¶1Defendant Dale Gilbert Lopez appeals seeking reversal of his conviction of second-degree burglary upon a trial to the court in Seventh District' Court. He contends that his conviction is not supported by lawful evidence in that (1) he was placed under arrest without probable cause; (2) the claimed consent he gave to the search of his motel room was unlawfully obtained; (3) testimony concerning “other ■crimes” was improperly admitted; and (4) he was deprived of his right of trial by jury.
¶2In this nonjury trial it was the prerogative of the trial court to judge the evidence and to find the facts. Therefore upon our review we proceed upon the assumption that the court believed those aspects of the evidence' and drew' such reasonable inferences therefrom as support his rulings and judgment.
¶3On the night of January 27, 1968, the defendant was enroute from Dragerton, Utah, to Price, Utah, when his car hit an icy spot on the highway, skidded off the road and “turned on its side.” The defendant, being unable himself to return the car to the highway, hitchhiked to Price where he reported the accident to- the Sheriff’s Office. While waiting to give a full report of the accident, Lopez left the Sheriff’s Office to buy-a pack of' cigarettes. As he was. returning, two deputies approached him and escorted him back' to the Sheriff’s Office, and asked him if he would take an “alcohol .test,” to which he willingly- sub-: mitted, and which did npt confirm intoxication. The evidence shows that at about that time, the defendant was -given what *260is now known as the ''Miranda
¶4The following events seem significant as bearing upon the issues here raised: After the defendant had reported his accident, the sheriffs confronted him with some items of property, identified as stolen property, which had been in the defendant’s car. It is not shown, nor was any issue raised at the trial, as to how they came into possession of it. But it is evident from the record that this property, even though stolen elsewhere, played a part in focusing the officer’s attention upon the defendant as a suspect in the burglary. When Deputy Semken confronted the defendant with this property and asked him how it came to be in his car, he stated that he had purchased it from a hitchhiker. Consequent thereto, the deputy asked questions and the defendant gave answers in substance thus: Where do you live? At the Tuxedo Motel in Wellington. Would it be all right to search your room? Yes, it would be all right. Where is the key? On the chain with other keys in the ignition of the automobile.
¶5Acting on this information Deputy Sem-ken went to the room and made a preliminary search. Next morning, in the company of another deputy and Mr. Charles Bezyack, the owner of the Betr-Buy Market, he went to the room and retrieved a number of articles matching the description of property which had been taken in the burglary including several rolls of quarters, nickles, dimes and pennies. On the way back to Price from the motel room, they found alongside the roadway the cash box which had been taken.
¶6Prior to this trip, the defendant, in response to questions by the deputy about the burglary, had said that he “didn’t know anything about it.” But a significant fact in this case is that after the search, when the defendant was confronted with the facts concerning the articles found in his room, he made no further denial, and said to Mr. Bezyack: “Charlie, I am sorry. … I would like to pay you for all the damages. I can pay you back as soon as I get my income tax check back.”
¶7We direct our attention to the charge of unlawful arrest: The authority of an officer to make an arrest without a warrant includes cases in which “a felony has in fact been committed, and he has *261reasonable cause for believing the person arrested to have committed it.”
¶8The sheriffs knew the facts herein-above delineated concerning the discovery of stolen property which had been in the defendant’s car, coupled with what could be regarded as a flimsy explanation of that fact. They also had information that just moments before the burglary had occurred at the Betr-Buy Market, a 1957 Ford, four-door sedan of the same description as the defendant’s car, had been seen coasting to, a stop by the store. We think that these facts justify the trial court’s view that the defendant was not arrested without the required probable cause.
¶9This brings us to the question raised as to the validity of the consent given to the search of defendant’s motel room. In this connection we observe that under the. circumstances here shown it would have been very little trouble, and it may have been a prudent precaution, to obtain a search warrant. Nevertheless, that was not done and we confront the question whether what was done so tainted the evidence and the conviction that it must be nullified. We agree with the soundness of these principles argued by the defense: that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination includes not only the privilege of remaining silent, but also the concomitant right to have an attorney and to consult with him both before and during an interrogation; and that where there is an in-custody questioning by police officers, the prosecution has the burden of showing that an accused knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege in that regard.
¶10 Defendant’s next charge of error is that receiving testimony concerning the stolen articles which came from his car. relates to another crime and was, thus, improper. Concededly, evidence of other crimes is not admissible if the purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person of evil character with a propensity to commit crime and thus likely to have 'committed the crime charged. However, if the evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose; and the' fact that it may. tend to connect the defendant with another crime will not render it incompetent.
¶11We find no merit in defendant’s contention as to a jury trial.
I think on the basis of the discussion between court and counsel in chambers that the court may discharge the jury.
¶12This meets requirement of Sec. 77-27-2, > U.C.A.1953, which provides that the waiver, of a jury must “be made in open court and entered in the minutes,” and the record in- ' dicates with sufficient clarity that the right was waived. In this respect this case is analogous to the case of Barlow et al. v. *263Young.
¶13Affirmed. No costs awarded.
¶14. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
¶15. Sec. 77-13-3(3), U.C.A.1953.
¶16. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).
¶17. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 79 S.Ct. 329, 3 L.Ed.2d 327 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
¶18. Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 24 L.Ed. 1035 (1878).
¶19. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 490, n. 14, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977 (1964).
¶20. i Wharton, Criminal Evidence, Sees. 233 et seg. (12th Ed. 1955); State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961).
¶21. As to safeguarding the right of trial by-jury see Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 194, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, 522 (1968); Cottrell v. Grand Union Tea Co., 5 Utah 2d 187, 299 P.2d 622 (1956).
¶22. 108 Utah 523, 161 P.2d 927 (1945).