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← 218 Kan. 758 - State v. Lassley

State v. Lassley’s Empirical Analysis

1976

Citation profile

100
cited by 100 later decisions
11
states following
September 2011
most recently cited

100 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 100 later decisions — most recently September 2011 · most notably 88 Ill. 2d 225 - People v. Baynes (1981), State v. Schoonover (2006)

100 state decisions — followed in 11 states

37019761980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on State v. Valdez · 62 Wis. 2d 730 - State v. Stanislawski · State v. Lora · State v. Gauger · State v. Lowry

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 100 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “"In State v. Lora, 213 Kan. 184 , 515 P.2d 1086 , we stressed that duplicity [multiplicity] does not depend on whether the facts proved at trial are actually used to support the conviction of both offenses; rather, it turns on whether the necessary elements of proof of the one crime are included in the other." 218 Kan. at 761 .”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Defendant’s final argument relates to the propriety of instructing the jury on the presumption of intent. The trial court, over defense counsel’s objection, instructed the jury: ‘There is a presumption that a person intends all the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts. This presumption is overcome if you are persuaded by the evidence that the contrary is true.’ (Instruction No. 10.) This is the instruction recommended in PIK Criminal 54.01. Defendant does not question that this instruction is merely a restatement of a firmly established principle of law, long recognized and applied by the courts of this state. (State v. Donahue, 197 Kan. 317 , 416 P.2d 287 ; State v. Eye, 161 Kan. 69 , 166 P.2d 572 ; State v. Thomas, 157 Kan. 526 , 142 P.2d 692 .) He contends, however, that the instruction creating a presumption of intent is in conflict with the mandate of K.S.A. 21-3201, which places upon the prosecution the burden of proving an act to be intentional. In other words, defendant argues that by instructing the jury that a person is presumed to intend all the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts, the court is switching the burden upon defendant to show they were unintentional. “The presumption that a person intends all the natural and probable consequences of his voluntary acts is rebuttable, and may be overcome by evidence to the contrary. (State v. Warbritton, 211 Kan. 506 , 506 P.2d 1152 .) This principle is consistent with the requireme”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““Both the kidnapping and rape charges required proof of the element of force. In each instance the force was supplied by evidence of the conduct of defendant in ordering the victim to do acts under the implied threat of harm. The fact defendant had a knife in his hand was significant in establishing the force element of both crimes. This same act of force cannot also provide the basis for the charge of aggravated assault. . . . The conduct of defendant in the instant case constitutes a single continuous transaction in which two separate and distinct offenses were committed. The act cited by the prosecution as constituting the offense of aggravated assault was part of the act of kidnapping and a prelude to the act of rape. In sum, this case presents a situation where there was a continuous act of force on the part of defendant. The act which was relied on for the charges of rape and kidnapping cannot also be used to provide the basis of a separate offense. We hold therefore that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the charge of aggravated assault.””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.