Leonard v. Decker’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

6 federal appellate · 5 district · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““Counsel for respondents has submitted an elaborate argument against tlie jurisdiction o-f the district court in this cose, on the ground that, the tort is not a maritime one, since the bolts that did the injury were attached to the pier, and belonged to the land, and not to the water. Among the cases cited are the well-known cases supporting the countei* proposition that injuries done by vessels to wharves, or objects upon wharves, bridges, etc., are not maritime torts, and hence not within the jurisdiction of the district court. The Plymouth, 3 Wall. 20 ; The Neil Cochran, 1 Brown, Adm. 162 [Fed. Cas. No. 10,087]; The Ottawa, 1 Brown, Adm. 356 [Fed. Cas. No. 10,616]; The Maud Webster, 8 Ben. 547 [Fed. Cas. No. 9,302], Without, entering at length into a discussion of these and other cases cited, which I have carefully examined, I need only say that they do not seem to me to sustain the contention of the respondents, but, on the other hand, to be entirely consistent with, and to recognize, the jurisdiction of this court over torts like the present, and that upon two distinct grounds: First, that the bolts which caused the injuries were an obstruction to navigation; and, second, because the damage done was inflicted upon a vessel afloat, and because the place where the injury is consummated, and the damage actually received, is regarded as the locus of tlie tort.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hermann v. Port Blakely Mill Co.

2. ““We can give, therefore, no particular weight or influence to the consideration that the injury in the present case originated from the negligence of the servants of the respondents on board a vessel, except as evidence that it originated on navigable water [the Chicago river]; and, as we have seen, the simple fact that it originated there, hut, the whole damage done upon the land, the cause of action not being complete on navigable waters, affords no ground for the exercise of the admiralty jurisdiction. The negligence, of itself, furnishes no cause of action; it is damnum absque injuria. The case is not distinguishable from that of a person standing on a vessel or other support in the river, and sending a rocket or torpedo into the city, by means of which buildings were set on Are and destroyed. That would be a direct act of trespass, but quite as efficient a cause of damage as if the fire had proceeded from negligence. Could the admiralty take jurisdiction? We sup-lióse the strongest advocate for this jurisdiction would hardly ciyjtend for it. Yet the origin of the trespass is upon navigable waters, which are within its cognizance. The answer is, as already given: The whole or at least the substantial cause of action, arising out of the wrong, must be complete within the locality upon which the jurisdiction depends, — on the high seas or navigable waters.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Rundell v. La Campagnie Generale Transatlantique

3. ““In this case, the schooner which did the injury to Howell’s property was on the water, was afloat and engaged in navigation; hut Howell’s property was a part of the soil of the earth, or was affixed to it, and was wholly on land. In a case of tort, there can be no jurisdiction in the admiralty unless the substantial cause of action, arising out of the wrong, was complete upon navigable waters.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hermann v. Port Blakely Mill Co.