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← 22 N.J. 523 - Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp.

Friedman v. Tappan Development Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

1956

Citation profile

98
cited by 98 later decisions
4
states following
April 2019
most recently cited

6 federal appellate · 19 district · 62 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 98 later decisions — most recently April 2019 · most notably Weichert Co. Realtors v. Ryan (1992), Borough of West Caldwell v. Borough of Caldwell (1958)

6 federal appellate · 19 district · 62 state decisions

3101956196019701980199020002010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Wisconsin & Michigan Railway Co. v. Powers · Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown · Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Continental Can Co. · Rich v. Doneghey · Savarese v. Pyrene Manufacturing Co.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 98 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[i]t is not the real intent but the intent expressed or apparent in the writing that controls.”
    4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““In a word, a contract is a voluntary obligation proceeding from a common intention arising from an offer and acceptance. (Citation omitted) To be enforceable, a contract must be sufficiently definite in its terms that the performance to be rendered by each party can be ascertained with reasonable certainty.” (Citation omitted)”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “It is generally held that the principle of estoppel is applicable to in futuro promises, if subject to estoppel at all, only where they relate to an intended abandonment of an existing right, and are made to influence others who in fact are induced thereby to act or to forbear: e.g., where one who has induced his creditor to forbear to bring action upon his claim by a promise of payment or a promise not to plead the statute of limitations as a defense, even though such forbearance was not requested as consideration for the promise, and though the new promise (because not in writing or for some other reason) was not binding as such. In those cases, "no new right is created. The court does not sustain an action on the promise; it reaches the desired result by allowing a defense to an action or allowing an original right to be enforced by merely prohibiting the interposition of a defense." [ 22 N.J. at 537 , 126 A. 2d 646 (quoting from Williston on Contracts § 139 (rev. ed.))].”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.