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219 Ill. App. 241

Murawska v. Boeger

Appellate Court of Illinois

Decided October 6, 1920

Appellate Court of Illinois · decided 1920-10-06

<p>1. Brokebs, § 40*—when hrolcer is not entitled to compensation. In an action to recover a broker’s commission for the sale of real estate, held that in order to be entitled to a commission, the broker was bound to produce one who was ready, willing and financially able to make the purchase on the terms named by the owner of the property, and that he was not entitled to claim his commission by virtue of a contract between the owner and a third person, where it appeared that the broker had introduced such third person to the owner, that such third person had entered into an option contract with the owner, whereby he might buy in the property, or act as agent in securing a purchaser, who could and would consummate the transaction; and that said third person was instrumental in finding such purchaser to whom the property was subsequently sold, but on terms which varied materially from those originally submitted to the broker.</p> <p>2. Brokers, § 34*—what is essential to entitle hrolcer to commission. Commissions for procuring a purchaser of real estate cannot be recovered where plaintiff is not the efficient and procuring cause of the sale as it is finally consummated.</p> <p>3. Brokers, § 34*—when sale is not effected hy hrolcer. In an action to recover a broker’s commission for the sale of real estate, held that a broker cannot recover a commission from the owner of real estate where said property was subsequently sold to a person under a contract with which the broker had no direct or proximate connection, where it appeared that said purchaser was introduced to the owner by a third person, whom the plaintiff broker had introduced to the owner; that such purchaser had been introduced to said third person by a second broker; and that said purchaser and second broker had no knowledge of the plaintiff broker.</p> <p>4. Brokers, § 34*—what is proximate cause of act. The proximate cause of an act is that which produces it without the interposition of an independent agency, which is not the probable result of the first cause. It is the proximate cause of which the law takes notice and not the causa causarum. ■</p> <p>5. Brokers, § 34*—when sale of property is not effected by hrolcer. In an action to recover a broker’s commission for the sale of real estate, held that a broker cannot recover on a contract with the owner of real estate where the property in question is subsequently sold under an agreement, different in many respects from the one under which he testified he was employed to ■ perform, where it appeared that the broker was to receive a commission of 10 per cent if he secured the sale of the property in question at a price of $295,000, and that the person who finally agreed to take title had not been introduced by the broker to the owner and had agreed to pay $280,500.</p> <p>6. Brokers, § 42*—what is effect of sale under different terms as to broker's compensation. Commission for procuring a purchaser for real estate cannot be recovered where the contract finally consummated is different from the one plaintiff was employed to accomplish.</p>

Relies on Henry v. Stewart

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1920-10-06

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently August 1975

2 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

20192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Mr. Presiding Justice Taylor,

¶1dissenting: Anderson testified that he was introduced to the defendant, Boeger, by Reynolds and that before that time he knew practically nothing of the Oak Ridge Cemetery; from which it follows that all that took place subsequent to his meeting Reynolds was the result of the plaintiff having gotten Reynolds to take an option contract on the property in question. Everything that was done through Reynolds by Anderson may be said to have been done as the result of the complainant’s services in producing Reynolds and having the option contract obtained from the defendant. Anderson knew nothing of the matter save what he got through Reynolds, and Reynolds as a prospective purchaser was a creation of the complainant. The fact that Anderson was introduced to Reynolds by one Stewart is immaterial and entirely irrelevant. If Stewart had introduced Anderson to Boeger and at that time Boeger had the right to sell the property it would be an entirely.different situation, but as the option was outstanding and owned by Reynolds, and Anderson first became connected with the matter through Reynolds, it is obvious that whatever transpired thereafter was fundamentally dependent upon the services of the plaintiff in producing Reynolds. Without Reynolds, Anderson never would have come in contact with the defendant and as everything that was done through Reynolds was the same as though it were done through the plaintiff, it is quite obvious that the services of the plaintiff were the actual cause of the ultimate sale to Anderson. If the services of the plaintiff and Reynolds are stricken out there is a Matus. Anderson wdnld not even have known Boeger.

¶2The contract of January 20, 1917, between Anderson and Reynolds, which was made prior to the contract between Anderson and the defendant, shows that Anderson received from Reynolds the option right without which he could not have purchased the property from the defendant. As, therefore, the actual, ultimate sale of the property was based in its inception, as far as Anderson and Boeger were concerned, upon the option given by the defendant to Reynolds as a result of the services of the plaintiff— and as a practical matter was the ripening of Reynolds’ option into a sale—it follows that in the eyes of the law the plaintiff must be considered the moving, procuring cause of the sale, and entitled to a commission. Strong evidence that the Reynolds’ option was basic is the fact that the very $2,000 he paid down when he got it was credited on the ultimate purchase price.

¶3Believing that the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that .Reynolds, the creature of the plaintiff, was the conduit through which Anderson did reach, and could only reach, the defendant in order that the sale might take place, I am constrained to dissent.

¶4That the terms of the sale were changed somewhat from what they were as expressed in the option contract, of course, was immaterial. Henry v. Stewart, 185 Ill. 448.

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