¶1dissenting.
¶2The preferred procedure in taking a plea of guilty is a dialogue between court and defendant in which the rights waived by a plea of guilty are detailed and the court satisfies itself that the rights are understood and voluntarily waived by the defendant. State v. Tweedy, 209 Neb. 649, 309 N.W.2d 94 (1981).
¶3Admittedly, we have permitted exceptions to the dialogue, such as the use of a presentence report to establish a factual basis, State v. Daniels, 190 Neb. 602, 211 N.W.2d 127 (1973), *342and a remand to the trial court for a hearing to ascertain whether independent knowledge of the range of penalties existed in the defendant where the trial judge neglected to inform the defendant in taking a plea, State v. Curnyn, 202 Neb. 135, 274 N.W.2d 157 (1979).
¶4In this case no explanation of the rights waived by a plea of guilty was addressed to the defendant. Instead, the majority adopts what I suspect will be known as the Stickleman rule: “If the defendant was in the courtroom while Stickleman’s rights were articulated and he heard them, close enough! ”
¶5I fail to see how a trial judge can be said to have satisfied himself of a knowing and intelligent waiver in these circumstances.
¶6I respectfully dissent.