Chasanow v. Willcox’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

29 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 29 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “"If, when he [the purchaser] defaulted, the seller had notified the purchaser of his intent to forfeit the deposit and had thereafter done so as the broker had requested the seller to do, there is no doubt that the seller could have kept the deposit as liquidated damages under the terms of the contract, and the purchaser’s right k> a refund of the deposit would have terminated. See Spellman v. Dundalk Co., 1933, 164 Md. 465 , 165 A. 192 ; Annotation, 31 A.L.R.2d 8 , 37 (1953); 91 C.J.S. Vendor and Purchaser § 139b(l). See also Asher v. Hull, 1952, 207 Okl. 478 , 250 P.2d 866 . But when the seller — or his broker for him — retains the deposit without forfeiting it and thereafter resells the property to another purchaser at the same price it had been sold to the original purchaser, the mere retention of the deposit does not amount to an election to forfeit it. See Sheffield v. Paul T. Stone, Inc., 1938, 68 App. D.C. 378 , 98 F.2d 250 . Cf. Barnette v. Sayers, 1923, 53 App. D.C. 169 , 289 F. 567 .” (Emphasis added.)”

   3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 47 Md. App. 602 - Sampson v. McAdoo · Casey v. Jones

2. ““[T]he statute is applicable only ‘in the absence of a special agreement to the contrary,’ and, in this case, there were two special agreements, one of which was a substitute for the other. There was an agreement that the seller would pay the broker a commission to be deducted from the proceeds of sale. However, in the event the purchaser should default it was understood that the seller would allow the broker one-half of the deposit as compensation for his services to the seller. Since these are substitutional provisions, affecting the time of payment, source and amount of the compensation to which the broker would be entitled, the statute has no bearing on a decision of this case, [citations omitted]” (Emphasis- in original.) 220 Md. at 176 , 151 A. 2d at 750-51 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Cohen v. Duclos · Prince Georges Properties, Inc. v. Rogers

3. ““In the absence of special agreement to the contrary, if a real estate broker employed to sell, buy, lease, or otherwise negotiate an estate, or a mortgage or loan secured by the property, procures in good faith a purchaser, vendor, lessor, lessee, mortgagor, mortgagee, borrower, or lender, as the case may be, and the person procured is accepted by the employer and enters into a valid, binding, and enforceable written contract, in terms acceptable to the employer, of a sale, purchase, lease, mortgage, loan, or other contract, as the case may be, and the contract is accepted by the employer and signed by him, the broker is deemed to have earned the customary or agreed commission. He has earned the commission regardless of whether or not the contract entered into is performed, unless the performance of the contract is prevented, hindered, or delayed by any act of the broker.” (Emphasis supplied.) 2”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Berman v. Hall