Volume 220 — Illinois Reports

Appear from the Appellate Court for the Second District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. N. E. Worthington, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the case, brought in the circuit court of Peoria county by appellee to recover damages from appellant for injuries received while crossing appellant’s tracks at a street crossing in the city of Peoria.

<p>Writ op Error to the Circuit Court of McLean county; the Hon. Colostin D. Myers, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Third District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. G. W. Patton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Criminal law—when accused is not entitled to discharge for delay in trial. Section 18 of division 13 of the Criminal Code, securing to one accused of crime the right to a trial at some term commencing within four months from the time of commitment, excludes from the operation of such statute cases where the People have been properly granted a continuance, and if such continuance has been granted in accordance with the statute it is immaterial whether or not a legal jury was in attendance at that term.</p>

Writ oE Error to the Appellate Court for the First District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of McHenry county; the Hon. C. H. Donnelly, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ of Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding.

<p>1. Estoppel—effect of accepting devise under a will. One who accepts a devise under a will is estopped to set up. any right or claim of his own which would defeat any part of the will, including the recitals thereof as to the title of the testatrix; nor can he maintain a claim against her estate based upon the ground that as the result of a misdescription in one of the deeds in her chain of title he is entitled, as an heir of the grantor in the deed, to a share of the rents and profits collected by her in her lifetime.</p> <p>2. Instructions—when instruction does not leave question of construction of deed to fury. On appeal to the circuit court from an order of the county court disallowing a claim against an estate for rents and profits, an instruction which directs the jury to find against the said claim if they believe, from the evidence, that the grantor in a certain deed intended to convey the land in question by the deed does not leave the construction of the deed to the jury.</p>

<p>Original petition for mandamus.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District ;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Marion county; the Hon. W. M. Farmer, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Wiees—word “children” is primarily a word of purchase. The word “children” is primarily a word of purchase, and is not to be construed as equivalent to “heirs” in the absence of other words or circumstances showing it to have been used in that sensé.</p> <p>2. Same—courts favor a construction giving an estate of inheritance to ñrst taker. In construing a will the courts favor such a construction as gives an estate of inheritance to the first taker, and one which disposes of the entire estate of the testator if that meaning can reasonably be given to it.</p> <p>3. Same—will construed as passing a fee to testator’s children. A devise of all the rest, residue and remainder of the testator’s estate after the death of his wife, the life tenant, to be ^divided equally between his children, naming them, “and to their children forever,” passes a fee simple estate to the named children of the testator where there are no other words or circumstances showing a different intention.</p> <p>4. Same—intention to limit prior devise of fee simple must be clear. A devise of a fee simple estate will not be held to be qualified or limited by other portions of the will unless they show a clear intention to that effect on the part of the testator.</p>

Writ or Error to the Appellate Court for the Second District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Winnebago county; the Hon. Arthur H. Frost, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ oe Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. Orrin N. Carter, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. Frederick A. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Taxes—the act curing invalid levies of county taxes is valid. The act of 1905, (Laws of 1905, p. 359,) curing prior levies of county taxes where the county board had failed to specify the particular purposes for which the tax was levied, is valid. (People v. Wisconsin Central Railroad Co. 219 Ill. 94, followed.)</p> <p>2. Same—county board not required to make tax levy on any particular day of September session. A county board which meets on the first Monday of September may adjourn from time to time until all the business of such session is transacted, and may levy the county tax at any time during such session notwithstanding it extends beyond the month of September.</p>

<p>1. Jurisdiction—jurisdiction acquired by general appearance not lost by subsequent special appearance. Jurisdiction of the person of a defendant in a condemnation proceeding who made a motion for a separate trial without limiting his appearance, is not lost by the fact that he afterwards enters a special appearance and moves to dismiss the petition and files a plea to the jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. Same—when court has jurisdiction of condemnation petition. Failure of a condemnation petition to allege that the petitioner had located its line of railroad over the land of the defendant does not deprive the county court of jurisdiction of the subject matter, and it may permit the petition to be amended to state the omitted fact.</p> <p>3. Pleading—when plea to jurisdiction cannot be entertained. A plea to the jurisdiction based upon the same grounds as were urged in support of a motion to dismiss, which was overruled, can not be entertained.</p> <p>4. Eminent domain—reasons for separate trial should be presented in some proper form. In order to enable the trial court to understandingly exercise its discretion as to granting a separate jury trial in condemnation, the reasons for a separate trial should be presented in some proper form and preserved for consideration of a court of review, so that the court may see whether refusal to grant a separate trial has resulted in injury, otherwise it will be presumed the discretion of the trial court was properly exercised.</p> <p>5. Samé—separate parcels owned by different parties may be included in petition. To justify'including separate parcels of land in one condemnation petition it is not necessary that the parcels be owned by the same person.</p> <p>6. Same—what is not a reason why separate trial is a matter of right. Separate trial in condemnation is not a matter of right because of the alleged fact that the owner of a small tract of land, if he was the only person desiring to appeal, would be practically de- - barred of that right because of the expense of including in the record evidence as to the other tracts, since his bill of exceptions need not necessarily contain evidence relating exclusively to other tracts.</p> <p>7. Same—-when evidence of recent sales is not material. In condemnation of an unsubdivided tract of land, evidence as to what certain lots in a subdivided tract in the vicinity of the defendant’s land had sold for is not material.</p> <p>8. Same—rule as to considering adaptability of land for subdivision. The rule that if land commands a higher market value because of its supposed adaptability for subdivision that fact should be considered in estimating damages, does not mean that unsubdivided land must be valued at what it might be worth after subdivision.</p> <p>9. Same—when refusal to admit plan of subdivision is not error. If oral testimony as to the adaptability of unsubdivided land for subdivision has been admitted, it is not error to refuse to admit in evidence a plan of the witness showing a certain manner in which the land might be subdivided.</p> <p>10. Appeals and Errors—record should show at whose request instructions were given. Alleged errors in instructions given in a condemnation case will not be considered where neither the record nor the abstract shows at whose instance the instructions were given, leaving that matter wholly to conjecture.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Vermilion county; the Hon. S. Murray Clark, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding.

S. C. Stough, Judge, presiding. On May 2, 1903,- Samuel W, Calkins and Fannie M. Calkins, his wife, filed a bill in the circuit court of LaSalle county to remove a cloud from their title to the north forty acres of the east half of the south-east quarter of section 24, town 33, north, range 2, east of the third principal meridian, in said county.

<p>Mines—when coal miner does not assume risk of injury. A coal miner who follows the system of mining adopted by the mine manager, and who, when in doubt as to whether he is thus leaving a wall or rib of proper thickness, requests the mine manager to make an investigation and relies upon the latter’s assurance that he is pursuing the right course and obeys his instructions to continue work, does not assume the risk of injury due to the condition of the wall or rib unless the danger therefrom was so obvious that an ordinarily prudent man would not have continued to work.</p>

<p>1. Corporations—proof of corporation de jure is necessary to enable directors to escape personal liability. Proof of a corporation de facto does not relieve directors and officers from the personal liability imposed by section 18 of the Incorporation act, proof of a corporation de jure being essential to produce that effect.</p> <p>2. §amE—failure to observe directory provision of statute does not defeat corporate organisation. Failure to substantially comply with a mandatory provision of the statute relating to organization of corporations prevents the corporation from becoming one de jure, but failure to observe a provision which is merely directory does not have that effect.</p> <p>3. Same—failure to mail notice of first meeting of stockholders does not defeat corporate organisation. Failure to mail notices of the meeting of subscribers of capital stock to elect officers, as required by section 3 of the Corporations act, does not defeat corporate organization, where the stockholders all have actual notice of the meeting and join in waiving the mailing of notices, since such provision is directory, and not mandatory, notwithstanding the word “shall” is used therein. (Loverin v. McLaughlin, 161 Ill. 417, distinguished.)</p> <p>4. Same—effect of section 4 requiring copy of notice to be filed with Secretary of State. The requirement of section 4 of the Corporations act, that a copy of the notice of the meeting to elect officers, required by section 3 of the act, shall be filed with the Secretary of State with the report, does not show that the provision for the mailing of notices is mandatory, and such requirement is sufficiently complied with where the written waiver of such notice, signed by the subscribers of the capital stock, is so filed.</p>

<p>Writ op Error to the County Court of Morgan county; the Hon. Charles A. Barnes, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Judicial sales—when re-sale is properly ordered. A re-sale of premises for an advance of over $2000 is properly ordered where some of the complainants in the partition proceeding are minors, the bidders at the first sale failed to deposit the amount of their bid with the master until two days after the sale, during which time one of their number had acquired the interests of the others and furnished all the purchase money, and where the parties making the second bid, who were non-resident defendants to the partition suit and not represented by a resident attorney, were misled by not having notice of the date and terms of the first sale in time to protect their interests.</p> <p>2. Same—when offer to indemnify minors against loss comes too late. After a partition sale, in which minors are interested, has been set aside and a re-sale at an advance bid has been ordered, an offer to pay into court for the benefit of the minors the portion of the difference between the first and second bids which they would be entitled to receive comes too late, even if it could have been of any force had it been made before the re-sale was ordered.</p> <p>3. Practice—exceptions by telegram are sufficient to base the amended exceptions upon. A telegram to the clerk of the court, signed by counsel for the defendants to a partition suit, stating that the defendants objected to confirmation of the partition sale on the ground of inadequacy of price, and directing him to file the telegram, which was received and filed during vacation, is sufficient to authorize the court, upon convening, to grant leave to file amended exceptions.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Peoria county; the Hon. T. N. Green, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of St. Clair county; the Hon. R. D. W. Holder, Judge, presiding.</p>

G. W. Patton, Judge, presiding. Appellees, as beneficiaries, began an action of assumpsit in the circuit court of Logan county against the appellant to recover upon a policy of insurance issued by it to Dr. Edward Rembe. Dr. Rembe, in May, 1903, being a physician and surgeon practicing his profession in the city and vicinity of Lincoln, this State, was solicited by an agent of appellant to take an accident policy in his company, which he consented to do.

Writ oB Error to the Appellate Court for the Fourth District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Madison county; the Hon. Charles T. Moore, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.</p>

Writ or Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. E. P. Vail, Judge, presiding.

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of DeKalb county; the Hon. Charles A. Bishop, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appear from the Circuit Court of DeKalb county; the Hon. Charles A. Bishop, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding.</p>

John L. Healy, Judge, presiding. This was a bill for partition and accounting, filed in the circuit court of Cook county by appellant, Haas. A verified plea was filed by a part of the defendants, setting up the pendency of a prior suit. Upon the filing of that plea the defendants pleading moved to dismiss the bill.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Calhoun county; the Hon. Albert Akers, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Deeds—when consideration must be returned before a deed will be set aside. A deed by a feeble-minded person for fair consideration, which she has received, made long before there had been any judicial finding as to her mental condition, will not be set aside without a return of the consideration, where there was no fraud, bad faith or undue influence on the part of the grantee, who expended the amount of the consideration in furnishing the grantor with support and the necessaries of life.</p> <p>2. Mortgages—when mortgagee is not entitled to full protection as a bona fide purchaser. Upon a bill to cancel a deed and mortgage and for an accounting, if the mortgagee, at the time he loaned the money, knew that the land was in the possession of the complainant, who claimed adversely to the mortgagor, he is not entitled to protection as a bona fide purchaser except to the extent of taxes and other legal charges on the land which he paid, where the complainant received no part of the consideration for the mortgage.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Whiteside county; the Hon. Henry C. Ward, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appeals and errors—when certificate of importance is necessary. A certificate of importance is essential to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming a foreclosure decree in all respects except as to the matter of allowing a solicitor’s fee of $150, when the only question involved relates to the matter of the solicitor’s fee, the right to which rests wholly in the contract.

Albert O. Marshall, Judge, presiding. On October 5, 1903, the last will and testament of Mary A. Williams was admitted to probate by the county court of Iroquois county. On October 22, 1903, Michael G. O’Brien, one of the heirs-at-law, appealed from this order of the county court to the circuit court of Iroquois county.

<p>Writ or Error to the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. James A. Creighton, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Quo warranto—right to hold or exercise license granted by ordinance may be questioned by quo warranto. The license or privilege of a telephone company to occupy the streets of a city may be questioned by an information in the nature of quo warranto upon the ground that it has been granted improperly or without warrant of law, or that it is so held and exercised.</p> <p>2. Ordinances—ordinances extend over annexed territory immediately upon annexation. Upon the annexation of territory to a city, ordinances of the city then existing extend immediately over the annexed territory.</p> <p>3. Telephones—when telephone ordinance will apply in territory subsequently annexed to city. An ordinance granting telephone privileges to a corporation upon certain conditions and containing certain limitations, there being no provision restricting the operation of the ordinance to the then existing limits of the city, applies to all territory óf the city during the period of the grant, including territory subsequently annexed.</p> <p>4. Same—when limitation as to telephone rates is binding. An ordinance granting telephone privileges to a corporation upon the limitation that the company shall not increase its then established rates to subscribers within the city does not entitle the company to charge greater rates in subsequently annexed territory, even though it had established such rates, before annexation, in the municipal corporations annexed, under ordinances granting it the right to occupy the streets of such municipal corporations, without any limitation as to time or rates but not for any definite period extending beyond the time the municipal corporations, as the result of annexation, ceased to exist.</p> <p>5. Same—limitations of an ordinance apply to improved service. An ordinance granting telephone privileges to a corporation with the limitation that it shall not increase to its present or future subscribers the rates for telephone service then established, does not, as between the city and the company, authorize the company to charge greater rates for an improved service, since, if the improved service is not within contemplation of the limitation, it is not within contemplation of the grant and the company would be without authority to adopt it.</p>

Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding. On September 2, 1898, appellee filed her bill in the superior court of Cook county, against appellant, for the specific performance of a contract, by the terms of which the appellee agreed to convey to appellant a certain stock of goods in the city of Peoria in exchange for a house and lot in the city of Chicago.

Writ or Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. W. Clifford, Judge, presiding.

M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. On June 17, 1905, appellees, the village of Kenilworth and certain owners of property along a ditch extending through said village, filed their bill in the superior court of Cook county against appellant, the Kenilworth Sanitarium, to restrain it from emptying sewerage into said ditch. A decree was rendered granting the prayer of the bill, and the defendant below appeals.

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Julian W. Mack, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Criminal Court of Cook county; the Hon. R. S. Tuthill, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse Holdom, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Writ of Error to the Circuit Court of Lake county; the Hon. C. H. Donnelly, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Fellow-servants—the question of the relation of servants is ordinarily one of fact. In Illinois the question whether servants of the same master are fellow-servants is a question of fact, and it is only when the facts are conceded, or where there is no dispute whatever as to the facts and they show beyond question that the relation of fellow-servants exists, that, on a motion to take the case from the jury, such question becomes one of law.</p> <p>2. Same—what essential to create relation of fellow-servants. To constitute servants of the same master fellow-servants, under the rule in Illinois, they must be directly co-operating with each other in a particular business in the same line of employment, or their duties must be such as to bring them into habitual association with each other so that they may exercise a mutual influence upon each other promotive of proper caution.</p> <p>3. Same—when a “steel-blower” is not a fellow-servant of another employee. A “steel-blower,” charged with the duty of sounding a whistle to warn other employees before “blowing a heat,” so that they may get into a place of safety, is, in that respect, a vice-principal of the employer and is 'not a fellow-servant of the other employees, since the duty of exercising reasonable care to provide employees with a safe place in which to work is a continuing one, which the employer cannot delegate and thereafter avoid liability.</p>

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Lake county; the Hon. D. L. Jones, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. F. A. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

Jesse Holdom, Judge, presiding. On March 31, 1896, appellant, Archibald W. McCandless, and appellee, John N. Crouse, entered into a written contract of co-partnership for the practice of dentistry in Chicago.

Writ of Error to the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Theodore Brentano, Judge, presiding.

<p>Appeal from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on writ of error to the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Jesse Holdom, Judge, presiding.</p>

M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding. The bill filed in' this case in the superior court of Cook county by Sarah J. Giles and George T. Giles, as amended, sought to enforce the specific performance of an option contract against Myrtie S. Bennett bearing date October i, 1899, whereby Myrtie S. Bennett agreed to convey to Sarah J. Giles the premises known as No. 418 Warren avenue, in the city of Chicago, on or before October 1, 1900, for the consideration of $2850.

<p>1. Benefit societies—section 16 of the act of 1893, relating to transfers of insurance, construed. Section 16 of the Assessment Companies act of 1893, (Laws of 1893, p. 124,) prescribing the course to be pursued in transferring members from one company to another, contemplates the transfer of all members, certificate holders or policy holders actually in good standing, whether appearing in good standing on the books of the transferring company or not, except as to those giving notice of their preference to be transferred to another company.</p> <p>2. Same—approval of contract of transfer operates ipso facto to transfer all members. Upon approval of a contract of transfer by two-thirds of the members of the transferring company, all the members, certificate holders or policy holders in actual good standing in the transferring company become members, certificate holders or policy holders in the transferee company without any further act upon their part, unless they elect to give notice of their preference to be transferred to some other company.</p> <p>3. Same—when member of transferring company is not a party to contract of transfer. A certificate holder in an assessment company to whom no notice was sent of a meeting of members of the company to vote upon the question of approving a contract of transfer to another company, and who does not appear and take part in the meeting, is not a party to the contract in the sense that he is precluded from questioning its terms.</p> <p>4. Same—transferee company cannot rely upon boohs of transferring company as to members in good standing. The books of an assessment company are not the only evidence of the good standing of its members, and if another company, in making a contract of transfer, chooses to rely upon such books as showing what members in the transferring company are in good standing it does so at its peril, and will be held, under section 16 of the act of 1893, to have accepted all members in actual good standing, whether appearing so on the books or not.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. J. W. Mack, Judge, presiding..</p>

L. Honore, Judge, presiding. On May 9, 1904, appellants, the Northern Trust Company, Calvin B. Beach, as trustee under the last will and testament of E. Kellogg Beach, deceased, and the First National Bank of Marengo, Illinois, filed their petition in the circuit court of Cook county against the appellees, the village of Wilmette and its officers, for a writ of mandamus to compel the municipality, out of its general funds, to re-construct a certain public improvement…

M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. This is an action on the case brought by James A. Chapman against the Pennsylvania Company, operating the Pitts-burg, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis railway, to recover for personal injuries sustained.

<p>1. Arbitration and award—when failure to consider books of account does not justify setting aside an award. In determining a fire loss the books of account are not the only evidence of the value of the stock on hand, and if the books are not produced, or if those produced are not believed by the appraisers to be truthful owing to apparent discrepancies, the appraisers may resort to other evidence.</p> <p>2. Same—what irregularity does not justify setting aside award. That the appraisers and the umpire acted together in making the appraisement and award, instead of the appraisers acting alone and calling in the umpire in case of dispute, does not require setting aside an award for a fire loss, where the owners of the goods were fully apprised of the course adopted and were present all the time except when the award was agreed upon, and where the appraisers and umpire acted fairly and impartially throughout.</p> <p>3. Same—seeking benefits of award amounts to a ratification of it. Filing proofs of loss in accordance with the terms of the appraisers’ award and seeking the benefit thereof with full knowledge of the facts, and after having refused, at first, to accept the award, is a ratification by the insured of the award.</p>

Jesse Holdom, Judge, presiding. The. relator, the South Chicago City Railway Company, filed its petition in the superior court of Cook county for a writ of mandamus against the appellant, as commissioner of public works of the city of Chicago, to compel him to issue to it a permit to build a double track street railway on Torrence avenue from One Hundred and Sixth street to One Hundred and Tenth street.

<p>This case is controlled by the decision in Bolles v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Ass. (ante, p. 400.)</p>

Appeals from the Appellate and Branch Appellate Courts for the First District;—heard in those courts on appeals from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. Kavanagh, Judge, presiding.

<p>Information to disbar.</p>

Dorrance Dibell, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the case, brought in the circuit court of Will county by Bella B. Hoadley, as administratrix of the estate of George E. Hoadley, deceased, against the Elgin, Joliet and Eastern Railway Company, appellant, to recover for the death of said George E. Hoadley, which was caused by one of appellant’s switch engines at the crossing of appellant’s railroad tracks and Maple street, just outside the corporate limits of the city…

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. Oscar E. Heard, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appear from the Branch Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. F. Tuley, Judge, presiding. This was an action on the case, brought in the circuit court of Cook county by Annie McCafferty, the appellee, against the West Chicago Street Railroad Company, appellant, to recover for personal injuries sustained by her while attempting to alight from one of appellant’s street cars in the city of Chicago.

O. P. Thompson, Judge, presiding. On May 15, 1896, Julia I. Whipple died seized in fee simple of 300 acres of land in Jersey county. She left a will, by the second clause of which she gave to her husband, Mathew C. Whipple, “the rents, use and possession, for and during his natural life,” of said real estate.

Thomas G. Windes, Judge, presiding. This is a petition for mandamus, filed in the circuit court of Cook county by James Kenneally, the appellant, who claims to have been wrongfully omitted and excluded as a policeman from the pay-roll of the police department of the city of Chicago since March 14, 1898, against the appellees, the city of Chicago, the mayor of said city, the superintendent of police, and the civil service commissioners of said city, commanding the city of…

<p>1. Words—definition of the word "survive." Ordinarily the word “survive” means to live longer than some other individual, but it may mean to continue to live beyond a specified period, event or condition.</p> <p>2. Wilds—when testamentary trust becomes passive and ceases. Under the rule that all provisions of a will must be considered and compared with each other to find the testator’s intention, a trust conditioned in one clause to continue in a married daughter’s favor so long as she “remains a married woman” and in other clauses to terminate if she “survives her present husband,” will, in case of divorce between the parties, at once terminate and become a passive trust such as the Statute of Uses would execute, where, from the whole will, it appears the sole object of the trust was to protect the property from the husband.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. F. A. Smith, Judge, presiding.</p>

Appear from the Appellate Court for the First District;— heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. Willard M. McEwen, Judge, presiding. This is an action on the case, brought in the superior court of Cook county by Frank Zakzewski, the appellee, against the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company, appellant, to recover damages for a personal injury sustained by appellee while working for appellant in its lumber yard, in the city of Chicago.

Elbridge Hanecy, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Appellate Court affirming a judgment in favor of appellee for damages for personal injuries he is alleged to have sustained by reason of the negligence of appellant. The evidence discloses that appellee was a passenger upon an electric car belonging to appellant, going in a west-' erly direction on Thirty-first street, in the city of Chicago.

<p>Cloud on Title—when bill to remove cloud cannot be maintained. The holder of a certificate of purchase at a foreclosure sale cannot maintain a bill for the sole purpose of setting aside a tax deed as a cloud on title to the premises which are not in his possession nor vacant and unoccupied. (Miller v. Cook, 135 Ill. 190, distinguished.)</p>

Solon Philbrick, Judge, presiding. This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court of Macon county sustaining a demurrer interposed by appellees to appellant’s bill, denying appellant’s motion for leave to file a supplemental bill and dismissing the bill for want of equity.

W. H. Hinebaugh, Judge, presiding. This was an application by the county collector of LaSalle county, made to the county court of that county, for judgment and order of sale against certain property belonging to the appellees, claimed to be delinquent on account of unpaid taxes for the year 1904, extended against said property by virtue of an appropriation ordinance and tax levy ordinance passed by the village of Sheridan.

<p>Appeal from the County Court of Cook county; the Hon. W. H. Hinebaugh, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Inheritance tax—when an estate is immediately taxable. Where a will creates a trust estate for a period of ten years, after which time the estate is to be divided, one-third to the wife to be hers absolutely, and the remaining two-thirds to the children of the testator in equal parts, to them and their heirs forever, the remainders are taxable immediately upon the death of the testator, and appraisement should not be postponed until after the expiration of the trust estate. ,</p> <p>2. Same—when value of life estate should not be deducted. In fixing an inheritance tax under the Illinois statute the value of the life estate is to be deducted from the remainder, and the tax computed on the balance, only when the remainder goes to collateral heirs, to a stranger to the blood or to a body corporate or politic.</p>

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of DeKalb county; the Hon. Henry B. Willis, Judge, presiding.</p>

<p>1. Appeals and errors—when party in possession of a mining claim has a freehold estate. If the party in possession of a mining claim has complied with the laws of the United States with reference to the acquisition of the claim he has a freehold estate, notwithstanding the naked legal title remains in the United States because of his failure to take out the patent to which he is entitled.</p> <p>2. Same—freehold involved may be located in a foreign State. While a court of equity in Illinois cannot bind the land itself in decreeing specific performance of a contract respecting a freehold located in a foreign State, yet if it has jurisdiction of all the parties by personal service it may enforce its decree in personam, and a freehold will be regarded as involved on appeal from the decree.</p> <p>3. Arbitration and award—when signature to articles of arbitration is binding on corporation. Articles of submission to arbitration, executed by the president of the corporation in its name and with the seal of the corporation, are binding upon the corporation, where the latter appeared by attorney before the arbitrators and participated in the hearing.</p> <p>4. Same—rule where award is in conformity with general submission. Where an award is in conformity with the general submission and no fraud or mistake appears on the face of the award, it will not be interfered with or set aside by a court of equity for errors, either of law or fact, committed by arbitrators.</p> <p>5. Same—when submission to arbitration is not special. The fact that articles of submission expressly provide that the decision of the arbitrators shall be based upon competent evidence only, and shall be according to established principles of law and equity, does not render the submission special, so as to justify a court of equity in setting aside the award for errors of law, where there is no provision for a review of the case by the courts or that the legal questions should be referred to some tribunal other than the arbitrators for decision. (Hand, J., and Cartwright, C. J., dissenting.)</p> <p>6. Same—impeaching facts must appear on face of an azvard to justify court’s interference. Where it appears from an award that the arbitrators base their decision upon certain rules of law or upon a finding of certain facts, and it is clearly apparent that they misapprehended the law or the facts, a court of equity, if the facts appear upon the face of the award itself, may set the award aside or reform it on the ground of mistake.</p> <p>7. Same—separate statement of an arbitrator cannot be considered to impeach award. The opinion of the arbitrators which binds the parties is that expressed in the award, and a separate statement or opinion of one of the arbitrators cannot be considered by the courts in determining whether the arbitrators mistook or misunderstood the law.</p>