State v. Mims’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 105 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 106 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"We interpret the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Doyle to settle the question so as to make it constitutionally impermissible for a state prosecutor to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory story told for the first time at the trial by cross-examining him as to his post-arrest silence after receiving the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.Ed. 2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 [1966].””

   4 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Taylor · State v. Falke

2. ““. . . [T]he use for impeachment purposes of petitioners’ silence, at the time of arrest and after receiving Miranda warnings, violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. . . .” (p. 619.)”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Taylor · 6 Kan. App. 2d 925 - State v. Thomas

3. ““Prior to Doyle there was a conflict of decisions of the United States Courts of Appeals on the question whether a prosecutor may properly cross-examine the defendant on the fact that he remained silent and did not tell the police an exculpatory explanation at the time he was arrested as he did at the time he testified at the trial. We had the question before this court in State v. Bly, 215 Kan. 168 , 523 P.2d 397 [(1974)]. In Bly we held that when a defendant testifies he may be impeached like any other witness and that the use of pretrial silence for impeachment depends on whether, in the circumstances presented, there is such inconsistency between silence and testimony as to reasonably permit tire use of silence to impeach the defendant’s credibility. In Bly the court relied primarily upon State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795 , 443 P.2d 279 [(1968)], cert. den. 394 U.S. 908 , 22 L.Ed.2d 219 , 89 S.Ct. 1019 [(1969)]. “We interpret the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Doyle to settle the question so as to make it constitutionally impermissible for a state prosecutor to impeach a defendant’s exculpatory story told for the first time at the trial by cross-examining him as to his post-arrest silence after receiving the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 [(1966)], 10 A.L.R.3d 974 . We specifically overrule syllabus eight and corresponding portions of the opinion in State v. Bly, supra, insofar as they are in conflict wi”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Nott