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← 220 F.2d 200 - Welsh v. United States

Welsh v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

220 F.2d 200 · 1955

Citation profile

50
cited by 50 later decisions
3
states following
May 1991
most recently cited

25 federal appellate · 6 district · 4 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 50 later decisions — most recently May 1991 · most notably United States v. Francis (1981), United States v. Van Cauwenberghe (1991)

25 federal appellate · 6 district · 4 state decisions

17019551960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 2410

Relies on McDonald v. United States · United States v. Jeffers · Trupiano v. United States · Glass City Bank of Jeanette Pa v. United States · Dodge v. United States

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 50 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “But here the money has been declared illegally seized and has been suppressed as evidence. To sub ject it to a tax lien does not result in using the money as evidence in any proceeding, criminal or civil. The money is being held as security for an asserted tax debt — not arising out of the illegal seizure or, so far as appears, out of information gained from the seized money — pending determination of the debt and lien in an appropriate proceeding.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. “When a tax lien attaches to property, the United States becomes in a sense a co-owner with the taxpayer of the property to the extent of the lien. The taxpayer then ceases to have an unconditional right to obtain or retain possession of the property. ■ The substantive rights of the United States and of the taxpayer are in no sense dependent upon the nature of the immediate custody of the property or the identity of the custodian. If it appeared that money in the possession of a marshal had been stolen, no good reason appears why the law should require its return to the thief upon his discharge from custody. Nor do we see any reason why the United States Marshal may not recognize the United States as the owner of an interest in property in his custody.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.