · 183 W. Va. 451 - Whiting v. Whiting · Metz v. Metz

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[t]he majority of courts contemplating the proper classification of disability benefits have adopted an approach which focuses on the underlying purpose of the specific disability benefits at issue. Thus, benefits which actually compensate for disability are classified as separate property because they are personal to the spouse who receives them. However, where justified by the particular facts of the case, courts adopting this approach have separated the benefits into a retirement component and a true disability component, classifying the retirement component as marital property and the disability component as separate property.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “(1) All property and earnings acquired by either spouse during a marriage, including every valuable right and interest, corporeal or incorporeal, tangible or intangible, real or personal, regardless of the form of ownership, whether legal or beneficial, whether individually held, held in trust by a third party, or whether held by the parties to the marriage in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy or tenancy in common, joint tenancy with the right of survivorship, or any other form of shared ownership recognized in other jurisdictions without this state, except that marital property does not include separate property as defined in section 1-238 [W. Va.Code § 48-1-238]; and (2) The amount of any increase in value in the separate property of either of the parties to a marriage, which increase results from: (A) an expenditure of funds which are marital property, including an expenditure of such funds which reduces indebtedness against separate property, extinguishes liens, or otherwise increases the net value of separate property; or (B) work performed by either or both of the parties during the marriage.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “[r]eeoupment of payment of marital debt by one party prior to the ultimate division of marital property has often been permitted upon a final equitable distribution order. See Jordan v. Jordan, 192 W.Va. 377 , 452 S.E.2d 468 (1994) (final allocation of marital debt permitted husband to recoup his expenses related to the marital home); Kapfer v. Kapfer, 187 W.Va. 396 , 419 S.E.2d 464 (1992) (the parties agreed to allow husband to recoup from home sale all mortgage principal he paid on marital home after date of separation).”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.