¶1(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I concur with the majority in setting aside the *453conviction of the defendant on the second count of unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle. The plaintiff during oral argument conceded error on the part of the trial court when it, on the day of trial, allowed the second count of unlawfully driving away a motor vehicle to he added to the original charge.
¶2I do not agree, however, that the trial eourt erred when it allowed testimony, by the police detective, that when the defendant was informed of his right to remain silent — the defendant did not make a statement at that time. During the trial, the defendant made no objection to this testimony and hence no reversible error was committed, People v. Webb (1968), 13 Mich App 625.
¶3Defendant next alleges error by trial court when it allowed questions to be asked of the defendant, upon cross-examination, as to why he didn't tell the police detective about a friend who defendant claimed loaned him the automobile. Defendant objected to this testimony claiming he had a constitutional right to remain silent. The trial court ruled that the defendant had waived his right to remain silent by taking the stand to testify in his own behalf. That ruling was an expression of the settled law of this state. People v. McCrea (1942), 303 Mich 213. It may well be true, as the majority states, that since the decision in Malloy v. Hogan (1964), 378 US 1 (84 S Ct 1489; 12 L Ed 2d 653) People v. McCreahas been overruled. However, to date the Michigan Supreme Court has not addressed itself to this particular question and People v. McCreais still the law. Being an intermediate appellate court I feel duty-bound to follow the rule as stated in People v. McCrea.
¶4Lastly, defendant claims the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. The credibility and weight to be given testimony is for the jury to decide, *454People v. Morris (1968), 12 Mich App 411. There was sufficient evidence if believed by the jury to support the verdict of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, I would affirm the conviction of the defendant on the charge of knowingly having in his possession a stolen motor vehicle, CLS 1961, § 257.254 (Stat Ann 1968 Rev § 9.1954).