State v. Mooney’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

7 federal appellate · 4 district · 212 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 227 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “required the proponent of the evidence to demonstrate a close relationship between the proffered evidence and the evidence to be corroborated. Other crimes evidence, therefore, is only admissible for corroborative purposes, if the corroboration is direct and the matter corroborated is significant.... Under this test, significant evidence is defined as important, as opposed to trivial, evidence.... Direct corroborating evidence is that which is not wholly disconnected, remote, or collateral to the matter corroborated.... The requirement that the corroborating evidence be direct is necessary in order to ensure that the link between the corroborative evidence and the facts to be inferred therefrom is not too attenuated or nonprobative; otherwise, the evidence might unfairly reflect upon the defendant's propensity to commit crimes.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. 187 Conn. App. 350 - State v. Santiago

2. “factors such as whether the [party asserting the privacy right] was a trespasser and whether the place involved was public “are, of course, relevant as helpful guides, but should not be undertaken mechanistically. They are not ends in themselves; they merely aid in evaluating the ultimate question in all fourth amendment cases — whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy, in the eyes of our society, in the area searched.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
   e.g. 810 F. Supp. 1551 - Pottinger v. City of Miami

3. “[a]lthough whether a reasonable person would view property to have been abandoned may be relevant to whether the owner or possessor had abandoned his expectation of privacy therein, that is not the end of the inquiry for fourth amendment purposes. The test is whether, under all the facts, the owner or possessor may fairly be deemed as a matter of law to have relinquished his expectation of privacy in the object [or area] in question. . . .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
   e.g. State v. Jackson