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← 22 Ohio App. 3d 136 - Denoyer v. Lamb

22 Ohio App. 3d 136 - Denoyer v. Lamb’s Empirical Analysis

1984

Citation profile

60
cited by 60 later decisions
8
states following
March 2026
most recently cited

3 federal appellate · 52 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 60 later decisions — most recently March 2026 · most notably Ohio v. United States Department of the Interior (1989), Sunburst School District No. 2 v. Texaco, Inc. (2007)

3 federal appellate · 52 state decisions

23019841990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Relies on Stores Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland · 101 Cal. App. 3d 858 - Heninger v. Dunn · 21 Ohio App. 2d 41 - Thatcher v. Lane Construction Co. · Samson Construction Co. v. Brusowankin · Rector of St. Christopher's Episcopal Church v. C. S. McCrossan, Inc.

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “[I]n an action for compensatory damages for cutting, destroying and damaging trees and other growth, and for related damage to the land, when the owner intends to use the property for a residence or for recreation or for both, according to his personal tastes and wishes, the owner is not limited to the diminution in value (difference in value of the whole property before and after the damage) or to the stumpage or other commercial value of the timber. He may recover as damages the costs of reasonable restoration of his property to its preexisting condition or to a condition as close as reasonably feasible, without requiring grossly disproportionate expenditures and with allowance for the natural processes of regeneration within a reasonable period of time. [Citations omitted.]”
    7 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““(1) If one is entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total destruction of value, the damages include compensation for “(a) the difference between the value of the land before the harm and the value after the harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably incurred, “(b) the loss of use of the land, and “(c) discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupant. “(2) If a thing attached to the land but severable from it is damaged, he may at his election recover the loss in value to the thing instead of the damage to the land as a whole.””
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “The cardinal rule of the law of damages is that the injured party shall be fully compensated. [Citation omitted.] If an owner is to be fully compensated for temporary (reparable) damage to his property, then what he expects from the use of it is a vital factor. “* * * The owner of property has a right to hold it for his own use as well as to hold it for sale, and if he has elected the former he should be compensated for an injury wrongfully done him in that respect, although that injury might be unappreciable to one holding the same premises for purposes of sale.* * * ” Gilman v. Brown (1902), 115 Wisc. 1, 8, 91 N.W. 227, 229 . . . . Shade and ornamental trees used for a specific, identifiable purpose are compensable. Annotation (1979), 95 A.L.R. 3d 508 . Recovery, however, has not been limited to trees used for “specific uses.” It has been awarded when the owner’s personal use is neither specific nor measurable by commercial standards, and when the trees form a part of an ecological system of personal value to the owner. Heninger v. Dunn, [ 101 Cal. App. 3d 858 , 162 Cal. Rptr. 104 (1980)] (two hundred twenty-five trees and vegetative undergrowth destroyed in remote mountain land to make a new road that actually enhanced the value of the land as a whole); Roark v. Musgrave (1976), 41 Ill. App. 3d 1008 , 355 N.E. 2d 91 (rough and hilly land accessible only by horse or four-wheel-drive vehicle) . . . Morris v. Ciborowski (1973), 113 N.H. 563 , 311 A. 2d 296 (personal residenti”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.