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← 22 F.3d 149 - Scheib v. Grant

Scheib v. Grant’s Empirical Analysis

22 F.3d 149 · 1994

Citation profile

49
cited by 49 later decisions
12
states following
January 2019
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 2 district · 19 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 49 later decisions — most recently January 2019 · most notably Cooney v. Rossiter (2009), Steffes v. Stepan Co. (1998)

11 federal appellate · 2 district · 19 state decisions — followed in 12 states

260199420002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2520 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Class Action Fairness Act of 2005)

Relies on Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. · Conway v. Statesman Mortgage Co. · United Transportation Union v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority · National Organization for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler · Securities Investor Protection Corp. v. Barbour

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 49 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The language of § 2510(5)(a)(i) juxtaposes the terms “subscriber” and “user” with the phrase “in the ordinary course of business.” Although the latter phrase might be used to distinguish commercial from personal life, in the context presented here, it must be read in conjunction with the terms “subscriber” and “user.” These terms certainly do not have exclusively market-oriented connotations. Reading this extension phone exemption as a whole, then, it is no lexical stretch to read this language as applying to a “subscriber’s” conduct — or “business” — in raising his or her children.”
    6 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “"(5) 'electronic, mechanical, or other device' means any device or apparatus which can be used to intercept a wire or oral communication other than — "(a) any telephone or telegraph instrument, equipment or facility, or any component thereof, (i) furnished to the subscriber or user by a communications common carrier in the ordinary course of business and being used by the subscriber or user in the ordinary course of its business. . . ."”
    5 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. ““[T]he interception at issue here is not reached by [ 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 ], The interception of a family member’s telephone conversations by use of an extension phone in the family home is arguably permitted by a broad reading of the exemption contained in 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a)(i) .... ‘[W]e think the (5)(a)(i) exemption is indicative of Congress’s intention to abjure from deciding a very intimate question of familial relations, that of the extent of privacy family members may expect within the home.’ ””
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.