H-A

Interim Decision #3394




                             In re H-A-, Respondent

                                 Decided May 25, 1999

                            U.S. Department of Justice
                     Executive Office for Immigration Review
                         Board of Immigration Appeals


     Matter of Arthur, 

 (BIA 1992), is not inconsistent with the motions to
reopen regulations at 

(c)(2) and 3.23(b)(4)(i) (effective July 1, 1996). Matter
of Arthur, supra, reaffirmed.

John H. Hagopian, Esquire, Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, for respondent

Before:   Board En Banc: DUNNE, Vice Chairman; VACCA, HEILMAN, FILPPU, COLE,
          MATHON, JONES, GRANT, and SCIALABBA, Board Members. Dissenting
          Opinion: VILLAGELIU, Board Member, joined by SCHMIDT, Chairman;
          HOLMES, HURWITZ, ROSENBERG, GUENDELSBERGER, and MOSCATO,
          Board Members.

SCIALABBA, Board Member:

     This case was last before us on April 17, 1997, when we denied the
respondent’s motion to reopen filed on September 25, 1996, for the purpose
of applying for adjustment of status under section 245(i) of the Immigration
and Nationality Act, 

(i) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). The motion
to reopen was denied because the visa petition filed on the respondent’s
behalf had not yet been approved. The respondent has submitted a motion
to reconsider our April 17, 1997, denial of his motion and has also submitted a “Supplement to Motion to Reconsider” based on the fact that the
immediate relative visa petition filed on his behalf was subsequently
approved. We construe the respondent’s May 20, 1998, “supplement” to be
a motion to reopen because he has presented evidence that was previously
unavailable. Such motion is both time and number barred under 

(c)(2) (1999). The respondent’s motion to reconsider our April 17, 1997,
decision will be denied.1


      1
        We will not be determining whether the respondent is eligible for adjustment of status
in this case. Rather, we will only address the specific issue raised in his motion to reconsider—whether Matter of Arthur, 

 (BIA 1992), should be modified.

                                             728
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             I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

     The respondent is a 37-year-old male native and citizen of Sudan2 who
entered the United States on January 26, 1990, as a nonimmigrant authorized to stay for 6 months. He overstayed his visa. The Immigration and
Naturalization Service issued him an Order to Show Cause and Notice of
Hearing (Form I-221) on June 24, 1993. The respondent filed an asylum
application with the Immigration Court, which was denied on January 31,
1994. The Immigration Judge did, however, grant the respondent voluntary
departure until March 7, 1994. The respondent appealed the Immigration
Judge’s decision to deny asylum. While the appeal was pending with this
Board, the respondent married a United States citizen on July 27, 1994.
     We dismissed the respondent’s appeal on September 7, 1995, but gave
him 30 days from the date of our order to voluntarily depart the United
States. On September 18, 1996, nearly a year after the respondent’s voluntary departure period ended and over 2 years after the couple were married,
the respondent’s spouse filed a Petition for Alien Relative (Form I-130) on
his behalf with the Service. The respondent also filed an application to
adjust his status with the Service on the same day. One week later, on
September 25, 1996, the respondent filed with this Board a motion to
reopen his deportation proceedings so that he could apply for adjustment of
status.3 The Service did not file an opposition to the motion. Because the
visa petition had been filed only a week earlier, the Service had not yet
adjudicated it when the respondent filed his motion to reopen. We denied
the respondent’s motion on April 17, 1997, in accordance with Matter of
Arthur, 

 (BIA 1992), which requires an approved immediate relative visa petition before a case may be reopened for adjustment of
status. In Matter of Arthur, supra, we determined that we will not grant



      2
        We observe that the respondent, as a national of Sudan, could have applied for
Temporary Protected Status (“TPS”) with the Immigration and Naturalization Service separate and apart from the issues before us relating to the denial of the motion to reconsider;
however, the record contains no evidence that he has done so. See 

(1997) (designating Sudan for TPS effective November 4, 1997, until November 3, 1998);

 (1998) (extending designation until November 3, 1999).
      3
        The question arises whether the respondent is barred from reopening his case to apply
for adjustment of status under Matter of Shaar, 

 (BIA 1996), because he
has failed to voluntarily depart the United States by his departure date in accordance with
our April 17, 1997, order. However, we note that although the Immigration Judge stated during the hearing that he was giving the respondent written and oral warnings of the consequences of failing to depart the country as ordered, the record does not contain the written
warnings. See section 242B(e)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e)(2) (1994). Thus, it is
unclear if the respondent would be ineligible to adjust his status for a period of 5 years under
section 242B of the Act.

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Interim Decision #3394


motions to reopen for the consideration of adjustment applications based
upon unadjudicated visa petitions which fall within the ambit of sections
204(g) and 245(e) of the Act, 

(g) and 1255(e) (Supp. II
1990), as discussed more fully infra.
     On May 16, 1997, the respondent filed a timely motion to reconsider
our April 17, 1997, decision denying his motion to reopen. See 

(b)(2) (1997).4 In the motion to reconsider, the respondent, through
counsel, argues that the Board should revisit its decision in Matter of Arthur,
supra, because it is inconsistent with the new motions regulations, which
permit only one motion to reopen to be filed no later than 90 days after the
final administrative decision. See 

(c)(2) (effective July 1,
1996). The respondent’s motion to reconsider is based on the dissenting
opinion that was part of our April 17, 1997, decision. The respondent contends that we should provide an exception to the Arthur rule because it is
now inconsistent with due process, in light of the motions regulations. He
argues that if we continue to apply Matter of Arthur without exception, we
will be effectively foreclosing adjustment of status to eligible aliens
because the motions regulations do not provide sufficient time for the visa
petition adjudication process to be completed before the deadline for filing
a motion to reopen expires.


                                      II. ISSUE

     The issue before us is whether to modify our holding in Matter of
Arthur, supra, and permit an alien to file a timely motion to reopen on the
basis of a simultaneously filed adjustment application and an unapproved
immediate relative visa petition that is based upon a marriage entered into
during deportation or removal proceedings.
     We conclude that Matter of Arthur should not be modified. The
rationale for the Arthur rule remains because Congress has not modified
the presumption it created in section 5 of the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986, 

 Stat. 3537, 3543
(“IMFA”), and the Immigration Act of 1990, 

Stat. 4978 (“IMMACT 90”), that a marriage entered into after the institution of proceedings is fraudulent, unless overcome by a showing of
clear and convincing evidence that it is bona fide. See Matter of Arthur,
supra, at 479. Congress also mandated that the filing of motions be lim-



     4
       We note that the Service has not filed an opposition to the motion. See 

(g)(3).



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                                                       Interim Decision #3394


ited in time and number in order to reach finality in deportation cases.
These motions restrictions will end many cases where eligibility for relief
arises late in the process, not just marriage fraud cases. As a result, the regulations will effectively require most out-of-time claimants, not just those
with unadjudicated immediate relative visa petitions, to pursue their applications outside the context of deportation or removal proceedings, and often
to do so outside of the United States. To create an additional exception to
the motions restrictions for aliens falling within sections 204(g) and 245(e)
of the Act would undermine the purpose of such restrictions—finality in
deportation and removal cases. Finally, as we stated in Matter of Arthur, the
suggested modification would “constitute a substantial and unwarranted
intrusion into the district director’s authority” if this Board attempts or,
more particularly, if Immigration Judges attempt to evaluate whether clear
and convincing evidence of a bona fide marriage has been shown. See 

; 

 (1999).


                         III. MATTER OF ARTHUR

     In Matter of Arthur, supra, we modified our decision in Matter of
Garcia, 

 (BIA 1978), based on Congress’ 1986 enactment
of the IMFA. Congress saw immigration-related marriage fraud as a serious
problem and passed legislation designed to deter fraud by aliens seeking to
acquire lawful permanent residence in the United States through marriage
to a United States citizen or a lawful permanent resident alien. Section 5 of
the IMFA provides, regarding an alien’s right to enter or remain the United
States, that if the alien marries while an administrative or judicial proceeding is pending, he or she may not use that marriage as a basis for adjustment
of status or to gain immediate relative or preference status. See H.R. Rep.
No. 99-906, at 11 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5983; see
also sections 204(g), 245(e)(1) of the Act.
     In 1990, Congress amended the IMFA by creating a bona fide marriage exception. In section 702 of the IMMACT 90, 104 Stat. at 5086,
Congress enacted a provision that allows an alien to overcome the marriage fraud presumption, but only if he or she is able to demonstrate by
clear and convincing evidence the bona fides of the marriage. This provision also limits an alien to one administrative review in order to promote
finality. See H.R. Rep. No. 101-723(I), at 51-52 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6731-32; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, at 128
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6793; see also section
245(e)(3) of the Act.
     It was within this framework that we issued our decision in Matter of
Arthur, supra. In Matter of Arthur, we stated that the presumption estab-


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Interim Decision #3394


lished in Matter of Garcia, supra,5 was inconsistent and incompatible with
the congressionally mandated presumption that marriages entered into after
the institution of proceedings are fraudulent. Matter of Arthur, supra, at
479. We held that motions to reopen for adjustment of status based upon
unadjudicated visa petitions which fall within the ambit of sections 204(g)
and 245(e) of the Act will not be granted.6


                           IV. MOTIONS RESTRICTIONS

    In section 545(d) of the IMMACT 90, 104 Stat. at 5066, Congress also
addressed the problem of successive and frivolous administrative motions.
See Stone v. INS, 

 (1995) (“[A] principal purpose of the
1990 amendments to the INA was to . . . redress the related problem of successive and frivolous administrative appeals and motions.”). Congress
directed the Attorney General to issue regulations limiting the number of
motions to reopen and the maximum time period during which a motion to
reopen may be submitted. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-955, at 133 (1990),


      5
        In Matter of Garcia, we held that, absent clear ineligibility, motions to reopen generally should be granted for adjustment applications supported by simultaneously filed visa petitions with immediate visa availability. See Matter of Garcia, supra, at 657. Thus, a pending
prima facie approvable visa petition was treated as though it were already approved for purposes of reopening. Id.
      6
        Section 204(g) of the Act states:
      [E]xcept as provided in section 245(e)(3), a petition may not be approved to grant
      an alien immediate relative status or preference status by reason of a marriage
      which was entered into during the period described in section 245(e)(2), until the
      alien has resided outside the United States for a 2-year period beginning after the
      date of the marriage.
     Section 245(e) of the Act states:
      (1) Except as provided in paragraph (3), an alien who is seeking to receive an
      immigrant visa on the basis of a marriage which was entered into during the period described in paragraph (2) may not have the alien’s status adjusted under subsection (a).
             ....
      (3) Paragraph (1) and section 204(g) shall not apply with respect to a marriage
      if the alien establishes by clear and convincing evidence to the satisfaction of the
      Attorney General that the marriage was entered into in good faith and . . . the
      marriage was not entered into for the purpose of procuring the alien’s entry as an
      immigrant and no fee or other consideration was given . . . for the filing of a petition under section 204(a) or 214(d) with respect to the alien spouse . . . . In accordance with regulations, there shall be only one level of administrative appellate
      review for each alien under the previous sentence.


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reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6798. In fact, the restrictions
Congress had in mind were much more restrictive than those eventually
issued by the Attorney General. “Unless the Attorney General finds reasonable evidence to the contrary, the regulations should state that such motions
be made within 20 days of the date of the final determination . . . .” Id.
     Pursuant to the congressional mandate, the Attorney General revised
the reopening regulations, effective July 1, 1996. Subject to certain exceptions, a party may file only one motion to reopen and it must be filed within 90 days of the final administrative decision, or on or before September
30, 1996, whichever is later. See 

(c)(2), 3.23(b)(4)(i) (1997);
Matter of J-J-, 

 (BIA 1997) (holding that reopening sua
sponte is limited to exceptional circumstances and is not meant to cure filing defects or circumvent the regulations to prevent hardship).7
     While the Attorney General was in the process of revising the motion
to reopen regulations, Congress codified the motions restrictions in section
304(a)(3) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Division C of 

 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-
593 (“IIRIRA”). This sent a clear message that Congress wanted an end to
successive and frivolous motions to achieve finality in removal cases. See
sections 240(c)(5), (6) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229a(c)(5), (6) (Supp. II
1996); see also Removal of Criminal and Illegal Aliens: Hearing before the
Subcomm. on Immigration and Claims of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (Mar. 23, 1995) (statement of Hon.
Lamar Smith, Subcomm. Chairman) (aliens “often file . . . dilatory procedural motions . . . in an effort to extend their stay and become eligible for
relief. The time clock should stop when people are put in proceedings, and
we must stop the abuse of this system to delay deportation.”).


                                   V. DISCUSSION

     Contrary to the respondent’s contention, we do not find an inconsistency between our holding in Matter of Arthur, supra, which is based on the
IMFA, and the motions restrictions. The purpose of the IMFA is to deter
immigration-related marriage fraud. The purpose of the motions regulations
is to bring finality to administrative proceedings. These goals are distinct
and separate are in no way inconsistent. After examining Congress’ activity and inactivity with these two matters, we see no need either to modify the
Arthur rule or to create an exception to the motions regulations for aliens



     The regulation at 

(b)(2) also limits the alien to one motion to reconsider
     7


submitted within 30 days of the mailing of the Board’s decision.


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Interim Decision #3394


with unadjudicated immediate relative visa petitions, for two reasons. First,
within the IMMACT 90, Congress both created the bona fide marriage
exception and mandated that the Attorney General issue motions restrictions that include an exception for asylum claims arising from changed
country conditions. In contemporaneously considering these two issues of
marriage fraud and motions restrictions in 1990, Congress chose not to
mandate an additional motions exception for marriage fraud cases.
     Second, after we issued our 1992 holding in Matter of Arthur, Congress
codified the motions restrictions in the IIRIRA in 1996. While Congress
specifically included a time limit exception for asylum applicants based on
changed country conditions,8 it did not create an exception for aliens who
fall within the ambit of the Arthur rule and the 90-day motion deadline.
Thus, Congress had two opportunities to amend the marriage fraud presumption or to create an additional exception to the restrictions for marriage
fraud cases, but it declined to do either in both 1990 and 1996. The Supreme
Court assumes that Congress is aware of existing law when it passes legislation. South Dakota v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, 

, 

 (1998). We can therefore assume that Congress was aware of our holding in Matter of Arthur when it chose not to modify the marriage fraud presumption or to create an Arthur exception to the motions restrictions in the
IIRIRA. Based on Congress’ inactivity, we decline to modify the Arthur
rule or to create an additional motions exception.
     Furthermore, while there is now statutory authority for motions in removal
cases, the authority for motions to reopen deportation proceedings is derived
solely from regulations promulgated by the Attorney General. INS v. Doherty,

 (1992); INS v. Rios-Pineda, 

 (1985). Any
decision to grant a motion to reopen deportation proceedings is a matter within
the discretion of this Board. See INS v. 

; INS v.
Phinpathya, 

, 188 n.6 (1984). It is within this Board’s discretion
to determine that, in light of the marriage fraud presumption, visa petitions
based on marriages entered into during proceedings must be approved before
we will consider a motion to reopen for adjustment on that basis.
     The respondent argues that if we do not modify our holding in Matter
of Arthur, supra, we will effectively foreclose adjustment of status in all
cases where motions to reopen are filed after July 1, 1996, the effective date
of the new motions restrictions, because the Service does not have a reasonable opportunity to adjudicate a visa petition within the 90-day period
required to file a motion to reopen.9 The dissent frames a policy argument


     See section 240(c)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act (Supp. II 1996); see also 

(c)(3)(ii).
     8


     This argument is based on the assumption that the marriage takes place on the day the
     9


proceedings become final, because it is at that point in time that the respondent has 90 days
in which to file a motion to reopen the proceeding.


                                             734
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against Matter of Arthur, contending that its application will impose an
absolute bar to adjustment of status based on marriages entered into during
the pendency of proceedings. According to the dissent, the Arthur rule violates Congress’ express intent by negating the statutory exception of section
245(e)(3) of the Act, which permits adjustment where the bona fide nature
of the marriage is established.
     We reject these arguments. Contrary to the dissent’s view, no absolute
bar results from Arthur. The result is that an alien must have a visa petition
approved prior to or within 90 days of a final order to take advantage of the
bona fide marriage exception. Despite the dissent’s reference to an alien’s
“statutory right” to apply for adjustment of status, adjustment is a form of
relief from deportation or removal, the grant or denial of which remains
within the exercise of this Board’s discretionary authority. Moreover, we
cannot ignore Congress’ express legislative purpose behind the motions
restrictions—to bring deportation and removal cases to a close. Finally, we
note that the motions restrictions may affect those who find themselves eligible for various forms of relief late in the deportation or removal process.
Unlike marriages entered into during proceedings, other forms of relief that
may arise late in deportation or removal proceedings are not subject to a
presumption of fraud. There are no exceptions to the motions restrictions
other than those set forth in the implementing regulation at 

(c)(3). Among the exceptions are a motion to reopen to apply for asylum
based on changed country conditions and a motion to reopen agreed upon
by all parties and jointly filed. See 

(c)(3)(ii)(iii); see also section 240(c)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act. Even if a visa petition is not timely
approved, an alien has the possibility of seeking and obtaining the Service’s
acquiescence to a joint motion pursuant to 

(c)(3)(iii). For
these reasons, we find the dissent unpersuasive.
     With respect to this particular case, we find that the respondent is not a
victim of the motions regulations as he claims. The respondent was married
for over a year before this Board issued a final order, which granted him 30
days to voluntarily depart the United States. If the respondent’s wife had
filed a visa petition in a timely manner, there is a very good possibility that
the petition would have been adjudicated before this Board issued its final
order. Furthermore, the respondent could have voluntarily departed the
United States and pursued his immigrant visa abroad. However, the respondent chose not to depart the United States, and his spouse did not file a visa
petition on his behalf until September 18, 1996, 2 years after the couple
were married and 1 year after the respondent’s voluntary departure period
ended. One week later, on September 25, 1996, which was shortly before
the September 30, 1996, motion deadline, the respondent filed his motion
to reopen. It is not surprising that, when the respondent filed his motion 7
days after he filed the visa petition, the petition remained unadjudicated.
This is the type of delay and dilatory tactics that Congress sought to halt in

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1990 and again in 1996, in codifying the motions restrictions in section
304(a)(3) of the IIRIRA.
     The respondent suggests that we examine the evidence that he has submitted in support of his motion, in order to judge whether he has shown
clear and convincing evidence of a bona fide marriage under 

(a)(1)(iii)(E) (1997). In Matter of Arthur, supra, however, we noted
the jurisdictional problem involved if we or, more particularly, Immigration
Judges inquire into whether the evidence submitted in support of a visa petition is sufficient. We stated that “in light of the heavy burden imposed on
the petitioner, to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for the preference
sought,” such an inquiry on our part or that of Immigration Judges “would
necessarily involve an in-depth examination into the merits of the petition.
Such examination would, in our view, constitute a substantial and unwarranted intrusion into the district director’s authority over the initial adjudication of visa petitions.” Id. at 479. Because this issue remains a concern
today, particularly with respect to Immigration Judges,10 we shall decline to
preadjudicate, issue an advisory opinion on, or second-guess the outcome
of visa petitions based on marriages entered into during proceedings that
are within the jurisdiction of the district director.


                                   VI. CONCLUSION

     We do not find that Matter of Arthur, supra, should be modified in light
of the motions restrictions. Our decision in Matter of Arthur stems from the
IMFA, federal legislation designed to end marriage fraud. Congress has also
clearly indicated its intent to end the practice of filing numerous dilatory
motions and to bring immigration cases to a close. Because Congress has
not amended the marriage fraud presumption and because we cannot ignore
its mandate to bring closure to cases through the use of motions restrictions,
we find that our decision in Matter of Arthur should not be modified.
Eligible aliens can continue to seek adjustment of status based on a marriage entered into during proceedings. However, they will be required to
comply with the requirements set out in Matter of Arthur. Aliens who marry
late in the removal process, or who have petitions filed for them at a late
stage, will obviously run the risk of having to complete the immigration
process from outside the country.



     10
       We note that jurisdiction to determine whether an alien is eligible for family-based
immigrant visas lies initially with the district director and is subject to our appellate review.
See 

(b)(5), 204.2 (1999). Immigration Judges do not have original jurisdiction
or direct review over such visa petitions.


                                             736
                                                                 Interim Decision #3394


     ORDER: The motion to reconsider is denied.
     FURTHER ORDER: The Board’s grant of a stay of deportation
pending adjudication of the motion is vacated.

DISSENTING OPINION: Gustavo D. Villageliu, Board Member, in which
Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman; David B. Holmes, Gerald S. Hurwitz, Lory D.
Rosenberg, John Guendelsberger, and Anthony C. Moscato, Board
Members, joined

     I respectfully dissent from the denial of the respondent’s motion to
reconsider our denial of his motion to reopen seeking adjustment of status.
The respondent is the husband and father of United States citizens and the
beneficiary of an approved immediate relative visa petition. We should not
as a matter of policy deprive him of his statutory right to apply for adjustment of status.
     The majority inappropriately links legislation designed to end marriage
fraud with general congressional intent to bring immigration cases to a
close in order to preclude aliens eligible to adjust their status from the
opportunity to do so. In so doing, the majority recognizes that certain aliens
“will obviously run the risk of having to complete the immigration process
from outside the country.” Matter of H-A-, 

, at 11 (BIA
1999). The majority reaffirms its 1992 policy of denying reopening to
adjustment of status applicants with pending immediate relative visa petitions despite the fact that the 90-day period now prescribed for seeking
reopening is often too short for the Immigration and Naturalization Service
to adjudicate the visa petition. It compounds this mistaken policy by refusing to reconsider it or reopen when the Service finally approved the respondent’s visa petition after we denied the original motion.
     This harsh policy does not accomplish the congressional goal of
bringing immigration cases properly to a close and does nothing to end
marriage fraud. Instead, as a matter of course, the immigration of qualified spouses of United States citizens will be unduly delayed; the consular
offices outside of the United States will be encumbered with applications
more easily adjudicated in the United States; and this delay will cause
needless hardship to the United States citizens whose bona fide marriages
and families may disintegrate because their spouses will be deported and,
as the majority dictates, be required to “complete the immigration process
from outside the country.”1 

 The majority’s policy is neither legally
correct nor justified, as discussed below.


      1
        The alternative of obtaining an immigrant visa through the consular process is impractical and inconsistent with congressional intent. Although the respondent could apply for an
immigrant visa at a consular post abroad, his or her deportation would render him excludable

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            I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

     The respondent is a native and citizen of Sudan who came to the United
States seeking asylum from his country, which has been designated for
Temporary Protected Status due to its dangerous civil war and brutal
regime. See 

 (1997); cf. 

 (1998)
(extension of Temporary Protected Status); 1 Committees on Foreign
Relations and International Relations, 106th Cong., lst Sess., Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1998 392 (Joint Comm. Print
1999). His appeal from a denial of asylum was dismissed on September 7,
o Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status (Form I-485) in accordance with C.F.R. § 245.2(a)(2)(i) (1996).
     On September 25, 1996, the respondent submitted a motion to reopen
seeking adjustment of status. The motion was accompanied by the July 27,
1994, certificate of marriage; the couple’s birth certificates; a copy of an
immediate relative visa petition on Form I-130 (Petition for Alien Relative),
filed on the respondent’s behalf by his United States citizen spouse; their
United States citizen child’s birth certificate; and documents similarly evidencing the bona fides of the marriage, such as joint income tax returns,
bank statements, a residential lease, a telephone bill, and a cable television
bill. Finally, the motion included the application for adjustment of status,
Biographic Information Sheets (Form G-325A), a fingerprint chart, and the
fee receipt, as required by 

(c)(1) (1997). The Service did not
oppose the motion. See 

(g)(3).
     However, the Service had not adjudicated the underlying immediate
relative visa petition prior to the September 30, 1996, deadline for filing
such a motion. Accordingly, on April 17, 1997, we denied the motion under
the policy set forth in Matter of Arthur, 

 (BIA 1992), modifying Matter of Garcia, 

 (BIA 1978), which requires prior
Service approval of marital visa petitions before reopening for adjustment
of status cases subject to the marriage fraud provisions of sections 204(g)
and 245(e) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(g) and
1255(e) (1994 & Supp. II 1996).
     On May 16, 1997, the respondent filed a timely motion to reconsider our
April 17, 1997, decision, also unopposed by the Service, arguing that we
should reconsider Matter of Arthur, supra, because it is inconsistent with the



from the United States. See section 212(a)(9) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 

(a)(9) (Supp. II 1996). Further, Congress has recently made clear its preference
for the adjustment of status process for aliens already in the United States whose visa petitions had been filed before January 14, 1998. See, e.g., sections 212(o), 245(i) of the Act, 

(o) and 1255(i) (1994 & Supp. II 1996). Finally, we have no diplomatic relations with the respondent’s native Sudan.

                                            738
                                                       Interim Decision #3394


new motions regulations, effective July 1, 1996, which permit only one
motion to reopen to be filed and imposes a 90-day time limit to do so. See 

(c)(2) (1999). On January 13, 1998, the Service approved the
respondent’s visa petition as an immediate relative of a United States citizen.


                      II. QUESTIONS PRESENTED

      The question before the Board is how to treat an unopposed motion to
reopen seeking adjustment of status with a simultaneously filed, but still
pending, immediate relative visa petition, based upon a marriage entered
into during deportation proceedings in view of the new regulations. A subsidiary question is what we should do when the Service approves the pending visa petition after we denied a motion under the Arthur rule.
       The majority will neither grant reopening nor reconsider its prior decision denying the motion to reopen in such circumstances. In so doing, it
reaffirms Matter of Arthur, supra, requiring prior approval of the underlying visa petition before granting a motion to reopen for adjustment of status despite the fact that there is now only a 90-day period of time when an
alien can submit a motion to reopen under 

(c)(2).
      I believe that by refusing to reconsider or grant the motion, the majority, in effect, turns the rebuttable presumption that the marriage of an alien
in proceedings is fraudulent into an irrebuttable presumption inconsistent
with the 1990 congressional directive to provide the spouse of a United
States citizen with an administrative process by which he can seek adjustment of status if he proves that this marriage is bona fide when the Service
does not adjudicate the visa petition within 90 days.


      III. POLICY ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ARTHUR RULE

     Retaining the rule prescribed in Matter of Arthur precludes the respondent’s statutory right to apply for permanent residence in the United States
through adjustment of status when the Service eventually approved his
immediate relative visa petition. See section 245 of the Act, 

(1994 & Supp. II 1996). In order to qualify for adjustment of status under
section 245 of the Act, an alien in deportation or removal proceedings must
apply for adjustment of status only in those proceedings. See 

(a)(1) (1999). If we persist in applying Matter of Arthur, we will
effectively foreclose adjustment of status in all cases where timely motions
to reopen for such relief are filed simultaneously with visa petitions in
accordance with 

(c)(2) and 245.2(a)(2)(i) (1999). The statutory exception to the restriction on adjustment of status where bona fide
marriages are entered into during proceedings will be negated by creating

                                     739
Interim Decision #3394


an absolute bar to the adjustment of status based upon such marriages. See
section 245(e)(3) of the Act. Contrary to the outcome accomplished by the
majority, no absolute bar to adjustment of status is contained in the statute.
See also 

(a)(iii)(B)-(E) (1999).
     The majority’s analysis confuses the district director’s ultimate determination in adjudicating visa petitions that a marriage is bona fide for purposes of adjustment of status with the preliminary determination by the
Board and the Immigration Judge that the marriage is prima facie bona fide
and that a hearing should be allowed to consider the merits of the application. There is no conflict between our concluding that a marriage appears
bona fide for purposes of granting a hearing and the district director’s ultimate determination of the visa petition.
     The majority’s assertion, that since Congress is presumed to be aware
of the Arthur rule its inaction means its approval, is a fallacy. In fact,
Congress had already acted by prescribing in 1990 that the presumption was
rebuttable, and the marriage fraud regulations, as explained below, specifically prescribe an administrative determination in the adjustment of status
process. What Congress could not anticipate is that the majority would
interpret its regulations to preclude the adjustment of status forum for eligible applicants. In any event, the recent congressional extension of the
availability of section 245(i) relief to beneficiaries of visa petitions filed
before January 14, 1998, suggests that Congress prefers that we adjudicate
the respondent’s prima facie approvable application.
     It is the Board and the Immigration Judges that bear the responsibility
to determine whether an alien in deportation proceedings may pursue an
application for adjustment of status based on a bona fide marriage. See section 245(e)(3) of the Act; 

(a)(1)(iii)(D), 245.1(c)(9)(vii)
(1999). We must determine the applicant’s prima facie eligibility for adjustment of status under a clear and convincing evidence standard in accordance with 

(c)(9)(iii)(F), as we consider the only motion to
reopen allowed by regulation. See 

(c)(2).
     We need only decide that there is a reasonable likelihood that the
statutory requirements for the relief sought will be satisfied. INS v. Abudu,

 (1988); INS v. Jong Ha Wong, 

 (1981) (per curiam); Matter of Coelho, 

 (BIA 1992). Regulations issued
subsequent to the Board’s decision in Matter of Arthur provide an adequate framework to consider the respondent’s assertion that his marriage
is a bona fide marriage. See 

(a)(1)(iii)(B) (listing evidence to be relied upon to meet the bona fide marriage exemption to the
marriage fraud provisions in sections 204(g) and 245(e) of the Act); see
also 

(a)(2)(i) (instructing that adjustment applications are
to be retained when filed simultaneously with immediate relative visa
petitions).


                                     740
                                                                 Interim Decision #3394



        IV. LEGAL ARGUMENT AGAINST THE ARTHUR RULE

      A review of the legal background relating to the Arthur rule shows that
it is no longer justified. A motion to reopen for adjustment of status requires
a prima facie showing of eligibility for such relief, including immediate
visa availability. See INS v. 

 INS v. 

 Matter of
Gutierrez, 

 (BIA 1996); Matter of Coelho, supra. As a
result of a 1976 amendment to section 245 of the Act, the regulations permit filing an adjustment application simultaneously with a visa petition,
where the approval of the petition would make an immigrant visa immediately available. See 

(a)(2) (1978); Matter of Garcia, supra,
at 654-55.
      Prior to the 1976 amendment to section 245, visa availability was only
required when the application for adjustment of status was approved.2
However, effective January 1, 1977, visa availability was required when the
adjustment application was filed. Consequently, 

(a)(2) was
amended to require immediate visa availability upon filing. See 

 (1976). As a result, the Board issued two precedent decisions
addressing these changes. Matter of Garcia, supra; and Matter of Kotte, 

 (BIA 1978).
      Matter of Garcia, supra, addressed adjustment applications simultaneously filed with the marital visa petition because there was immediate visa
availability. Matter of Kotte, supra, in contrast, addressed applications for
adjustment of status that could not be simultaneously filed because to file
for third-preference status required prior approval by the United States
Department of Labor of a labor certification. We ruled that 

(a)(2) did not require holding in abeyance pending deportation proceedings until the employment preference visa petition was adjudicated. 

; accord Matter of Ficalora, 

 (BIA 1966) (sixth preference); Matter of M-, 

 (BIA 1954) (ineligible nonimmi-



     2
       Prior to October 20, 1976, section 245(a) of the Act, 

(a) (1970) provided:

      The status of an alien, other than an alien crewman, who was inspected and
      admitted or paroled into the United States may be adjusted by the Attorney
      General, in his discretion and under such regulations as he may prescribe, to that
      of an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence if (1) the alien makes an
      application for such adjustment, (2) the alien is eligible to receive an immigrant
      visa and is admissible to the United States for permanent residence, and (3) an
      immigrant visa is immediately available at the time his application is approved.

See also Matter of Kotte, 

, 452 n.2 (BIA 1978).


                                            741
Interim Decision #3394


grant seaman overstay). Whether an alien qualified for third-preference status was solely within the exclusive jurisdiction of the district director, and
an appeal from a denial was solely before the Service’s Regional
Commissioner under 

(m)(2) and (n) (1978), and specifically outside our appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 

(b)(5)
(1978). Matter of Kotte, supra, at 452; cf. 

(b)(5) (Board appellate jurisdiction over most familial visa petitions). The remedy was to move
to reopen once the third-preference visa petition was approved. Matter of
Kotte, supra, at 452, and cases cited therein. The recently promulgated one-time and 90-day limits upon motions to reopen prescribed by 

(c)(2) no longer allow this remedy.
     Matter of Garcia, supra, addressed, instead, applications simultaneously filed with immediate relative visa petitions. See Matter of Guiragossian,

, 164 n.5 (BIA 1979); Matter of Yodying, 

(BIA 1979). If the visa petition is subsequently approved, the adjustment
application is deemed to have been properly filed with the accompanying
petition. Matter of Garcia, supra, at 654-55. Since the date an adjustment
application is filed determines whether a visa is immediately available, and
the regulation allows a qualified applicant to preserve immediate visa availability, we decided that absent clear ineligibility, a motion to reopen should
generally be granted for adjustment applications supported by simultaneously filed visa petitions with immediate visa availability. Id. at 657. A
pending prima facie approvable visa petition would be treated as though it
were already approved for purposes of reopening.
     The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, 

 Stat. 3537, prohibited approval of visa petitions and adjustment
applications based on marriages entered into while an alien was in proceedings. Thus, the rules prescribed in our decision in Matter of Garcia,
supra, for purposes of reopening by beneficiaries of pending marital visa
petitions, had no consequence after the 1986 Marriage Fraud Amendments
were enacted. However, when Congress again amended the statute in 1990
to allow approval of such visa petitions and adjustment applications if the
alien established by clear and convincing evidence that the marriage was
bona fide, we had to devise a new policy regarding motions to reopen with
visa petitions based on bona fide marriages entered into while in expulsion
proceedings. We did not have to then consider the effect of the one-time and
90-day limitations which became effective 6 years later.
     Under the amended statute, a marriage entered into while an alien was
in proceedings was deemed presumptively fraudulent, the presumption was
rebuttable by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that the marriage
was entered into in good faith, and Congress expressed a legislative intent
that aliens marrying after proceedings are initiated should be given an
opportunity to present for administrative review such clear and convincing
evidence that their marriage was bona fide. See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 101-

                                     742
                                                           Interim Decision #3394


955, at 128 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6793. Because
we perceived potential jurisdictional problems with the district director’s
primary role of adjudicating visa petitions, we held as a matter of policy
that we would “hereafter decline to grant motions to reopen” where the
alien married a United States citizen or lawful permanent resident while the
alien’s proceedings were pending until the Service approved the marital
visa petition filed on the alien’s behalf. Matter of Arthur, supra, at 479.
     The subsequently enacted regulations prescribing procedures for bona
fide marriage adjudications avoid such jurisdictional problems, and require
that we provide a forum for adjustment applicants with bona fide marriages.
The regulations at 

(c)(9)(iii)(F) and (iv) confer jurisdiction on the Immigration Court to at least consider prima facie evidence of a
bona fide marriage for purposes of reopening. The regulation at 

(c)(9)(iii)(F) specifically states that the prohibition against adjustment
of status on the basis of a marriage while in deportation proceedings does
not apply if the alien establishes that the marriage is bona fide by providing
clear and convincing evidence that the marriage was entered into in good
faith. The regulation at 

(a)(2) permits simultaneous filing
of the visa petition and adjustment application, and under 

(a)(1) the Immigration Court has sole jurisdiction over adjustment
applications after an alien is placed in deportation proceedings.
     Since the Immigration Court has sole authority to entertain a bona fide
marriage exemption request for adjustment relief under 

(c)(9)(iii)(F), it follows that the Immigration Court can also make a preliminary assessment of evidence presented in connection with the exemption
request for purposes of reopening. The regulation at 

(c)(9)(iv)
specifies that the request for the bona fide exemption must be “submitted with
the Form I-485, Application for Permanent Residence.” Consequently, it is
logical that the official who has sole authority to consider the application can
also consider the accompanying bona fide marriage exemption request for
purposes of reopening as part of the application.
     After making this preliminary assessment, we may reopen, pending adjudication of the visa petition by the district director. Once the Service approves the
visa petition, the Immigration Judge may rule on the application, consistent with
the district director’s authority to adjudicate visa petitions. Otherwise the Service
could preclude adjustment of status simply by holding the visa petition without
adjudicating it for more than 90 days since 

(c)(2) allows only one
motion. Assuming arguendo that the Service could as a matter of discretion delay
its adjudication such an intent should not be presumed when in fact the visa petition was approved and the Service did not oppose either motion in this case.

                               V. CONCLUSION

    Subsequent legislation and recent amendments to the federal regulations require that we revisit Matter of Arthur, supra, in order to preserve the
                                     743
Interim Decision #3394


one opportunity for administrative review prescribed for adjustment applicants meeting the bona fide marriage exception, at least in cases where the
Service does not oppose reopening. The fact that the 1996 regulations were
enacted as a result of the same 1990 statute3 requiring us to provide an
administrative review of the bona fides of marriages in adjustment applications requires that we interpret the regulations in pari materia to complement rather than counter each other by the Arthur rule, which in effect
deprives an alien of the sole forum prescribed by 

(c)(9)(iii)(F) and (iv), and 

(a)(1).
     To deny reopening because the Service has not completed its adjudication of the visa petition, as the majority insists must be done, and then deny
reconsideration of the denial after the Service approves the visa petition
defeats the purpose of the regulations that allow for a United States citizen
to file a simultaneous visa petition on behalf of a spouse. The record reflects
that the Service did not oppose the motion to reopen and has not opposed
the respondent’s motion to reconsider. Why conclusively presume otherwise? The majority also disregards the authority of this Board and of the
Immigration Judges to adjudicate whether a respondent is a party to a bona
fide marriage under the regulations. No legitimate governmental interest is
furthered by effectively precluding a forum to spouses of United States citizens who submit a visa petition within the strict limits prescribed by the
regulations. It is only that result that is accomplished by the majority’s disposition of this matter.
     Finally, although the majority has declined to reconsider its denial of
the motion, I note that in Matter of J-J-, 

 (BIA 1997), we
held that we would reopen or reconsider cases sua sponte in exceptional circumstances. On December 23, 1997, the Service issued instructions containing guidance as to when the Service may consent to reopening because
of exceptional and compelling circumstances a case that is otherwise barred
from such reopening by the 

(c)(2) and 3.23(b)(1) one-time
and 90-day limitations. See 

(c)(3)(iii). These guidelines
describe the following factors, all of which are present in the respondent’s


      3
        Congress had also amended the Act to address the problem of dilatory motions. See
Stone v. INS, 

 (1995). Section 545(d) of the Immigration Act of 1990, 

 Stat. 4978, 5066 (“IMMACT 90”), directed the Attorney General to issue
regulations limiting the number of motions to reopen seeking relief from deportation and the
maximum time period during which such a motion may be submitted. See also H.R. Conf.
Rep. No. 101-955, at 133 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6784, 6798. Congress also
enacted then section 242B(e)(2) of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b(e)(2) (1994), another provision
designed to limit dilatory court tactics. See Stone v. INS, supra. Subsequently, additional
restrictions on dilatory acts and eligibility for relief from deportation were prescribed by the
enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996,
Division C of 

 Stat. 3009-546.


                                             744
                                                                  Interim Decision #3394


case:
    (1) whether the alien has presented new evidence that is material and was not available and could not reasonably have been discovered or presented at the former hearing; (2) whether the alien is statutorily eligible for the relief sought; (3) whether the
  alien merits a favorable exercise of discretion; (4) the hardship to the alien and/or his
  USC or LPR family members if the alien were required to procure a visa through consular processing (including the potential applicability of section 212(a)(9) should the
  alien depart the United States; (5) the alien’s criminal history, if any; (6) the number
  and severity of the alien’s immigration violations; (7) whether the alien has cooperated with, or his continued presence in the United States is desired for, a criminal or civil
  investigation or prosecution conducted by a federal, state or local law enforcement
  agency; and whether the alien’s removal is consistent with INS objectives.

Memorandum from Office of the General Counsel to Regional and District
Counsels, Motions to Reopen Policy (Dec. 23, 1997), reprinted in 75
Interpreter Releases, No. 7, February 23, 1998, app. III, at 275-76.
     In this case, the visa petition was timely submitted but approved long
after we denied the respondent’s motion to reopen. The respondent appears
prima facie eligible for relief and worthy of discretion. His United States
citizen wife and child will undoubtedly suffer if he is forced to be deported, as section 212(a)(9) of the Act, 

(a)(9) (Supp. II 1996),
would render him inadmissible, and there appear to be no criminal or other
violations present in the record before us. Moreover, as noted above, his
country has been designated for Temporary Protected Status. Consequently,
reopening these proceedings in order to adjudicate the respondent’s application appears to be consistent with the Service’s objectives.
     On July 23, 1997, while promulgating regulations to implement section
245 of the Act, the Service recognized that the adjustment of status process
is the preferred method of obtaining immigrant status for eligible aliens
presently in the United States, and found that “Congress, having thus invited such applications, [could not have] intended to create the futile situation
in which most entrants without inspection would be admissible solely for
the purpose of filing an adjustment application, but would be precluded
from ever being able to adjust status based on the same application.” 

, 39,422 (1997). Similarly, properly filed motions to
reopen for adjustment of status in which a prima facie showing of a bona
fide marital relationship is established should be granted. The goals of promoting family unity and efficiently resolving cases through the adjustment
of status mechanism is better served by providing a forum to consider an
adjustment application submitted by a qualifying spouse who has demonstrated a prima facie showing of a bona fide marriage. See Matter of
Cavazos, 

 (BIA 1980); cf. Matter of Ibrahim, 

 (BIA 1981). See generally INS v. Errico, 

 (1966) (congressional purpose to forestall deportation where it breaks up family of United
States citizen); Matter of Da Lomba, 

 (BIA 1978).

                                             745
Interim Decision #3394


     Absent individual adverse factors we can not invoke discretion to
deprive a class of eligible applicants of the sole forum prescribed by the regulations and section 245(e)(3) of the Act for consideration of their bona fide
marriages. See 

(c)(9)(iii)(F), (iv); 245.2(a)(1), (2). It is
well settled that the Attorney General from whom we derive our authority
can not disregard the procedure prescribed by the regulations as they have
the force of law. United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 

(1954); Matter of Ponce de Leon, 

 (BIA 1996; A.G., BIA
1997). In determining whether to exercise our delegated power under 

(a)(2), we should apply the test prescribed in Mathews v.
Eldridge, 

 (1976), which takes into account three factors:
the interest at stake for the individual; the risk of erroneous deprivation of
that interest; and the Government’s administrative burden. See Padilla-Agustin v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1994); Hernandez v. Cremer, 

 (5th Cir. 1990); Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Nelson, 

(11th Cir. 1989), aff’d sub nom. McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc.,

 (1991). Here the fundamental nature of the marital relationship being threatened by our failure to provide a forum, and the reduced
administrative burden entailed in proceedings likely to result in the prompt
and fair resolution of the respondent’s status favor reopening.
     The fundamental role of marriage in our society requires access to our
courts without creating an effectively irrebuttable presumption for purposes of adjustment of status, that the marriage is mala fide. Granting this timely filed motion to reopen would be consistent with the due process right to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner in view of the
90-day and one-time limitations imposed by 

(c)(2) (1997).
See Mathews v. 

 Bell v. Burson, 

 (1971);
Armstrong v. Manzo, 

 (1965). Under these circumstances the
Service should consider joining in the respondent’s motions pursuant to its
December 23, 1997, guidelines.




                                     746