State v. Tweedy’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

183 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 185 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[D]istinct repetitions of a prohibited act, however closely they may follow each other ... may be punished as separate crimes without offending the double jeopardy clause.... The same transaction, in other words, may constitute separate and distinct crimes where it is susceptible of separation into parts, each of which in itself constitutes a completed offense.... [T]he test is not whether the criminal intent is one and the same and inspiring the whole transaction, but whether separate acts have been committed with the requisite criminal intent and are such as are made punishable by the [statute].”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 187 Conn. App. 537 - State v. Jerrell R. · 208 W. Va. 144 - State v. Allen

2. “In order for a criminal defendant to enjoy the maximum benefit of the presumption of innocence, our courts should make every reasonable effort to present the defendant before the jury in a manner that does not suggest, expressly or impliedly, that he or she is a dangerous character whose guilt is a foregone conclusion.... The negative connotations of restraints, nevertheless, are without significance unless the fact of the restraints comes to the attention of the jury. [Where] the ... record is devoid of competent evidence that the jury was aware of the defendant's shackles at any time during his trial, it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that the presumption of innocence was not abridged by the court's decision to shackle him.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 167 Conn. App. 298 - State v. Gonzalez

3. “[T]he statute provides that a criminal defendant commits robbery when, in the course of committing a larceny, the defendant engages in forcible conduct with a proscribed purpose. The legislature thus expressly designated the course of committing a larceny, rather than the course of forcible conduct, as the time frame for completion of the offense of robbery.... Consequently, we conclude that the legislature intended § 53a-133 to authorize a punishment for robbery each time a criminal defendant with the requisite intent engages in forcible conduct against another person in the course of committing a larceny, irrespective of whether such conduct is unceasingly directed toward a single victim.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. State v. Brown