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← 218 Ill. 2d 1 - People v. Mertz

218 Ill. 2d 1 - People v. Mertz’s Empirical Analysis

2005

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
1
states following
March 2026
most recently cited

59 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently March 2026 · most notably 235 Ill. 2d 97 - People v. Lovejoy (2009), 241 Ill. 2d 44 - People v. Baez (2011)

59 state decisions

350200520102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Apprendi v. New Jersey · Crawford v. Washington · Woodson v. North Carolina · Zant v. Stephens · McCleskey v. Kemp

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““ ‘In determining whether a sentence of death is proper, we must consider “the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense.” People v. Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d 353, 388 (1990), citing Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 , 49 L. Ed. 2d 944, 961 , 96 S. Ct. 2978, 2991 (1976). “[E]ach capital case is unique and must be evaluated on its own facts, focusing on whether the circumstances of the crime and the character of the defendant are such that the deterrent and retributive functions of the ultimate sanction will be served by imposing the death penalty.” People v. Johnson, 128 Ill. 2d 253, 280 (1989). “A death sentence is appropriate if the sentence is commensurate with the seriousness of the offenses and gives adequate consideration to relevant mitigating circumstances.” Pitsonbarger, 142 Ill. 2d at 388 .’ ” Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d at 55 , quoting Ballard, 206 Ill. 2d at 179 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““If the weighing of factors in the second stage of capital sentencing were to be considered a factual finding, one would logically have to conclude that standard sentencing procedures undertaken daily by hundreds of courts across this state also partake of fact-finding which would fall within the purview of Apprendi. We reject that notion. See also Davis, 205 Ill. 2d at 375 (Apprendi does not apply to the consideration of mitigating and nonstatutory aggravating factors at the second stage of capital sentencing, because consideration of those factors ‘cannot increase the penalty for the crime’ beyond the statutory maximum of death established at the conclusion of the eligibility phase).” Mertz, 218 Ill. 2d at 93-94 .”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “any inferences drawn by [the profiler] were commonsense ones that the jurors no doubt had already drawn for themselves.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.