State v. Dixon’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

2 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “a person is guilty of theft if he purposely obtains services which he knows are available only for compensation, by deception or threat, or by false token, slug or other means, including but not limited to mechanical or electronic devices or through fraudulent statements, to avoid payment for the service. (Emphasis added).”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Dixon · 222 N.J. Super. 517 - State v. Kocen

2. “with respect to the category described, as “Theft of Services,” the Commission proposed only what eventually were passed as [subsections] a. and b. of N.J.S.A. 2C:20~8. I Final Report of the New Jersey Criminal Law Revision Commission: Report and Penal Code (1971). Before passage, however, the Legislature specifically appended to this statute as [subsections] c. and d., what had previously been treated in N.J.S.A. 2A:170-63 and 64 as disorderly persons offenses. State v. Insabella, 190 N.J.Super. 544, 548 (App.Div.1983). Those statutes were independent of one another under Title 2A and each included the statutory presumption here in issue as a result of a legislative amendment in 1938. State v. Curtis, 148 N.J.Super. 235, 240-41 (App.Div.1977), certif. den., 75 N.J. 22 . [Id. at 555-56.]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Dixon

3. ““[p]ortions of a statute should not be viewed in isolation, but rather in relation to the whole and each part should be so interpreted as to harmonize with the others.” 1 Wharton’s Criminal Law, § 12, p. 61 (14th ed. 1987). Thus, “[w]here a choice must be made between two imperfect interpretations, the view should be selected which more likely accords with the probable legislative intent.” County of Monmouth v. Wissell, 68 N.J. 35, 43 (1975). Indeed, a court may even delete or disregard statutory language when justifiable to fulfill the ascertained legislative intent. Id. at 44 . [ 220 N.J.Super. at 558 .]”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Dixon