217 Ill. 2d 270 - People v. Phillips’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

83 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 85 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““ ‘[D]efense counsel may waive a defendant’s right of confrontation as long as the defendant does not object and the decision to stipulate is a matter of trial tactics and strategy.’ [Citation.] However, *** a defendant must personally waive the right of confrontation ‘when the State’s entire case is to be presented by stipulation and the defendant does not present or preserve a defense ***, or where the stipulation includes a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict the defendant.’ [Citation.] We attached no other restrictions to defense counsel’s authority to stipulate to the admission of evidence, and, except in those specified instances where the stipulation is tantamount to a guilty plea, we imposed no obligations on the trial court or counsel to admonish the defendant and ensure that the advisement is made a part of the record. Insofar as the appellate court held otherwise, the court erred.” (Emphasis in original.) Phillips, 217 Ill. 2d at 283 .”

   7 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 379 Ill. App. 3d 317 - People v. Chapman · 365 Ill. App. 3d 842 - People v. Squire

2. ““In sum, it is not necessary for either the court or counsel to admonish a defendant about the implications and consequences of a stipulation, and defendant’s explicit agreement to the stipulation on the record is not required where, as here, (1) defense counsel’s decision to stipulate appears to have been a matter of trial tactics and strategy and defendant does not object to counsel’s decision, and (2) the State’s entire case is not presented by stipulation, the defendant does present or preserve a defense, and the stipulation does not include a statement that the evidence is sufficient to convict.” (Emphasis in original.)”

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 375 Ill. App. 3d 421 - People v. Rowell · 362 Ill. App. 3d 1180 - People v. Carter

3. “"[I]f we were to interpret the quoted passage from Ramey as the appellate court did, decisions regarding `what witnesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike and what trial motions should be made' [( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 )] would all, logically, require consultation with defendant, and his tacit approval, on the record. Since an evidentiary stipulation is, in effect, nothing more than an acknowledgment of what a witness would testify to if called, and a concomitant decision not to challenge the testimony the witness would give, a stipulation is not much different from a decision not to cross-examine. The notion that a defendant would have to approve every aspect of defense counsel's cross-examination—including `whether and how to conduct cross-examination' [( Ramey, 152 Ill.2d at 54 , 178 Ill.Dec. 19 , 604 N.E.2d 275 )]—highlights the impracticality of the procedure espoused by the appellate court. A representative system of litigation cannot function with those restrictions. We decline to impose them, and we hold that they are not constitutionally required." (Emphasis omitted.) Phillips III, 217 Ill.2d at 284 , 298 Ill.Dec. 759 , 840 N.E.2d 1194 .”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 395 Ill. App. 3d 412 - People v. Clendenin · People v. Clendenin