Meyer Ex Rel. Coplin v. Fluor Corp.’s Empirical Analysis
2007
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 13 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 21 later decisions — most recently October 2025
2 federal appellate · 2 district · 13 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin · Castano v. American Tobacco Co. · 6 Cal. 4th 965 - Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. · Ayers v. Township of Jackson · In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation MDL No. 381
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“As with any claim based in tort law, the injury underlying a medical monitoring claim is the invasion of a legally protected interest. Just as an individual has a legally protected interest in avoiding physical injury, so too does an individual have an interest in avoiding expensive medical evaluations caused by the tor-tious conduct of others. When a defendant invades this interest, the injury to which is neither speculative nor resistant to proof, it is elementary that the defendant should make the plaintiff whole by paying for the examinations. Even though a plaintiff may not have yet developed a diagnosable physical injury, it is not accurate to conclude that no compensable injury has been sustained. Thus, the theory of recovery for medical monitoring damages is that the plaintiff is entitled, upon proper proof, to obtain compensation for an injury to the legally protected interest in avoiding the cost of reasonably necessary medical monitoring occasioned by the defendant’s actions. The injury for which compensation is sought is not a present physical injury. Instead, medical monitoring damages compensate the plaintiff for the quantifiable costs of periodic medical examinations reasonably necessary for the early detection and treatment of latent injuries caused by the plaintiffs exposure to toxic substances. A physical injury requirement is inconsistent with the reality of latent injury and with the fact that the purpose of medical monitoring is to facilitate the early di”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“Class membership is restricted by definition to persons who have received specified, medically significant minimum levels of exposure to the toxins discharged from the Doe Run smelter. It is the common fact of exposure to a set of toxins from a single source that is the common and overriding issue in Plaintiffs case. The significance and extent of toxic exposure is primarily an issue of common proof. Under this theory of liability, the individual factors identified by the circuit court are not particularly relevant because the need for monitoring is based on a common threshold of exposure. Whether Plaintiff is able to prove this theory is, at this stage, irrelevant because the sole issue is whether Plaintiff met the requirements for a cause of action, not whether Plaintiff will ultimately prevail. [[Image here]] The circuit court misapplied the law by applying personal injury concepts to Plaintiffs medical monitoring claim and in holding that these individual personal injury issues were predominate over common issues.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.