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← 219 S.W.3d 327 - In Re Derzapf

In Re Derzapf’s Empirical Analysis

2007

Citation profile

50
cited by 50 later decisions
1
states following
April 2019
most recently cited

50 state decisions

Appellate journey

reviewedthe decision below (from Texas Court of Appeals, 2nd District (Fort Worth))

Relationships

Relies on Troxel v. Granville · Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts · In Re Prudential Insurance Co. of America · Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corporation v. Auld · Texas Department of Transportation v. Needham

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “(a) Subject to the prohibition in Section 153.004, unless the court finds that the appointment of the parent or parents would not bé in the best interest of the child because the appointmént would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emo- . tional development, a parent shall be appointed sole managing conservator or both parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators of the child, (b) It is a rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing conservators is in the best interest of the child. A finding of a history of family violence involving the parents of a child removes the presumption under this ' subsection.”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “[t]he manner in which she resisted the children transitioning to [Ricky's] full-time care interfered with the children's emotional and behavioral adjustment.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “(b) While a suit for modification is pending, the court may not render a temporary order that has the effect of changing the designation of the person who has the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child under the final order unless the temporary order is in the best interest of the child and: (1) the order is necessary because the child’s present circumstances would sig nificantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development; (2) the person designated in the final order has voluntarily relinquished the primary care and possession of the child for more than six months; or (3) the child is 12 years of age or older and has expressed to the court in chambers as provided by Section 153.009 the name of the person who is the child’s preference to have the exclusive right to designate the primary residence of the child.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.