220 So. 2d 833 - Matula v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

20 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “As Justice Griffith said in Westbrook v. State, 202 Miss. 426, 432-433 , 32 So.2d 251, 252 (1947): "It is fundamental that convictions of crime cannot be sustained on proof which amounts to no more than a possibility or even when it amounts to a probability, but it must rise to that height which will exclude every reasonable doubt; that when in any essential respect the state relies on circumstantial evidence, it must be such as to exclude every other reasonable hypothesis than that the contention of the state is true, and that throughout the burden of proof is on the state. It is our duty here to maintain these principles." See also Boyd v. State, 204 So.2d 165 (Miss. 1967); Moore v. State, 188 Miss. 546 , 195 So. 695 (1940); Hogan v. State, 127 Miss. 407 , 90 So. 99 (1921) and Algheri v. State, 25 Miss. 584 , 1 Mor.St.Cas. 658 (1853). ( 220 So.2d at 836 )”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 410 So. 2d 380 - Knowles v. State · 463 So. 2d 1087 - Hester v. State

2. “Facts not directly proved but which jurors legitimately may infer from other facts which have been proved, are limited to such as naturally follow as being logically connected or related, and which reasonably derive from such established facts.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 463 So. 2d 1087 - Hester v. State · 573 So. 2d 719 - Lewis v. State

3. “An indispensable element of the crime charged against Matula is that he acted with guilty knowledge. Crosby v. State, 179 Miss. 149 , 175 So. 180 (1937). In 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 31(3) (1961) it is stated: Ordinarily one is not guilty of a crime unless he is aware of the existence of all those facts which make his conduct criminal. Without guilty knowledge criminal intent cannot exist. Also, in 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 96 (1961) it is stated: To render one liable as an accessary after the fact he must have had actual knowledge, at the time he relieved or assisted the principal, that the latter had committed a felony, or was an accessary before the fact to a felony; and such knowledge must be personal as distinguished from constructive. Thus, it has been held that if accused had actual knowledge of facts which would give him good reason to believe the person assisted to be guilty of the felony, this will be sufficient. ( 220 So.2d at 834 ).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 290 So. 2d 924 - Harris v. State