Wilson v. Tranbarger’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 federal appellate · 35 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 41 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “The instructions given by the judge to the jury should be directly applicable to the facts in evidence. There must be testimony tending to raise the question in order for an issue to be submitted to the jury.”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Langford v. Mingle & Elrod, Inc. · Ketron v. Gray

2. “Of course, the harmless error statute, T.C.A. sec. 27-117, clearly shows that such an instruction is not harmless, and when the question of reversible error depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case, as it does here, the Court must reverse. See Espitia v. State, 199 Tenn. 696 , 288 S.W.2d 731 . In other words where there is an error committed which is not harmless, it is the obligation of this Court to reverse the matter for proper consideration under proper instructions. This was in effect the reason for the reversal in McClard v. Reid, 190 Tenn. 337 , 229 S.W.2d 505 . In the McClard case the trial judge had instructed the jury that, if the defendant was guilty of negligence which proximately caused the accident, then they would not consider any remote contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. This Court held that this instruction was erroneous, required a reversal of the trial court’s judgment, and held that the harmless error statute (T.C.A. sec. 27-117) did not preclude a reversal in view of the erroneous nature of the court’s charge.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Holder v. Martin

3. ““ ‘The general rule obtains in criminal as well as civil cases, that a party cannot impeach his own witness, but this is subject to the exception that where a party is compelled to call an indispensable witness, or a witness that is hostile taking the party by surprise, such witness may be impeached by the party calling him. * * * In such case the hostility may be shown by the witness himself or otherwise, and he then may be examined as to his contradictory statements; but the impeachment of one’s own witness is limited to those cases where his testimony is in direct contradiction to his prior statements, and he cannot be impeached where he is merely reluctant to give testimony or unless the testimony is actually prejudicial.’ Wharton’s Criminal Evidence, Volume 1, Tenth Edition, Section 484A, page 1002; King v. State, 187 Tenn. 431 , 215 S.W.2d 813 (1948); Turner v. State, 188 Tenn. 312 , 219 S. W.2d 188 (1949).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Briggs v. State