Louisville Nashville Railroad Company v. Spencer Melton’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

17 federal appellate · 5 district · 139 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 253 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““And coming to consider the concrete application made of these general principles in the decisions of this court which have construed the statute here in question, and statutes of the same general character enacted in states other than indiana, we think, when rightly analyzed, it will appear that they are decisive against the contention now made. It is true that in the Tullís Case, which came here on certificate, the nature and character of the work of the railroad employe who was injured was not stated, and that reference in the course of the opinion was made to some state cases, limiting the right to classify to employes engaged in the movement of trains. But that it was not the intention of the court to thereby intimate that a classification, if not so restricted, would be repugnant to the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, will be made clear by observing that the previous case of Chicago, etc., R. Co. v. Pontius, 157 U. S. 209 , 15 Sup. Ct. 585 , 39 L. Ed. 675 , was cited approvingly, in which, under a statute of Kansas classifying railroad employes, recovery was allowed to a.bridge carpenter employed by the railroad company, who was injured while attempting to load timber on a car. And in the opinion in the Pontius Case there was approvingly cited a decision of the Ooiirt of Appeals of the Eighth Circuit (Chicago, R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Stahley, 62 Fed. 363 , 11 C. C. A. 88 ), wherein it was held that under the same statute an employe injured in a roundho”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Austin v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. · Kreps v. Brady

2. “`There is therefore no precise application of the rule of reasonableness of classification, and the rule of equality permits many practical inequalities. And necessarily so. In a classification for governmental purposes there cannot be an exact exclusion or inclusion of persons and things.' Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283 , 18 S.Ct. 594 , 42 L.Ed. 1037, 1043 (1898).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Chicago &. N. W. Ry. Co. v. Railroad & Warehouse Commission · 44 N.J. Super. 262 - Robson v. Rodriquez

3. ““That every railroad * * * operating] in this state, shall be liable in damages for personal injury suffered by any employe while in its service, the employe so injured being in the exercise of due care and diligence, in the following eases: “First. When such injury is suffered by reason of any defect in the condition of ways, works, plant, * * * and machinery connected with or in ase in the business of such corporation, when such defect was the result of negligence on the part of the corporation, or some person entrusted by it with the duty of keeping such ways, works, * * * and machinery in proper condition.” “Second. Where such injury results from the negligence of any person in the service of such corporation, to whose order or direction the injured employe at the time of the injury was hound to conform, and did conform.” Laws Ind. 1893, e. 130, § 1.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Austin v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co.