Mackey v. Dutton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

15 federal appellate · 1 district · 10 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 46 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “A trial court’s failure to grant a continuance to enable a defendant to exercise his constitutionally protected right to offer the testimony of witnesses and to compel their attendance may, in some circumstances, constitute a denial of due process. When a denial of a continuance forms a basis of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, not only must there have been an abuse of discretion but it must have been so arbitrary and fundamentally unfair that it violates constitutional principles of due process. To warrant habeas relief, there must also be some showing that granting the continuance would have furthered the court’s attempt to secure a just determination of the cause. We have considered the following factors in determining whether an accused was deprived of his right to due process by a denial of a motion for a continuance: the diligence of the defense in interviewing witnesses and procuring their presence, the probability of procuring their testimony within a reasonable time, the specificity with which the defense is able to describe their expected knowledge or testimony, the degree to which such testimony is expected to be favorable to the accused, and the unique or cumulative nature of the testimony.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Coy v. Renico

2. “In several cases, the Court has classified as “factual issues” within § 2254(d)’s compass questions extending beyond the determination of “what happened.” This category notably includes: competency to stand trial; and juror impartiality. While these issues encompass more than “basic, primary, or historical facts,” their resolution depends heavily on the trial court’s appraisal of witness credibility and demeanor. This court has reasoned that a trial court is better positioned to make decisions of this genre, and has therefore accorded the judgment of the jurist-observer “presumptive weight.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Akers ex rel. Lee v. Angelone

3. “Mackey’s arguments were implicitly rejected by the [Supreme] Court in Ful-ford. In Ftdford, the state trial court received evidence on the defendant’s motion for a psychiatric evaluation, but it refused to order a further inquiry into the defendant’s competency. Despite the fact that no evidentiary hearing on competency had been conducted by the trial court, the Supreme Court accorded the trial court’s competency determination a presumption of correctness.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. Akers ex rel. Lee v. Angelone