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← 22 F.3d 1376 - Pennington v. Didrickson

Pennington v. Didrickson’s Empirical Analysis

22 F.3d 1376 · 1994

Citation profile

29
cited by 29 later decisions
1
states following
September 2014
most recently cited

16 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 29 later decisions — most recently September 2014 · most notably Smith v. Metropolitan School District Perry Township (1997), Bankers Life and Casualty Company v. United States (1998)

16 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

220199420002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 26 U.S.C. § 3301 (Federal Unemployment Tax Act) · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act)) · 42 U.S.C. § 502 (§ 302 of the Social Security Act of 1935) · 42 U.S.C. § 503 (§ 303 of the Social Security Act of 1935)

Relies on Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. · Udall v. Tallman · Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital · Commodity Futures Trading Commission v. Schor · Batterton v. Francis

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[w]e are mindful of our obligation to defer to the interpretation of the agency whenever that interpretation can be said to embody a deliberate and considered interpretation of the legislative intent.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “deliberate attempt of the agency to implement the will of Congress through the regulatory process.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “Zambrano contends that the [Wisconsin policy] violates the When Due clause because it operated to exclude the wages he earned ... from his eligibility determination. Zambrano’s claim is unavailing, however, because the [policy] sets forth a method of determining whether work performed by an applicant is “employment” and thus whether the applicant is eligible to receive benefits. Therefore, because it determines who is eligible to receive benefits, as opposed to when the eligibility determination is made or when an eligible person receives benefits, the [policy] is an eligibility requirement that is “beyond the reach of the ‘when due’ clause.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.