220 Md. App. 174 - Wagner v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 8 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “In approaching ownership of a bank account prior to the death of one of the parties, the current state of the law requires us to look at the intent of the [co-owner] and determine if he intended to make an irrevocable gift of ownership of the account.... [T]itling an account as “joint owners” presumptively creates an ownership interest in both parties, but that presumption can be rebutted by evidence of a contrary intent of the original owner of the account.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Andrews · Wagner v. State

2. “The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the [General Assembly]. As this Court has explained, [t]o determine that purpose or policy, we look first to the language of the statute, giving it its natural and ordinary meaning. We do so on the tacit theory that the [General Assembly] is presumed to have meant what it said and said what it meant. When the statutory language is clear, we need not look beyond the statutory language to determine the [General Assembly]’s intent. If the words of the statute, construed according to their common and everyday meaning, are clear and unambiguous and express a plain meaning, we will give effect to the statute as it is written. In addition, [w]e neither add nor delete words to a clear and unambiguous statute to give it a meaning not reflected by the words [that] the [General Assembly] used or engage in forced or subtle interpretation in an attempt to extend or limit the statute’s meaning. If there is no ambiguity in th[e] language, either inherently or by reference to other relevant laws or circumstances, the inquiry as to legislative intent ends[.] If the language of the statute is ambiguous, however, then courts consider not only the literal or usual meaning of the words, but their meaning and effect in light of the setting, the objectives[,] and [the] purpose of [the] enactment [under consideration]. We have said that there is an ambiguity within [a] statute when there exist[ ] two or more rea”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Wagner v. State

3. “We cannot uphold the Tax Court's decision 'on grounds other than the findings and reasons set forth by [the Tax Court]' "). II. Given no tax was authorized under the statute, no penalty could be properly charged against the Estate. Following our finding that the Comptroller did not have the authority to tax the value of the QTIP, we need not address appellant's second question presented, as we find no late-payment or interest penalties could be properly charged against the Estate. We therefore vacate the late-payment and interest penalties. JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR WASHINGTON COUNTY AFFIRMED; COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT. 1 Appellant presented the following questions for our review: 1. Is the value of Margaret Beale Taylor's interest in the trust transferred to her under her predeceased husband's will - known in tax parlance as "QTIP”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 238 Md. App. 139 - Comptroller of the Treasury v. Taylor